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"With this ring I wed you.
This gold and silver I give you, tokens of all my worldly
goods."
The Nuptial Mass
"The private, regarded in legal ideology as unsuitable for
legal regulation, is ordered according to an ideology of
love."
K.O'Donovan, Sexual Divisions in Law
"What a silly thing love is! ... it is always ... making
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The aim of this thesis is a study of relations between
marriage, property and law. It looks at the legal
relationship of marriage, the form and nature of
matrimonial property and the rules of Scots law as they
apply to the property of husband and wife.
The study falls into three parts. In Part I there are three
histories. Historical changes in Scots law, in marriage and
in property are traced through the accounts of legal and
philosophical writers and through the historical account of
marriage presented by L.Stone in The Family, Sex and
Marriage in England 1500-1800. Part I presents isolated
historical accounts of change in each of the three elements
of law, marriage and property.
In Part II, the patterns of change that emerge from these
histories are questioned. It is argued that presentations
of change in isolation may create an image or perception of
change which can give rise to unfulfilled expectations. The
term "image" is intended to convey the possibility of
illusion, a false or misleading picture. The dominant image
of change has three characteristics: the disappearance of
property from marriage and its replacement with affect, an
increasing emphasis on privacy and a split from the public
and an increasing emphasis on individualism rather than
community. These trends can be discovered in the historical
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accounts of each of the elements of marriage, property and
law.
In Part III these emerging images of change are used to
analyse specific points of interaction between marriage,
property and law.
The aim of this study is to consider how an image has
arisen of marriage and its relations with property and law,
to assess what contribution this image has made to the
confusion which seems to surround the relations between
marriage, property and law and to explore how this
confusion is reflected in Scots law.
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CHAPTER 1: MARRIAGE, PROPERTY AND LAW; AW INTRODUCTION
"With this ring I thee wed...with all my wordly goods I
thee endow."
It is this conjunction of marriage and property that
inspired my interest to write the following thesis. Dual
themes of love and money, fundamental legal relationships
of marriage and ownership, are apparently entwined.
Dominant views of marriage and property suggest conflict
and division between these two elements-'- and so, as a
student of law, I wanted to discover how they were
contained within terms of legal regulation. How does law
accommodate the co-existence of marriage and property?
There are therefore three strands to my study - the
relationship of marriage, the property of husband and wife
and their regulation by law.
The subjects of my study are marriage, property
(matrimonial) and their legal regulation. What is proposed
is not a full scale analysis of each of these elements but
a look at some of their points of interaction. I do not
intend to produce a comprehensive theory of their
relations but to investigate aspects of them.
As a starting point, it seemed to me that once upon a time
there was a very clear relationship between marriage,
property and law. Legal and social histories explain that
for landowning families of the past, marriage had a lot to
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do with property and the law regulated it accordingly.
Property was a recognised element of marriage and
regulation of it was incorporated in the law of husband
and wife. Among those families that owned property, only
the foolish or the unfortunate would enter into marriage
without a carefully negotiated marriage settlement to take
care of their property. In more recent times, it seems
that romance may have clouded the ties between marriage
and property, leaving it to the divorce lawyers to remind
the spouses how closely linked were their emotions and
their assets. A split seems to have developed between the
personal relationship of marriage and the commercial
matter of property. There was I thought some confusion, in
legal regulation, in social ideals and in popular beliefs
about relations between marriage, property and law. I was
interested to consider this confusion and to trace its
development.
To consider this confusion by means of a coherent
structure it was necessary to set some limits. I did not
want to create grand theories of developments in marriage,
property and law. I wanted to be able to pick out those
aspects that interested me; those aspects which seemed to
contribute to confusions and contradictions. The scope of
the study is not, therefore, consistent but there are
certain limits within which I have tried to abide.
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Marriage
The personal relationship on which I have focused is that
within the legal status of marriage. Methods of entering
into this relationship in Scotland have changed within the
period with which I am interested. Prior to 1940, wedlock
in Scotland could be entered into by regular or irregular
marriage. The irregular forms of marriage created by
declaration de praesenti and by promise subsequente copula
have been abolished and the remaining irregular form
created by cohabitation with habit and repute is little
used and its continued existence is under threat. The
legal relationship of marriage in Scotland is therefore
almost entirely the product of regular marriage as now
governed by the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977. Although
there have been changes in the rules regulating entry into
marriage, legal recognition of this status has remained
consistent. Despite reports of a growth in cohabitation,
it has attracted little legal recognition and for that
reason I will also ignore it.^ I will concentrate
therefore on marriage as recognised by the current legal
rules.
Reference may be made to families but my primary concern
is with husband and wife. The term family may be used to
describe the nuclear unit founded on marriage. Although
this might include issue of the couple, children have
little part to play in this study. The relations between
parent and child and the links between children and family
property merit a distinct consideration and in my opinion
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should not be subsumed within a study of husband and wife.
There may be some discussion of children in relation to
changing roles of husband and wife and in relation to
property. They are, however, for the purposes of this
study, incidental to the union of husband and wife. The
term "family" will also be used to describe the "extended
family"; the wider network of relatives of husband and
wife.
Not all marriages are of interest to me. This is a study
of marriage and property and so I only want to look at
marriages that involve some element of property. It is not
possible to restrict the scope to a fixed social class. At
various historical stages, different types of property
have been relevant to a changing range of families. When
land was the most important type of property then only
marriage within the upper classes was likely to involve
any significant amount of property. The growth in
importance of income, of moveable property and, in recent
times, the expansion of domestic goods have contributed to
the spread of ownership within a much wider range of
social classes. Thus the scope of my study will alter
depending on the nature of matrimonial property.
In recent times most discussion, and most legal reform, of
marriage and property have concentrated on what happens
when a marriage breaks down. It seems that so long as an
equitable financial settlement is reached on divorce,
there is no need to investigate what goes on within the
marriage. The Scottish Law Commission in its most recent
consideration of matrimonial property concluded that
provided a legal mechanism was available for fair sharing
of property on divorce there was no need to interfere with
the separation of property during marriage.^ What I want
to discuss however is not divorce and property, but
marriage and property.0 It might be argued that such
concern is of no practical value but it is, I would reply,
of immense academic interest. It is interesting to
consider why the economic realities of the relationship
should be postponed until the relationship has broken
down.
The relationship of marriage will therefore be considered
within these limits. My concern is with the legal
relationship of marriage; it is with the marriage
relationship of those who own property and it is with the
currency of the relationship.
Law
Some of the limits which I have set in terms of studying
marriage have been guided by the scope of the existing
law. The legally recognised relationship of marriage, for
example, has been preferred to cohabitation. Perhaps the
scope of my interest in the element of law is the simplest
to define - located as it is in tangible form in statutes
and case reports. The law with which I am concerned is
Scots law as it has regulated the property of husband and
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wife. I will look at the common law system as it governed
matrimonial property, at the changes introduced by the
reforming legislation of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries and finally at more recent developments within
the Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act
1981 and the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985. At the centre
of this legal pattern of regulation is the apparent
turning point of the Married Women's Property reform
legislation.^
Property
What of property? Again this is a subject too wide to pass
without some limitation. My main concern is with property
that is relevant to marriage.
Prior to the property reforms of the late 19th and early
20th centuries, it might have been possible to say that I
was interested in property which attracted legal
regulation as matrimonial property. For a time, however,
it looked as if law did not recognise any property as
relevant to marriage. With the introduction of separate
property, matrimonial property seemed to disappear. It is
therefore difficult to define the scope of my interest in
property. It is not a fixed category of property; it is a
flexible and changing group of assets that is in some way
tied, by law or in use, to the act of marriage or to the
spouses.
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This property might be loosely termed as matrimonial or as
O
the property of husband and wife. Scots law has tended to
describe such property as the property of husband and
wife. The terms are perhaps not interchangeable.
Matrimonial property seems to fit with the idea of
marriage as a combination whereas the property of husband
and wife is perhaps more consistent with the view of
spouses as individuals. These terms might therefore be
used as a way of expressing different concepts of the
relationship between property and marriage.
Structure - Histories, Images and Reflections
Within these limits, I want to look at the three elements
of law, marriage and property and to consider the
relations that exist between them. I want to investigate
their interaction and to trace some of the conflicts and
confusions that surround their co-existence. My study
falls into three parts. I will begin, in Part I, by
considering historically each of these three separate
elements. I will consider changes in Scots law as it
relates to the property of husband and wife, changes in
the marriage relationship and changes in property.
Historical changes will be traced in each of the three
elements of law, marriage and property. What will result
is not a meticulous, chronological account but a loosely
fitting collection of aspects of the past.
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Where shall I find historical accounts of these elements?
For my purposes these histories are to be located not in
personal empirical study but in the accounts of others. I
do not want to discover anew or to rediscover the history
and development of marriage, property and law. I do not
want to present the truth about them. I want to consider
the discoveries of others. In so doing, I intend to look
not only at what these elements are or have been but at
how they have been presented. Historical accounts of legal
reform, marriage and property will contribute to a picture
of concrete changes but they will also help to explain how
images of the past develop.
There are many accounts of marriage, matrimonial property
and the relevant legal reforms. How will I choose? To some
extent I have chosen those which I found interesting;
those which were the least surprising; those which fit
with my assumptions about the past - my misunderstandings
of marriage, property and legal regulation. I am aware
that for each account I have chosen there are many that
speak in contradiction. It is not my purpose to compare
and to evaluate the historical facts of these various
accounts but rather to make use of a range of histories
which seem to contribute to dominant concepts of what
happened in the past and what has changed. Changes in
terms of legal reform and of property will be presented
through the accounts of Scottish legal writers and
philosophers of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. Changes
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in terms of the personal relationship of marriage will be
Q
presented through the account of Lawrence Stone.
Part I of this thesis will therefore look at separate
accounts of developments within legal reform, marriage and
property. It will present historical changes in law,
marriage and property gathered from the accounts of
others. Part II will look at these developments in
conjunction. Having charted developments separately within
law, marriage and property in Part I, I will then return,
in Part II, to my opening proposition that marriage and
property are closely linked - "With this ring ..." I would
suggest that there is an enduring connection between
property, marriage and law, and I will consider what
evidence there is of such a connection within the
histories of Part I. Is there a constant link between
marriage, property and law? Does this emerge from the
three historical accounts that I have presented? Or do the
separate histories suggest a break in relations?
In Part II I will re-examine the patterns that emerge from
the separate histories of Part I. I will suggest that the
historical approach employed by the legal writers and,
more particularly, by Stone can produce misleading images
of change: images that are exposed by considering the
interaction of change in marriage, property and law.
First I will reconsider the apparent disappearance of
property from marriage - an image that emerges from the
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legal reforms and from Stone's history of marriage.
Secondly I will highlight other trends and images that
emerge from the separate historical patterns of Part I. I
will re-examine the isolated accounts of change within
legal reform, marriage and property to consider what
images emerge from each. From looking at the presentation
of changes in marriage, what images emerge about marriage?
In a similar way, what images emerge about matrimonial
property, about legal regulation and about the relations
between all three. If, as I suggested at the outset, there
is confusion about the relations between marriage,
property and law, how did this confusion develop? Is it
the product of misleading images of how things have
changed from the past? Has a dominant image of change
within the personal relationship of marriage misled us
into a misunderstanding of the connections between
marriage and property? I want to consider how
presentations of change and changing perceptions of these
three aspects have contributed to the emergence of images,
characteristics, beliefs of marriage and matrimonial
property.
In Part I therefore I will present patterns of change
within marriage, law and property. There will be three
isolated patterns of change. In Part II I will consider
the interaction of these three elements and I will argue
that their presentation in isolation has contributed to
the emergence of images which characterise marriage,
property and law and the relations between them.
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In Part III I will use these dominant images of change as
tools with which to analyse relations between marriage,
property and law. In particular I am interested to
discover to what extent these images or characteristics
are reflected in the legal regulation of marriage and
property, both under the system which operated prior to
the Married Women's Property reforms and more recently.
This thesis therefore divides into three parts. In Part I
there are three presentations of historical change - in
law, in marriage and in property. In Part II there is a
critical examination of the presentation of these
histories, in particular, the histories of law and
marriage. Changes considered in isolation in each of these
three elements produce misleading images. In Part III, I
will analyse continuing relations between marriage,
property and law in the light of these images.
What I do not intend to do is to provide an answer; to
criticise what others have done and then to give my own
solution. This thesis was not inspired by the desire to
change or to solve. There may be defects in the way in
which Scots law regulates property in marriage, there may
be other systems which do it better. It is not my aim to
suggest a new property regime for Scotland. I am
interested in considering what relations can be discovered
between law, marriage and property but not, primarily, in
proposing reform.
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The purpose of this thesis was to further ray understanding
of interaction between marriage, property and law. Its
inspiration was simply an interest in some of the
confusions, contradictions and seemingly insoluble
conflicts that I perceive in marriage, its relations with
property and their regulation by law: a fascination with




1 For example, marriage as a relationship based on
altruism in conflict with property as a selfish right, or
property as a matter of commerce divided from marriage as
a matter of romance.
^ Marriage (Scotland) Act 1939, s.5.
0
Scot. Law Com., Discussion Paper 85, Family Law: Pre-
consolidation Reforms, March 1990.
^ The Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection)(Scotland) Act
1981 took the legally radical step of recognising
cohabitation for the purpose of granting occupancy rights.
More recently the Scottish Law Commission has considered
the need for greater legal regulation of cohabitation, in
Discussion Paper 86, The Effects of Cohabitation in
Private Law, May 1990.
^ Scot. Law Com., Consultative Memorandum 57, Matrimonial
Property, March 1983.
r
There will be some discussion of how law deals with
property on divorce under the Family Law (Scotland) Act
1985 to the extent that such treatment is clearly
influenced by what happens during the relationship.
^ Marriage and families are regulated by a diverse body of
rules emanating from public law, private law and what
might be termed welfare agencies. It is increasingly
difficult to define a fixed set of rules as Family Law.
While recognising the importance of, for example, taxation
and social security law to marital and familial economics,
1 have chosen to consider only private law.
8 See discussion of Matrimonial Property and Property of
Husband and Wife in chapter 4.
Q
L.Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500 -
1800. Although in timing and in detail, developments in
Scotland may have differed, Scottish histories such as
T.Smout, History of the Scottish People and K.Marshall,
Virgins and Viragos suggesT that the influence of general
trends as described by Stone were also present in Scottish
society.
10
By using the phrase "black letter law" I am referring
to a method of application and study of law which focuses
on the written legal rules and excludes consideration of,







This thesis is a study of three elements - Scots law,
marriage and property and in this Part I will consider
separately changes in each of these elements. Part I will,
therefore, consist of three histories - a history of legal
reform, a history of marriage and a history of property.
These histories are not comprehensive chronological
accounts but aspects of change. The changes that are
presented in each of these three histories are not those
which I have discovered through empirical study. They are
changes that have been presented by other writers.
Discussion in Part I does not take account of legislative
developments since 1980.
It is a recurrent theme throughout this thesis that change
may be accompanied by a presentation or perception of that
change which contributes to an image of change. In
suggesting that there is some image of change, I am arguing
that there are two levels of change. On one level there is
concrete change. On a second level, presentation and
interpretation of this change have contributed to an image
of change which may be unjustified. This is a theme which
will be considered in more depth in Part II but, in Part I,
I will begin to discuss and to question the presentation of
change.
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CHAPTER 2: HISTORY OF LEGAL REFORM
In this study of law, marriage and property I will begin
with law. I will look at the law in Scotland as it relates
to the regulation of property on marriage and consider the
-|
way in which it has developed. The first step in the
process of analysing the relations between law and property
and marriage is to provide a straightforward account of the
specific legal changes: to present the legal developments
in Scots law in relation to the property of husband and
wife. The last two centuries have produced change, and much
documentation of change, in the law of husband and wife.
The period of greatest activity in law reform relating to
the property of husband and wife has been the late 19th and
early 20th centuries and it is on that era that I will
concentrate.^
MARITAL UNITY AND COMMUNITY OF GOODS
In considering the law relating to the property of husband
and wife there are three distinct phases. First there was
the common law; the traditional system which governed,
largely unchanged, until the 19th century. Secondly, there
were the legislative reforms of the late 19th and early
20th centuries. These reforms gradually refined, modified
and ultimately abolished the common law system. It is this
process which I will now consider. Finally, there is the





There were two aspects to the regulation of matrimonial
property under the common law - the pre-nuptial
arrangements relating to the property brought by the two
parties to the marriage and the subsequent legal rights of
the spouses to their property.^ As the law relating to
property on death or divorce is largely outwith the scope
of this study, so too is the law relating to pre-nuptial
negotiations and settlements. Some insight into the legal
rules governing matrimonial property may however be gained
from consideration of the source of such property.
Accordingly it is appropriate to look briefly at property
exchange and contributions on the occasion of marriage.
In Scotland, there existed a practice whereby property
would be exchanged between the two families on marriage.
Provision was made for each spouse to bring some material
assets to the union, the nature and quantity of which would
vary greatly depending on the economic position of the
spouses and their families. This would establish the
financial base of the marriage. The general system was that
the woman would bring her dowry which was known in Scots
law as the tocher.The tocher would be a sum of money or a
collection of assets paid or given over to the husband. It
would be provided either by the wife or by her family. In
return, the husband made his contribution to the economic
union.^ In medieval times the husband might make his
contribution in the form of a church door gift, giving to
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his wife some land or goods on the morning of their
wedding. The husband's contribution was sometimes referred
to as the donatio propter nuptias.^ Later practice was for
the husband and wife to be,
"put in joint possession of a piece of land which in
Scotland was termed the conjunct fee."
This would represent the husband's contribution to the
union and it would usually reflect the size of the wife's
tocher. Income from this land would enable the husband to
maintain his wife and any children and it could be used to
provide an annuity for the wife if she outlived her
husband.
The source of matrimonial property was significant in
understanding the common law rules relating to ownership
and control of matrimonial property. Traditionally
matrimonial property would be based on a fund established
at the time of marriage and would comprise property that
was inherited by or gifted to the spouses. It was common
for both spouses and their families to contribute to the
financial base of the union. Later, matrimonial property
was more likely to be acquired by the spouses in return for
labour. There was therefore a shift from a fund of
predominantly heritable property, transmitted through a
family line, to a collection of heritable and moveable
assets, including earned income, which would be acquired
through the lifetimes of the spouses. This changing source
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and nature of matrimonial property was important in
producing the legal reforms.^
Equipped with some idea of the property arrangements made
on the occasion of marriage, I will now proceed to the law
relating to the property of husband and wife during
marriage. In Scotland, the common law regulation of
property during marriage was in the 19th century very
little changed from that of the preceding centuries. It
could be summarised simply and briefly in that, on
marriage, the property of husband and wife was consolidated
automatically into one fund. This fund was to some extent
1 0ownedx by the husband and it was entirely administered by
him.
"Immediately upon marriage the husband is by the common law
of Scotland invested with what are known as his jus mariti
and right of administration."11
Under the common law, when a couple married the husband was
given two rights. The jus mariti related solely to the
moveable property of the wife. The jus administrationis
applied to all of her property, both heritable and
moveable.
jus mariti
By virtue of the jus mariti the husband was given complete
ownership of the moveable property of his wife.1^ This
extended to all of her moveable assets, regardless of how
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they had been acquired. It applied to all moveable property
which the wife might have at the point of entry into
marriage and to all moveable property which she might
subsequently acquire. Most importantly, the husband's jus
mariti gave him ownership of all money which his wife might
have, including money which she personally earned.
The husband's right to such property was complete. He was
free to use and abuse the property as he wished and it
could be attached by any of his creditors.
"He could dispose of it at will, and. -it was liable for his
debts 'to the very last farthing'."
The wife could claim maintenance from her husband"^ but her
claim would rank second to the claims of her husband's
creditors.-^ The only other restriction on the husband's
disposal of his, or his wife's property, was that on
marriage he became liable for all of his wife's ante
nuptial debts, so far as they related to her moveable
property.The question of post nuptial debts did not
arise, as a wife could not become a debtor. As expressed by
Braxfield, L.J.C. in 1791, in Harvey v. Chessels, Bell,
258,
"A married woman can grant no personal obligation: such
obligation is null and void, because in law a wife has no
person."
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Two very limited exceptions to the husband's jus mariti
existed in the wife's paraphernalia and peculium. By these
two devices the wife retained ownership of very specific
categories of moveable items. The paraphernalia related to
property which formed part of the woman's dowry but over
which she was allowed to retain ownership. The types of
assets which fell within the description of paraphernalia
were extremely restricted. The paraphernalia would include
only her clothes, her jewellery and ornaments along with
any pieces of furniture or cases required for storing these
items. It might be argued that some jewellery did not
properly fall within the category of paraphernalia.
Jewellery of considerable value might be classified as
family jewellery - an heirloom - and therefore as heritable
1 7
property. ' Classed as paraphernalia would also be gifts
given by the husband to the wife in respect of the
marriage. Assets which fell within this narrow category
would remain under the sole ownership of the wife.-*-^
The second exception to the jus mariti - the wife's
peculium or "lady's gown" - was a similarly narrow
exception. Where a wife survived her husband, she would be
entitled to a liferent of one third of her husband's
heritable property. This right was known in Scots law as
1 9
terce.
Before the husband could sell land in which the wife had a
potential right of terce, he required her consent. If
during the marriage the husband did sell such heritage
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there was a practice whereby the purchaser might make a
gift to the wife, probably of a small sum of money. This
gift was known as her peculium or lady's gown and it did
not fall under the husband's jus mariti.^ It remained
under the ownership of the wife and, along with her
paraphernalia, it formed the wife's separate property.
All of the wife's moveable assets, except for her
paraphernalia and peculium, were transferred into the
91
ownership of her husband by virtue of his jus mariti. The
goods were transferred automatically, with no need for
intimation of assignation."^ The husband's right was very
extensive. He had complete ownership and control of the
goods and he was free to use and abuse them as he wished.
Right of administration
The second right, the jus administrationis, governed all of
the wife's property, both heritable and moveable. It was a
right of administration and control. It was significant
mainly in respect of heritable property. As already
discussed, the jus mariti gave the husband complete
ownership, with consequent power of use and disposal, of
the wife's moveables. The separate right of administration
was therefore of little relevance. The right of
administration was important in relation to any moveable
property which fell into the wife's separate estate, namely
paraphernalia and peculium. Although these categories of
- 29 -
moveable property remained in the ownership of the wife,
the husband by virtue of the jus administrationis had the
right of control.
Although the jus administrationis did apply to all of the
wife's property and, as seen above, it was important in
relation to specific types of moveables, it will be
discussed mainly in respect of heritable property. The jus
administrationis or right of administration applied to all
of the wife's property and therefore included any heritage
which she owned. It applied to any land or buildings
thereon, with any income from such land falling under the
jus mariti. Until the 19th century it was this category of
property - heritable property - which was by far the more
O O
important. J For that reason the right of administration,
although a lesser legal right than the jus mariti, was of
great value.
Perhaps it was in recognition of the greater significance
of heritable property that the husband's right to it was
more restricted than his right to the moveables. By virtue
of the jus administrationis, the husband was not given
ownership of his wife's heritable property. The wife
herself retained ownership. Her right of ownership,
however, was nominal, with the jus administrationis giving
to the husband full rights of administration and control.
Although the wife was the owner of her heritable property,
she could not deal with it or administer it. She was
prevented from entering into legally binding agreements in
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relation to her property except with the full consent and
participation of her husband. While the law stopped short
of giving full ownership of the heritable property to the
husband, it vested in him all practical powers of dealing
with and controlling his wife's assets.
"The right of administration may be defined to be ... not a
right of property, but a right of managing property,
whereby the husband's consent must be obtained to every act
of administration."
The right of administration, while primarily discussed in
relation to heritable property, was in fact an all
encompassing right. It gave the husband the power of
administration over all of his wife's property. Her
moveable property had already passed into his ownership
which brought with it the right of administration. The jus
administrationis, however, would catch any separate estate
which the wife might have - her paraphernalia and peculium.
Thus by virtue of the basic, universal right of
administration the husband was placed in practical control
of all of his wife's assets and given full managerial
powers while, in relation to her moveable property, his
position was further enhanced by the legal status of
ownership.
This remained the position until the late 19t'n century. The
jus mariti and the right of administration took effect
automatically on marriage and the property was held to be
transferred without any need for intimation of assignation.
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Subject to limited exceptions to the jus mariti, which
provided some separate estate for the wife, married women
had no right to ownership of moveables and no power to
administer any of their property.
The defects and anachronisms in this system became obvious
long before it was reformed. As an interim measure,
marriage contracts provided an important means of
protection against the often harsh and undesirable effects
of the operation of the jus mariti and the right of
administration. Up to the 18th century, marriage contracts
had been widely used but their purpose was limited. They
were a means of setting out the contributions to be made by
both parties to the marriage and they might also be used to
regulate the dispersal of property on the dissolution of
the marriage. From that time on, however, their purpose
changed and widened. It became the practice for marriage
contracts to be used to exclude the husband's jus mariti
and right of administration. They provided for the
reservation of some separate estate for the wife. In this
way marriage contracts played an important interim role in
helping to modify the common law and bring it closer into
line with current thought and need.^
REFORM OF THE COMMON LAW: INCREASINGLY SEPARATE
The 19th century witnessed a great enthusiasm for law
reform. Understandably perhaps the male reformers remained
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cautious of changes in a legal system which so clearly
benefited husbands. In Victorian times, an era of extensive
legal reform, it was suggested that although,
"in the law of personal and domestic relations the same
spirit of progress has been at work [the reformers]
saturated with Roman ideas of patria pptestas, lagged
further behind public feeling and opinion."
Legal reform of the law relating to the property of husband
and wife was certainly slow in coming and the common law
was seen to be vastly out of step with current need. One
factor which is argued to have been influential in finally
procuring the legislative amendments was the participation
of women in paid employment. As both the social and
economic position of women continued to change, the calls
for the complete removal of the property disqualifications
attaching to married women were strengthened. Another
important factor was an increase in the extent and
? 7
importance of moveable property. ' By the late 19th century
demands for change of the common law position on a general,
positive basis, rather than by permitting individual
refinement through the use of marriage contracts, were
answered by the legislators. A series of Acts removed from
Scots law the legal disabilities which marriage had
previously placed upon women. In this process Scotland
followed the lead of England, the similarity of their
conclusions to a large extent hiding the differences in
legal background.
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Conjugal Rights (Scotland) Amendment Act 1861
The progress of reform of the common law began in 1861 with
the Conjugal Rights (Scotland) Amendment Act. This
legislation made two important, if limited, changes to a
husband's rights in respect of his wife's property. The
first aspect of reform related to the position where the
husband had deserted his wife. In that situation, section 1
provided that the wife could petition the Court of Session
for a protection order in respect of her property. The
protection order would apply to all property which would
fall under the jus mariti, and which was either property
which the wife acquired by her own industry or property
which she inherited or otherwise acquired. In both cases it
only applied to property which the wife acquired after she
had been deserted. The purpose of the order was to protect
such property against the husband or his creditors. If the
wife obtained a protection order, all such property would
remain in her ownership and would not pass to the husband
or be available to his creditors. So long as the order
operated, the wife would own the property as if she were
unmarried and she would be able to enter into obligations.
In other words both the jus mariti and the right of
administration would be excluded.^®
Section 6 went on to provide for the situation where the
wife had obtained a decree of separation. Again the
husband's jus mariti would be excluded in respect of all
property acquired after the separation and which would
otherwise have fallen to him under the jus mariti. His
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right of administration would also be excluded and the
wife would therefore be able to enter into legal
obligations, sue and be sued as if she were unmarried.
Where either a protection order or a decree of separation
had been obtained, the wife would remain the owner of this
separate property only for so long as husband and wife
continued to live apart. If they resumed cohabitation, the
husband's jus mariti and right of administration would
revive and the wife would once more be unable to take legal
action or enter into binding obligations. The only
exception was that any property which she had acquired as
separate property during the currency of the order would
9Q
remain as her separate property.
The second aspect of the legislation was related in that it
concerned the husband's obligation to maintain his wife. It
highlighted the dual nature of the property system: the
obligation of the husband to maintain his wife, having been
given ownership and control of her property. Section 16
operated in relation to any property which the wife
acquired by succession or gift but not property which she
personally earned. The husband's jus mariti and right of
administration would be excluded in respect of such
property if, having been asked by the wife, he failed to
provide reasonable maintenance for her from the property.
As with the previous reforms, these restrictions would only
operate if the wife's claim was made before the husband
gained full and lawful possession of the property.
This provision placed a restriction, however limited and
specific, on the husband's right of ownership over his
wife's moveable estate. It highlighted the dual nature of
the marriage arrangement. It also highlighted the threat to
the wife's property posed by her husband's creditors.
Section 16 prevented not only the husband from claiming
such property but it also protected against the claims of
his creditors. Under the common law, the wife's property
passed into the control and ownership of the husband but in
return the husband was expected to care for and support his
wife.
"The law assumed that husbands supported their wives and
children and this assumption seemed to justify the legal
rule that husbands owned or controlled their wives'
property.
This reform recognised the injustice of the common law
where the husband failed to keep his part of the bargain.
It highlighted the possible conflict between a husband's
duties to his wife and his obligations to his creditors.
This reform also recognised the interests of a third party,
perhaps the father or other relation of the wife. It might
be that the wife's father provided a sum of money which was
to be used primarily for the support of the woman. This
reform recognised the interest of that third party and his
right to some guarantee that his donation would be used in
the way he had intended. It offered some assurance that
property given to the wife and which would pass to the
husband under the jus mariti would first be used to
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maintain the wife before it was squandered by the husband
or disappeared into the hands of his creditors.
Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act 1877
A more far reaching step was taken by the Married Women's
Property (Scotland) Act 1877. Section 3 of this Act stated
that,
"The jus mariti and right of administration of the husband
shall be excluded from the wages and earnings of any
married woman...in any employment, occupation or trade in
which she is engaged, or in any business which she carries
on under her own name."
It went on to provide that the husband's rights would
similarly be excluded from,
"any money or property acquired by her . . . through the
exercise of any literary, artistic or scientific skill."
These provisions applied only to money or property acquired
after the commencement of this Act.
This provision could be seen as an extension of one aspect
of the protection granted in the 1861 Act. Under that
earlier legislation, the earnings of the woman were
retained for her separate use only in the event of her
having been deserted by her husband or having obtained a
decree of separation. The 1877 Act, however, gave a married
woman an unconditional right to the income from her own
labour which was in no way dependent on her husband and, as
such, was a significant modification of the common law
position. Married women now had the right to their own
earned income regardless of whether or not they continued
to live with and be supported by their husbands.
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Section 4 of the 1877 Act, perhaps to redress the balance,
made an amendment in favour of the husband. Until this
time, a husband became liable for the full extent of his
wife's ante nuptial debts. Section 4 provided that, in
relation to any marriage concluded after the commencement
of the Act, the husband would only be liable for the debts
of the wife up to the value of any property which he
received from or through her "at, or before, or subsequent
to, the marriage."
Married Women's Policies of Assurance (Scotland) Act 1880
A less direct reform was introduced in 1880 by the Married
Women's Policies of Assurance (Scotland) Act. At common
law, a wife has an insurable interest in the life of her
husband and a husband in the life of his wife. The 1880 Act
therefore did not create a right for the wife to insure her
husband's life. It provided, however, that a married woman
could take a policy of assurance on her own life or on the
life of her husband and could state that it was for her own
separate use. As a result the policy would vest directly in
her and all benefits would be paid to her, for her separate
use. In this way, the husband's jus mariti and right of
administration would be excluded.
A wife's separate estate had previously comprised only her
paraphernalia and peculium. Although this property did not
fall under the jus mariti, it was still subject to the
right of administration. Her separate estate had now been
extended to include wages and earnings and the benefits of
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any policy of assurance in respect of her own life or the
life of her husband. Where a woman had been deserted by her
husband, there were certain further exclusions of the jus
mariti. In relation to this extended separate estate, the
husband's right of administration was also excluded. The
quid pro quo was that the wife might be liable to some
extent for her own ante nuptial debts.
Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act 1881
By this time there had been significant modifications of
the basic common law system through these reforms. The
following year, however, saw an end to such circumspect
measures and a significant challenge to the husband's
position. This came in the form of the Married Women's
Property (Scotland) Act 1881. The 1881 Act was a much
longer, more detailed and to a certain extent more
confused, piece of legislation than the previous reforms. A
large part of the confusion arises from the inconsistent
exclusion of jus mariti and right of administration. In
some aspects both are excluded, in other aspects only the
jus mariti is excluded. There is also a distinction in the
application of the Act between (a) those marriages
contracted after the passing of the Act and (b) those which
predated it.^l
(a) marriages contracted after passing of MWP(S)A 1881
Section 1(1) provided that the jus mariti was excluded from
all of the wife's moveable property. Any moveable property,
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whether acquired before or during the marriage, would
remain as the wife's separate estate.
The husband's right of administration, although usually
discussed in relation to heritable property, was an
universal right, covering all of the wife's property. The
Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act 1881 did not
exclude the right of administration in relation to moveable
property in general. Therefore, although a married woman
now retained ownership of all her moveable property, her
husband retained his right of administration over it.
The right of administration was, however, restricted in
relation to two specific types of property. Section 1(2)
provided that the husband's right of administration would
be restricted in respect of income from moveable property.
This income was part of the wife's moveable estate and
would now form part of her separate property. Section 1(2)
provided that the wife could give her own receipt for such
property and to this limited extent was able to administer
it. She could not, however, proceed to assign it or dispose
of it in any way. In order to administer the income in any
way other than simply giving receipt for it, the wife
required the consent of her husband. Therefore the
husband's right of administration was only very slightly
restricted.
Section 2 of the Act specifically excluded both the jus
mariti and the right of administration from the rents and
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produce of any heritable property in Scotland which
belonged to the wife. Income from heritable property was
classed as moveable property and therefore previously had
passed to the husband under the jus mariti. It was now to
form part of the wife's separate estate and in addition she
was able to deal with it, free from the constraints of the
husband's right of administration.^
In summary, there were three changes to the law relating to
marriages entered into after the enactment of the Married
Women's Property (Scotland) Act 1881. The wife retained
ownership of her moveable property as a result of the
exclusion of the husband's jus mariti. ^ She remained
subject, however, to the control exerted through the
husband's right of administration. The 1881 Act made no
general provision to remove the right of administration.
She was therefore unable to deal with, or enter into legal
obligations concerning, her moveable property even though
it now formed part of her separate estate. In general her
moveable property was now in the same position as her
paraphernalia and peculium. It was her separate estate but
she still required the concurrence of her husband in order
to administer it.^ The husband's right of administration
was however subject to two restrictions. It no longer
extended to the giving of receipts for income from the
wife's moveable property. A married woman was now legally
capable of doing that on her own. The right of
administration was completely excluded from rents from any
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heritable property which belonged to her and which was
situated in Scotland.
(b) marriages contracted prior to MWP(S)A 1881
The provisions relating to this category of marriages were
contained in sections 3 and 4 of the Married Women's
Property (Scotland) Act 1881. Section 3(1) provided that
the husband's jus mariti and right of administration would
not be excluded to any extent by the Act if he had executed
an irrevocable deed prior to the passing of the Act which
made reasonable provision for the wife in the event of her
surviving him.
Section 3(2) related to the situation where no such deed
had been executed. In that case, the jus mariti and right
of administration would be excluded in terms of the Act in
respect of any property and income acquired by the wife
after the date of the passing of the Act. The Act would
apply, therefore, to property acquired subsequent to the
Act, on the same terms as it applied to the property of
women who married after the passing of the Act.
Finally, section 4 provided that it was open to spouses who
married before the passing of the Act to declare in a
mutually executed deed that all of the wife's estate would
be regulated by the Act. It was, therefore, open to spouses
who married before the passing of the Act to agree to be
governed by it.
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The Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act 1881 was the
most radical of the reforms to date. Its main effect was to
exclude the husband's jus mariti and preserve the wife's
moveable property as her separate estate. Subject to two
exceptions, however, the legislation left intact the
husband's right of administration. It continued to be the
law that in order to enter into any legally binding
agreement and to deal with her property a married woman
required the consent of her husband.
Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act 1920
The progress of reform, however, was not complete and in
1920 the Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act abolished
the right of administration. The traditional common law
system of matrimonial property regulation had been finally
dismantled. Married women had always had separate ownership
of their heritable property, in 1881 they had acquired
separate ownership of their moveable property and finally
in 1920 they acquired the very important legal capacity to
deal with and administer their property and to enter into
binding legal agreements in relation to it. Married women
were now free to deal independently with their property and
they retained all rights and responsibilities in relation
to it. This had been achieved through a series of measures,
all of which had as their focus either the modification or
ultimately the exclusion of the husband's two rights - jus
mariti and right of administration. Gradually the separate
estate of the wife had been expanded, culminating in the
- 43 -
complete removal of the husband's rights to the property of
his wife.
The common law system had been dismantled with the
abolition of the jus mariti and the right of
administration. The rules which now applied were the result
of the dismantling of the old system and not the positive
product of a newly created system. Matrimonial property and
the ownership of it was now subject to the ordinary rules
of property. There was no longer a special regime of
matrimonial property law. The intervening years since 1920
have seen the introduction of various measures which relate
o tr
specifically to the property of husband and wife, J but the
basis of the system which governs such property continues
to be that which existed as a result of the reforms of the
married women's property legislation.
CHARACTERISTICS OF REFORM
We now have a background picture of the major changes in
Scots law relating to the property of husband and wife.
These changes form one of the three historical strands
which go together to produce the pattern of changing
relations between law, marriage (husband and wife) and
property. Having set out the basic process of reform, I
want to proceed to consider in more detail the
characteristics and images of these changes. A simple
historical ordering of the reforms may suggest a unified
and general process, perhaps with accompanying claims of
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progress/improvement.^0 This can emerge from looking at the
way in which legal writers have presented these reforms,
their analysis of the need for reform, the reforms which
were made and the implications of these reforms. It is my
intention to question this legal presentation of the
reforms, to suggest that what the reforms achieved was
something different from what the writers emphasised. In
questioning their presentation of the reforms, I want to
suggest that their presentation nonetheless contributes to
an image of marriage, property and law which I would
suggest is an important factor in the relations between
O "7
these three aspects. ' One purpose of considering the
changing historical concepts of law, marriage and property
is to suggest how various myths and images of the relations
between these aspects have emerged or been created. It is
the existence of such images or myths which will later be
relevant in looking at the way in which law governs
property.
There are, I would suggest, various trends which emerge
from looking at the legal process of reform of the property
laws. I would emphasise two trends that are discernible in
legal writing on the reforms - a shift from some form of
community property to strict separation of property and a
move away from legal regulation of property in marriage.
Legal historical accounts of these reforms have tended to
deal with them in a broadly similar manner and to place
them within a scheme of progress from community to separate
individuality. They further characterise the reforms as
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signalling a trend from legal regulation to non
intervention. While on one level these trends can be seen
in the pattern of the reforms, I would argue that some of
the accompanying implications or expectations were not
fulfilled and to that extent these trends can be treated as
images or myths which have contributed to the masking of
the relations between law, marriage and property.
COMMUNITY TO SEPARATE
"Nature inculcates the utmost possible identity of
interests and community of will between married persons;
the husband being lord and master or as it is expressed in
Scripture, being 'the head of the wife'; and this natural
subordination upon the part of the wife has led to the
positive law that in all civil matters having reference to
their united means the husband should represent both."
In this way Fraser, in his Treatise on Husband and Wife,
gives expression to a widely held view of the position of
husband and wife under common law.
Much legal discussion of the common law rules relating to
the property of husband and wife has concentrated on
whether or not that system fitted within the concept of a
community property system - a communio bonorum. Legal
writers, whether accepting or disputing the existence of a
communio bonorum in Scotland, have tended to discuss the
common law system in terms of community of goods. They have
measured and judged its provisions in relation to other
contemporary or modern community systems. There has been
considerable debate as to whether Scots common law provided
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for a communio bonorum, but few writers have discussed the
common law rules without introducing the concept of
community.
There was no clear statement at common law of a guiding
principle in relation to the property of husband and wife.
Scots law, in this as in many other areas, has tended to
adopt a rather piecemeal approach to regulation. Rather
than outlining a basic policy or regime, it dealt with
specific situations, providing rights and obligations. It
was by using the jus mariti and the right of administration
that it brought about a consolidation of the assets of
husband and wife. Until the legislative reforms of the 19th
century, however, some have argued that Scots law did
provide for a communio bonorum.
According to Stair,
"there is a communion of goods betwixt the married
persons.
Erskine follows, saying that entry to marriage involves
"a communication of ... mutual civil interests ... styled
in our law the communion of goods."
Clive writes that by the late 19th century,
"marriage was spoken of as bringing about a communion of
goods between the spouses."41
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Although there was a combination of the property of husband
and wife by means of the jus mariti and the right of
administration, there was considerable doubt as to whether
this constituted a system of community property.
"Clearly although it would be misleading to apply any term
to this system which would suggest that the wife was an
equal or unequal partner in the community of goods during
marriage, there were certain community property elements in
it. On marriage the spouses' moveable goods merged into one
fund, albeit the husband's."42
The debates as to the nature of the Scottish regulation of
matrimonial property centred to a large extent on the lack
of common rights which were provided to the fund. While
there was clearly some combination of property it was not a
system that followed the pattern adopted in what were
regarded as true community regimes. Fraser compared the
system operating in Scotland to what he regarded as a real
communio bonorum. The ancient Germans had a real community
system which was:
"a partnership proper, - a society to which each of the two
associates had an equal right."
Despite these doubts as to whether or not the Scottish
system was one of true community, there was a tendency for
it to be discussed in terms of community. When reform was
considered, the unacceptable system of property regulation
was categorised as a community system and the shift which
was brought about by the reforms was described as a shift
from community to separate property. In reforming the
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common law system in Scotland, all aspects of community in
relation to property were rejected.
"The result has been the replacement of a primitive system
of community of goods ... by a separate property system."
In summary, the process was presented as a move from a form
of community property (however imperfect) to strict
separation of property. The suggestion is that by moving
from community to separate there was progress.
The use of a community system, however, is not in itself an
evil. In many ways community is a notion in keeping with
the promoted nature of the marriage relationship, based on
sharing and unity. Countries which have adopted a full
community system point to the similarity in aim between the
sharing in property and the sharing in marriage. The
community of property can be regarded as reinforcing the
basis of the institution itself. The Canadian Law Reform
Commission in its report in 1975 thought of community
property that it,
"makes a reality out of the concept of partnership which
... strengthens the institution of marriage."
Categorisation of the unacceptable system as one involving
community, to some extent misrepresents its defects and
gives unjustified credit to a system based on separation.
What were the defects of the common law system? Were the
defects not linked to the inequalities of the system rather
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than its elements of community? In criticising the common
law system, legal writers and reformers tended to focus on
the community aspects of the law. They did not deal
directly with the inequality. Thus they reformed the law by
removing all traces of community, while not specifically
dealing with or highlighting inequality. The mischief of
the previous system was perhaps wrongly diagnosed as being
the element of community and thus the reforms were designed
to correct that mischief.
Discussing marriage in the late 19th century, Murray argued
that,
"if marriage is in any sense a partnership it can only be
of that description which was known amongst Roman jurists
as leonine. The lion in the fable divided the prey into
four shares but devoured all four himself; so the law of
Scotland speaks of a communio bonorum between husband and
wife but gives everything to the husband.'"*®
To the extent that the goods of both spouses merged there
was common property. What prevented it from being more than
a very primitive form of community was the lack of common
rights to the fund.^
The rights of ownership of moveables and control of all
property were not common but vested solely in the husband.
What Scots law provided for was the constitution of a
single fund, composed of property donated on behalf of both
parties to the marriage, but it was not a fund in which
both participated equally. The wife (and children) required
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to be maintained but otherwise all practical rights of
control were given to the husband. It is misleading that
the communal aspects should have been confused to some
extent with the imbalance of power between husband and
wife.
The writers (and reformers?) have misleadingly emphasised
the community aspect of the unsatisfactory common law
system. While concentrating on community, they failed to
focus on the inequalities of the system. This in turn had
consequences for the reforms.
It is clear that traditionally spouses were unequal both by
law and in practice. The disadvantages of the female
position and in particular the position of wife were
widespread and the need for reform of the common law was
evident. While the reforms did much to remove the greatest
injustices of the common law position, I would argue that
they also clouded the picture of marriage and its relations
with property. Previously the community and inequality
imposed by the legal rules had matched well with the
accepted view of marriage as the merging of two into one -
the husband. Following the reforms the legal rules changed
radically. There was now no community and there was legal
equality, with both husband and wife subject to the same
rules. There was no recognition in the legal rules,
however, of the continuing community nature of the marriage
relationship. The legal rules took no notice of the
personal relationship between husband and wife. The result
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of the legislation was to remove legal disqualifications
affecting wives as regards property by abolishing the
husband's rights to the goods of his spouse. The futility
of these changes, however, is summed up by Katherine
0'Donovan when she argues that,
"permitting women who have no means of acquiring property
to own it is to suggest that they change their philosophy
of life from altruism to individualism."
The law itself did not magically create equality. It can be
seen as operating a sex neutral policy towards property,
but in practice it may in many cases have contributed to
the disparity between the economic positions of the
spouses. The introduction of a system of separate property
seemed to reflect a general swing to individuality and
equality.^ The split between theory and practice in this
situation however is well known. The legal myth of marriage
as an equal partnership is contradicted by the unequal
bargaining power of the parties when such power is based on
property and earning capacity. If the basic marriage
contract continues to offer a means of support for those
members of society, denied access in practice to employment
and property, then its non-interventionist policy will tend
to result in inequality and hardship on the breakdown of
the relationship. The supremacy of individual ownership is
to some extent relaxed during the existence of the
relationship, when the dependent spouse is fulfilling her
or his part of the bargain, but under a separate property
system such non-financial contributions are not regarded as
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sufficient to override the rights of ownership on the
breakdown of the marriage. The incompatibility of a strict
regime of separate property is highlighted when it comes
into conflict with the altruism required to satisfy the
requirements of marriage. To comply with the emotional
aspects the spouses are encouraged to act in common but
when the group splits they abruptly revert to being treated
as individuals. It should be remembered that discussion of
the legal rules in this chapter is historical and does not
take account of post 1980 developments in Scots law.-^
What the legal reforms afforded women was the right to
equal treatment as individuals. It did not take account of
their promoted roles as wives and mothers. A.s isolated
individuals it granted them theoretical equality but in
regulating matrimonial property the law is dealing with
members of a group. Evaluation as an individual takes no
account of familial obligations or of children or of joint
enterprise. The legislative reforms advocated that spouses
be treated separately and individually. It continued so to
treat them even after they had formed a new, albeit
temporary, joint persona. What is fair and equitable
treatment of an individual is not necessarily fair and
equitable treatment of a partner or ex-partner. There was a
confusion of,
"woman's individuality and hence independence from men with
the ideology of liberal individualism, the atomised
individual. 1
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The legislative reform could be regarded as the first step
towards equality. Psychologically it was a massive step as
it afforded to women the status of legal persons and
potential property owners in their own right. It extended
to all women the status of unmarried women. Their continued
concurrent status as wives renders that step in many cases
insufficient. Not only did legislative reform fail to
produce practical equality in all marriages but it also
weakened the fighting strength of those still
disadvantaged. As Carol Smart has argued,
"once legal equality has been achieved ... it seems
politically unreasonable to ask for more."
It may be very simple to say now that the legal reforms of
the late 19th and early 20th centuries never offered
equality to husband and wife. What they did was something
much more specific and limited. They simply removed two
rights which previously had given the husband ownership and
control of his wife's property. They gave women legal
equality in terms of ownership but the significance of that
purely legal equality must be considered in the light of
the marriage relationship and of women's access to
property. Although the result of the reforms is clear, in
purely legal terms, they were surrounded by much
expectation and, in legal writing, they have been credited
with an equalising power. It became popular to speak of the
couple as a partnership and the idea that the spouses were
now legally equal in terms of ownership was an important
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factor in viewing them as partners. It was very easy to
confuse the notion of separation of property with equal
rights. Yes, the spouses now had equal rights. They each
had an equal right to own their own property but they did
not have equal rights to each other's property or to a
category of matrimonial property. If only one spouse had
substantial assets and if only one spouse had access to
employment, then their position as property owners was
highly unequal.
What separate property actually meant was that being
married had no legal effect on property ownership. For the
purposes of property, everyone was treated as an
individual. The law made no rules in relation to the
property of married persons other than those basic rules of
property which already existed. This gave weight to the
suggestion which will be considered in relation to
Lawrence Stone's history of the family, that property was
no longer a concern of marriage.It was also evidence of
the second trend which can be seen in the reforms - a move
from legal regulation to non-intervention.
AN UNREGULATED RELATIONSHIP
With the completion of the reforms, law appeared to
withdraw from the regulation of property through marriage.
This was widely regarded as a benefit of the family. It
fitted well with liberal thought that there should be a
sphere of personal autonomy. It also fitted well with
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changing concepts of the marriage relationship, with
increased emphasis placed on the isolated nuclear unit and
c r
the developing ideal of the family as a private refuge.
As will later be discussed, the privacy and apparent non
regulation of the family is neither consistently beneficial
nor is it substantiated.-^ At this stage I would also
suggest that to create a sphere of non-regulation was not
necessarily the aim of the legislation. The reforms were,
however, presented as an example of the closing off of the
family from legal intervention.
Of the legislative reform in England, A.V.Dicey said,
"When at last reform became a necessity, the method thereof
was determined almost wholly by the existence of the rules
of equity.
In a similar way the reforms in Scotland followed the
pattern of using a marriage contract. Both equity and
marriage contracts had operated by allowing private
exclusion of the husband's rights and thereby had created
a separate estate for women. The important difference
between the use of marriage contracts and the legislation
was that the marriage contract removed the husband's rights
and also made a private arrangement in relation to the
wife's property, whereas the legislation simply removed the
husband's rights. Marriage contracts allowed for a private
sphere of autonomy but this autonomy from the law was
permitted on the understanding that a preferable private
arrangement was being made.
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In looking for a direction in reform, the already frequent
use of marriage contracts provided a lead. Marriage
contracts were originally developed as the culmination of
financial negotiations preceding marriage. They simply gave
formal expression to the economic deal, worked out between
the families of the spouses, and laid down the
contributions to be made by both parties to the marriage
and the scheme of distribution of funds to be applied on
the dissolution of the relationship. In their early form
they did not permit any alteration of the basic rights
afforded to the husband under the jus mariti or the right
of administration. As described by Murray,
"the jus mariti was a faculty so inseparable from the
character of husband that any reservation thereof by the
wife or renunciation by him before the marriage always ran
back upon him as water thrown upon a higher ground doth
ever return.
In the mid 18th century, however, it was judicially decided
that it was competent to exclude the jus mariti^ and the
husband's right of administration^ by means of contract,
thus allowing an escape from the increasingly unacceptable
effects of the common law. This was not an option which a
woman could follow independently. The jus mariti and right
of administration had to be renounced with the consent of
the husband or excluded by a third party. It therefore
became common to use the marriage contract to create a
separate estate for the woman, by excluding the husband's
rights.
- 57 -
Marriage contracts, however, went still further. For a
woman, marriage entailed a passage from the guardianship
and support of one man to that of another. Her family,
happy to see her entering the most accepted and respectable
career of marriage and motherhood, would nonetheless be
concerned to guard against the possible failure of the
relationship. The marriage contract was a means of
creating a form of insurance should the marriage fail to
achieve its ideal. On marriage, the relationship envisaged
for the couple was that of husband as provider and guardian
and wife as housekeeper and mother. In return for the
support of his daughter, a father was expected to
contribute to the setting up of a marital fund. If a father
was so eager to entrust his daughter to the almost complete
care and control of another man, was he also willing to
entrust a portion of his wealth without some security?
Awareness of the possible shortcomings of the marriage
relationship was particularly evident in the development of
the use of trusts as part of the marriage contract. The
setting up of a trust could be regarded as a way of
ensuring that the dependent members of the family unit -
under the common law, the wife and children - could be
provided for if the husband failed in his duties. The
marriage trust commonly set aside a portion of the common
fund in which all parties concerned would have some rights.
No individual could overcome the rights of the whole unit.
So, by excluding the husband's legal rights, a marriage
contract could set up for the wife a separate estate. It
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could then set up a trust, the object of which was not
simply to establish the woman's separate property but to
ensure that some portion of the joint fund of both parties
was placed beyond their reach, for their future benefit and
r o
for the benefit of their dependants.
In introducing the series of legislative reforms, it could
be said that the law was extending to all women some of the
benefits which an elite already enjoyed as a result of a
carefully considered private marriage contract. The
legislation rendered unnecessary the contractual exclusion
of the husband's rights. It extended the exclusion
previously expressed in marriage contracts to all women.
The legislation did not deal, however, with the benefits or
possible necessity of some community of assets. Nor did it
extend to all wives the benefits of the private trust. The
law no longer intervened. It withdrew as it had withdrawn
in the past where there had been a private property
arrangement. But there was no guarantee that in the
majority of marriages there would be any private
arrangement. The legislation followed the pattern of
marriage contracts in that it removed the two most obvious
expressions of inequality and the two most unacceptable
examples of legal intervention in the marriage relationship
but without full consideration of the system - or the
absence of a system - which would remain. The jus mariti
and the right of administration were clearly prohibitive of
a property relationship suited to the growing notions of
equality and partnership within marriage. Their exclusion
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was therefore required. But marriage contracts had done
more than simply exclude these rights; they had made a
private property arrangement to protect the individuals and
to further the property interests of the community.
So the legislation did show a move away from legal
intervention. But the model for such non-intervention was a
system whereby private regulation was substituted. The
result of the legislation was to extend a sphere of
autonomy to all families but without any guarantee as to
how that autonomy would be exercised. The exclusion of the
law, which was seen as a benefit under the common law
system, was not necessarily a benefit where nothing was put
in its place. It was not that property was no longer to be
regarded as a legitimate aspect of the marriage
relationship but that it was to be regarded as an aspect
which should be privately controlled.^ To some extent, the
withdrawal of legal regulation was wrongly interpreted as a
sign that property was no longer an important aspect of
64
marriage. ^
The presentation of the reforms as bringing benefits in the
form of a switch from community to separate and in a move
to legal non-intervention credits them with expectations or
implications which they did not fulfil. These images of the
reforms, however, are reflected in other presentations of
the changing nature of marriage and its relations with
property and law.^ Although the substance of the images
can be questioned they continue to recur frequently in
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presentations of marriage and property and contribute to




As stated in the Introduction, I will restrict my study
to private law; to what is traditionally termed the law of
husband and wife.
^ Consideration of more recent legal reform, in particular
the Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act
1981 and the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, will be
contained in chapters 7 and 8.
O
J Discussion of the modern system will be postponed to
chapters 7 and 8.
^ There were also common law rules governing the division
of property on the breakdown of marriage - originally only
on death. These rules are outwith the scope of my study
which is primarily concerned with what happens during
marriage.
D.Murray, The Property of Married Persons, pp.88 - 89.
k Recognition of this method of funding the marriage will
be relevant in chapter 4 which considers the changing
nature of matrimonial property and its relationship to the
spouses.
^ Craig, Jus Feudale, Vol.11, pp.867-869.
0
R.K.Marshall, Virgins and Viragos: A History of Women in
Scotland from 1080-1980, p.75.
^ Changes in the nature of matrimonial property will be
considered more fully in chapters 4 and 5.
10
By virtue of the jus mariti, ownership of the wife's
moveable property passed to the husband. Ownership entailed
the power to "sell, or squander, or wastefully destroy" the
property - Gowan v. Pursell, 1822 1 S. 418; "to dispose of
and use them as he would any property he had acquired by




1 2 Some Scottish writers suggested that the jus mariti was
a right of administration but it seems clear from the
extent of a husband's power and control over his wife's
moveable property that it was a right of ownership. Stair
said that as a result of the jus mariti the husband,
"having the sole and unaccountable administration, his
power may rather seem to be a power of property ... yet is
no more than" the "economical power of government, the
administration ..." - Institutions, 1.4.9. Fraser, at
p.676, rejected the confusion oT The jus mariti with a
right of administration. He suggested that the definition
of the jus mariti as a mere right of administration
developed to fit with the idea of marriage as a
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partnership.
12 E.Clive, Husband and Wife, p.295.
1^ Murray, op.cit., p.8.
"The husband by the marriage becoming proprietor of all the
wife's personal estate ... is bound to provide her in all
the necessaries of life." Fraser, op.cit., p.837.
15 Murray, op.cit., p.8.
16 Fraser, op.cit., p.586.
12 Fraser, at p.773, records the notes of Lord Braxfield on
this problem:
"Yet valuable jewels different ... they are given to a wife
to wear while wife, and then to go to heir; not to be
considered as ordinary paraphernalia."
1 8
Her power to do anything with such items, however, was
subject to the husband's right of administration. She could
not, for example, enter into a contract of sale in respect
of any item of her paraphernalia without the consent of her
husband.
1^ Originally the right to terce was subject to the
requirement that the marriage must have lasted for at least
a year and a day or alternatively a child must have been
born and heard to cry - ie., a living child.
o o The idea was that she might use this money to buy a
dress.
O -i
Also excluded from the jus mariti were any provisions in
favour of the wife which were alimentary in nature. Such
provisions were regarded as "so peculiarly personal" to the






2^ Fraser, op.cit., p.796.
O c:
The development of marriage contracts will be discussed
more fully later in this chapter and in chapter 8.
^6 W.C. Smith, "Scots Law in the Victorian Era" (1901) 13
J.R. 152, at p.156.
27 Changes in property and in particular the rising
importance of income and moveables are discussed in chapter
4.




3^ L.Holcombe, Wives and Property, p. 35.
The Act received Royal Assent on 18 July 1881 and it
came into effect on that day.
32 Section 1(3) protected the wife's property against
arrestment or other diligence in respect of her husband's
debts, provided that it was kept separate from his
property.
33 The exclusion of the husband's jus mariti resulted in a
change in the law of succession. A wife already had a right
to share in the moveable estate of her husband if she
survived him - jus relictae. Previously no similar right
needed to be given to the husband who outlived his wife
because he already had ownership of her moveable property.
With the exclusion of the jus mariti, however, section 6
gave the husband an identical right - jus relicti - to a
share in the moveable estate of his wife, if she
predeceased him.
3^ Reforms relating to a married woman's earnings, as
previously discussed, excluded both jus mariti and the
right of administration.
O £
Some of these will be discussed in chapters 7 and 8.
o r
For example, A.D.M. Forte discussing changes in marriage
and property in Scotland:
"The present century has witnessed an almost continuous
improvement in the legal condition of women in Scotland."
"Some Aspects of the Law of Marriage in Scotland: 1500 -
1700," in E.M.Craik, Marriage and Property, p.104.
07 The significance of images emerging from historical






^ Clive, Husband and Wife, p.296.
^2 Clive, op.cit., p.295.
^3 Fraser, op.cit., p.651.
^ Scot. Law Com., Consultative Memorandum 57, Matrimonial
Property, 1983, p.5.
^■3 Quoted in Hoggett and Pearl, The Family, Law and
Society , p. 115 .
Murray, The Property of Married Persons, p.l.
^2 Prior to the reforms it might be argued that the wife's
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right to share in the common fund was suspended until the
death of her husband. Fraser v. Walker, 1872 10 M. 837, at
p.847. For discussion of the postponement of community
until death, see Fraser, at p.672.
AO
Sexual Divisions in Law, p.194.
^ The significance of a trend towards individualism will
be examined in chapter 8.
5® Modifications of the extreme separate property system,
in particular, resulting from the Family Law (Scotland) Act
1985 are discussed in Part III.
51 Z.Eisenstein, in A.Phillips (ed.), Feminism and
Equality, p.83.
52 C.Smart, The Ties That Bind, p.30.
s 8 The concept of marriage as a partnership will be
considered in chapter 8.
5^ Relations between marriage and property are complicated
by a (perceived) split between public and private which
will be examined in chapter 7.
55 Chapters 3 and 4.
See discussion of L.Stone in chapter 3.
52 Chapters 7 and 8.
c: o
A.V.Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England, p.387.
59
Murray, op.cit., p.19, discussing the opinion of Stair
at 1.4.9.
^ Walker v. Creditors of her Husband, 1730 M. 5841.
^ Trustees of Murray v. Dalrymple, 1745 M. 5842.
r r\
For further discussion of marriage contracts and the use
of trust see chapter 8.
r o
The absence of private control is discussed in chapter
8 •
^ This is an interpretation which will find support in my
arguments about Stone's discussion of the changing nature
of marriage: chapter 3.
^5 Chapters 3 and 4.
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CHAPTER 3: HISTORY OF MARRIAGE
In considering the changing law relating to matrimonial
property, there were suggestions that behind the reforms
-I
lay a changing pattern of familial and marital relations.
Such a connection between the form of the marriage
relationship and the property laws could be seen clearly
under the common law. There the combination of property and
the vesting of control in the husband fitted closely with
the doctrine of spousal unity and the position of the
husband as representative of the marital community.
"The view that the husband was 'the natural head of the
family' for centuries determined Scots law's approach to
the property consequences of marriage."
Under the common law there was, therefore, a clear link
between the promoted marriage relationship and the rules
that governed the property of husband and wife. Much legal
regulation seems to be informed by a conception of an ideal
type family - an image of the family. It may be that this
is an image which is influenced by or is represented in
historical studies of marriage and family. I propose now,
therefore, to trace some developments in the marriage
relationship.
With legal reform, the reforms themselves provide an
historical basis, followed by their representation by legal
writers. With the history of the marriage relationship,
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there are only representations. I will begin, therefore,
with an historical representation of changing marital and
familial relations. There is no shortage of historical
accounts of marriage and families from which to choose. It
is a subject which has attracted a wealth of social and
historical analysis. It is outwith the scope of this study
to evaluate the historical facts of these various accounts
and I do not intend to compare their merits or to question
their findings on the basis of empirical study. My concern
is not with tracing anew the historical development or
transformation of family structure and form. My concern is
not to discover for myself the truth about marriage and
families: the historical facts of their development.
Instead it is to present the true facts as exposed by
others.
I have chosen to concentrate in particular on the
historical account presented by Lawrence Stone in The
Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500 - 1800.^
In choosing Stone I am not primarily singling him out for
praise or criticism. I have chosen him for a variety of
reasons. Stone's account is detailed, it is wide ranging
and it is a good example of a family centred history. It
is, therefore, well suited to my purposes as I want to look
at the presentation of marriage in isolation. His book I
would suggest contains relatively few surprises. It fits
well with my impressions, my uncritical beliefs about how
marriage and families have changed. The progress in
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marriage that Stone recounts is largely consistent with
dominant perceptions of modern familial relations. Stone's
"picture of the past is just what one expects to find."-*
Stone's conclusions find some support in the work of other
writers on the family. His emphasis on the move to an
isolated conjugal family which has less to do with economic
functions and more to do with socialisation finds support
in, for example, the work of Talcott Parsons.^ Stone's
sentiment based method is similar to that adopted by P.
Aries in his study of childhood.^ In addition, the history
that Stone presents displays various similarities to the
apparent pattern of the legal reform of matrimonial
O
property. For these reasons also I have chosen it. In the
absence of my own historical study of family and marriage,
I will therefore use Stone's. His clear and detailed
account of developments in families and marriage will
provide a basis for looking at the history of marriage.^
Having set out the pattern of developments which he
describes I would then go on to consider, in more detail,
the conclusions that he produces; the trends that emerge.
Open Lineage Family
The basic pattern that Stone describes shows a progression
from an open and extended family, through a patriarchal and
increasingly nuclear family to the closed, domesticated,
nuclear family. He begins his history with the Open Lineage
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Family which was typical of the late medieval era. It was a
family type which was very "open to external influences"
and which displayed,
"a porosity that is in contrast to the more sealed off and
private nuclear family type that was to develop in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries."
The married couple and their children were only very
loosely distinguished from their wider family and kin. Many
of the functions that would later be performed within the
nuclear unit were instead carried out by an extensive
network of kinsfolk. The extended family, as described by
Stone, was not necessarily a family that lived together
under one roof. What bound the family and the kinship
together were ties of interest, property and common
support. The concern of the open lineage family was,
"the preservation, increase and transmission through
inheritance and marriage of the property and status of the
lineage.m11
According to Stone these ties and, in particular, concern
for the safe preservation of property were of varying
importance depending on the rank and status of the family
concerned. Among the families of the landowning elite,
there was intense concern over property and preservation of
lineage.
Stone argues that each marriage based family unit of this
age could not be considered in isolation, because it was so
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closely connected with the wider network of relatives and
kin. ^ in the arranging of marriages there was
considerable kin involvement, as a consequence of their
property interests. Even within the household there were
often no clear boundaries between the nuclear unit and the
servants, apprentices and other relatives who might be
resident with them. Among the poorer classes there was less
reason for kin to interfere in relation to property. Stone
argues, however, that even in those families there was
considerable outside interference and the ties between the
members of the nuclear unit were weak. Whereas, among the
propertied classes, economic interests were shared
throughout the family group, among the peasant classes,
economic interests were to a certain extent shared
throughout the community. This concern of the extended
family or the village was particularly evident in relation
to the process of spouse selection. There was strong
control exerted by parents or by the requirements of the
community over the choice of husband or wife.
In this extended open lineage family there was, according
to Stone, little concern for individual personality. This
seemed to be the product of various factors. The
personality of the spouses was not highlighted because the
personal or emotional side of the marriage was secondary to
the interests of property, status and kinship. Marriage for
interest or for status was, according to Stone, the norm
and property was a legitimate concern in the contracting of
a marriage. The personal nature of the chosen spouse was
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not of primary importance. There was at this time, and in
contrast to modern belief, no "clear dichotomy between
1 ^
marriage for interest ... and marriage for affect." To
marry for love was seen as a dangerous step, with the
carefully considered and financially advantageous union
being much preferred. As M.Anderson explains,
"love ... could not be allowed to interfere with the
essential economic functions of marriage."
Stone suggests that concern with the personal attributes of
a potential spouse was important only for the purposes of
breeding.^ It could be argued, on the basis of Stone's
portrayal, that there was, in effect, a "separation between
the sexual and the familial.Marriage was a means of
pursuing the interests and well-being of the family (the
extended family). For the property owning classes at least,
"marriage ... was a collective decision of family and kin,
not an individual one."1'
Marriage was not primarily regarded as a relationship for
the personal and sexual satisfaction of the spouses.
Marriage was seen less as establishing a private
relationship between husband and wife than as forging an
alliance between two family lines.
A more general, social explanation for the lack of interest
in personality was the belief that all individuals were
simply links in a grand chain of being. High mortality,
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particularly among infants, meant that frequently one child
would be substituted for another. A similar pattern was
common on the death of a wife. Continuation of the chain -
preservation of the family line - should be secured, with
little personal interest in the individual links - the
spouses and nuclear units.
These are some of the main factors which characterised the
open lineage family. It was a family network in which the
nuclear group was not prioritised. Instead there was likely
to be a much wider circle of more loosely connected
relatives and kin. It was a system that was very tightly
linked by interests of property and status. Kinship,
extended family interest and the elevated position of
heritage, particularly among the landowning elite, were
highly influential in the formation and regulation of
marriage. A similar pattern was to be found among the
poorer classes. While concerns of ownership were of less
importance to them, the economic functioning of the village
community, with the need to preserve and augment what few
assets one had, imposed restraints on spouse selection and
marriage. With the emphasis on material interests there
was little concern for affect. Marriage was regarded as an
important event in terms of property and status rather than
as an intimate and emotional relationship. It was, finally,
a family form that paid little regard to individual
personality. The dominant function of marriage, in
particular among the upper classes, was to ensure
continuation of the family line and preservation of
property, not to ensure personal happiness and individual
emotional satisfaction.
Restricted Patriarchal Nuclear Family
Between the 16th and the 18th centuries, the open lineage
family gave way to the Restricted Patriarchal Nuclear
Family.
Explanation of the open lineage family was, according to
Stone, relatively straightforward. It was the simple
product of a dominant concern to preserve power and status,
apparently with little room for individual feeling or
deviance. Explanation of the restricted patriarchal nuclear
family is much more complex and fragmented. Stone detects
three important factors which contributed to the emergence
of this new family type.
There was, first, the demise of kinship and clientage as
the guiding principles of society. This could be seen in
the declining importance of power and status as reasons for
marriage. These did remain important considerations among
some sections of society but they were no longer always the
only, or the dominant, consideration. Marriage for money or
status was suggested to have continued to a later date in
merchant classes and the lower middle class, where their
position on the economic ladder was somewhat tenuous.
Similarly, considerations of status may have continued
longer in the backward Scottish society.
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"The old considerations of political and territorial
alliance were slow to die out, because in Scotland kinship
remained an important factor until at least the beginning
of the eighteenth century."
Family connection and kinship alliance, however, was no
longer the main basis of power and social organisation.
Alongside the declining importance of status and
connection, there were signs of a closing off of the
nuclear core of the family. The extended family no longer
had the same need or justification to interfere. There was
a decline in the network of links that had previously
maintained the extended family. This could be seen in the
decreasing claims to patronage, cousinhood and hospitality
and in the reduction of control exerted by the wider family
over the arranging of marriage and over the economic
standing of the new unit.
The second factor which Stone identifies as influencing the
developing family form was the rise of the state. This was
closely connected with the first factor, the decline of
kinship. There was a shift in personal allegiance from the
family line, the kinship, to the centralised state and the
sovereign. It was, as described by Stone, "a shift from a
'lineage society'" to a "civil society."-^
Stone explains the influence of the rise of the state by
saying that,
"the modern state is a natural enemy to the values of the
clan, of kinship, and of good lordship and clientage links
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among the upper classes, for at this level they are a
direct threat to the state's own claim to prior loyalty."zu
Thus there was a decline in allegiance to a family or
kinship line and an increasing emphasis on direct
allegiance to the state.
The third factor discussed by Stone was the growth of
Protestantism. The emerging ideal of the Protestant church
was conjugal affection which contrasted with the previous
Roman Catholic ideal of chastity. The marriage bond was
sanctified through the Protestant teachings with increased
emphasis being placed on the quality of the marriage
relationship. Protestantism also emphasised the importance
of the family as the centre for religious teaching and
worship. The centralised power of the Church was dispersed
through the family as family prayers, private morality and
confession to each other became the focus for religious
activity.
These three factors, Stone argues, created the opportunity
for isolation of the nuclear unit from the previous ties
and demands of lineage and also introduced the ideal of the
conjugal bond, sanctified by religion. There was,
therefore, a significant closing off of the nuclear unit.
It was less open to family interference and less concerned
with preservation of lineage and family property. The
emphasis on membership of and allegiance to a family line
had switched to direct individual allegiance to the state.
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It also had as a focus the religious ideal of conjugal
affection which helped to strengthen personal bonds.
Within the increasingly distinct unit of the nuclear
family, there was however a new figure of authority - the
father. The heightened authority of the father could be
explained as follows:
"The growth of patriarchy was deliberately encouraged by
the new Renaissance state on the traditional grounds that
the subordination of the family to its head is analogous
to, and also a direct contributory cause of, subordination
of subjects to the sovereign."
With this new vision of a centralised state, stripped of
the controlling structure of kinship, there was fear of
chaos. Regulation of individual family units was therefore
concentrated in the father as head of the household. This
structure, it was hoped, would provide social stability and
would teach individuals allegiance and obedience within the
family which they would then reproduce in their relations
to the sovereign.
Patriarchal authority, while good for the father and
arguably good for the state, could pose a threat to the
weaker members of the nuclear unit. The wife and children
were now subject to the will of the father and, through the
greater isolation of the nuclear family, they were deprived
of the support of the wider kin network. Therefore Stone
notes a warning, of potential mistreatment of the wife and
children, in the midst of otherwise progressive and welcome
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family developments. The increasing isolation of the
nuclear unit could deprive the wife of outside support but
nonetheless it was,
"an essential preliminary step to clear the way fLcrr the
subsequent development of the domesticated family."
In Stone's discussion of the developments which produced
this new type of family there are signs of growing splits
and dichotomies. In particular, there is evidence of the
growing dichotomy between marriage for interest and
marriage for affect. Although the dominance of property and
status continues for a considerable time, at least at some
levels of society, the potential for conflict now exists
between choice based on considerations of property and
power and choice based on personal attributes and
expectation of affect.
Closed Domesticated Nuclear Family
The final stage in family development that Stone considers
produces the Closed Domesticated Nuclear Family. This
family form developed in the late 17th and the 18th
centuries and it was characterised by four main attributes.
There was, first, a trend away from hierarchy within the
family towards more equal relations. The patriarchal family
gave way to a relationship which was much less hierarchical
and authoritarian. This could be seen both in the greater
freedom of children from their parents and in the trend
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towards viewing spouses as forming a more equal
partnership. Secondly, the nuclear family became
increasingly isolated from the wider family and from the
community as a whole. This isolation could be seen in the
almost complete freedom of children to arrange their own
marriages and in the greater privacy accorded to family
members, both from each other and from outsiders. This
privacy was evidenced most clearly in the changing
architecture of their living space. Thirdly, there were
signs of much warmer affective relations between family
members. This could be seen in many aspects of marital
life, including the terms in which spouses addressed each
other, their letters and diaries, and also in the treatment
of children. The position of children in the family was, in
fact, the final characteristic of the closed domesticated
nuclear family. Children were now regarded as central to
the family, with much care and concern being lavished on
them. Children were recognised as a special group, distinct
from adults and with particular needs.
The closed domesticated nuclear family differed from the
previous types in that it was now a very distinct and
isolated unit. It was centred around the conjugal bond, a
bond which was entered into freely by two individuals on
the basis of personal choice. The relationship of marriage
was viewed as a partnership based on affect rather than a
hierarchy grounded in authority and property concerns. The
nuclear family, rather than being constrained by and
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answerable to outside interests, was increasingly inward
looking.
This brief outline of the three stages identified by Stone
provides a very summarised account of the dense and diverse
O O
detail accumulated in his history. J It displays the demise
of a very open and loosely defined nuclear family,
overshadowed by the interests and interference of a wider
kinship group and dominated to a large extent by property.
This was followed by a gradual closing off of the nuclear
unit, with increasing interest in its internal, affective
relations and growing emphasis on its individual members.
Progress towards the closed domesticated nuclear family was
temporarily held back by the authoritative structure of the
restricted patriarchal family. It is a story which seems to
accord with commonly held views of family and marriage
development and it is a pattern which finds support in the
progress of the legal reform of matrimonial property rules
in Scotland.
These changes, as described by Stone, provide a background
picture of developments in terms of marriage and family
forms. This is the second historical strand in considering
the relations between law, marriage and property.^ Having
outlined the pattern described by Stone, I want to go on to
discuss in more depth some of the changes, some of the
trends, that emerge from his history. I would suggest that
the developments that Stone describes may contribute to the
confusion of relations between law, marriage and property
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and I therefore intend to question them on that basis. The
images of change that emerge from Stone's account are to
some extent reflected in reforms of the legal regulation of
marriage and in particular of property in marriage. Stone's
account produces a pattern of change, a collection of
images, which I intend to use as a means of analysing the
relations between marriage, property and law. I will,
therefore, begin a critical examination of Stone's
conclusions which will be taken up again throughout the
following chapters.
My discussion of Stone's study and of the pattern which
emerges therefrom is not the product of a pretended
superiority of historical knowledge. Criticism of his work
is not primarily of the factual conclusions but of the
method that produced them. It is also a criticism which
recognises that other historical accounts already exist in
contradiction of Stone's conclusions."^
A SENTIMENTAL STUDY
Stone's book involves an attempt to chart changes over
three hundred years in marriage and the family, assessed
through consideration of personal feelings. His explanation
of changes in the family arises from a study of changing
attitudes within the family and between family members and
outsiders. Stone says of historical changes in marriage and
the family that,
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"what needs explaining is not a change of structure, or of
economics, or of social organization, but of sentiment."
By concentrating on individual sentiment Stone chooses the
most restricted and subjective way of regarding the family.
Stone's history has, as a basic element, the progression
from a family that placed little emphasis on sentiment to
one in which sentiment was supreme. In the early stages he
has to describe the demise of this former type of family,
which involves him in looking for other explanations and
interests. Having pinpointed the disappearance of this
early relationship he is free to look at the family from a
purely sentiment based approach. In particular Stone
suggests that there has been a shift in the central element
of the family from property to personal affect. Having
identified this shift he is free to concentrate only on
internal personal feeling while ignoring, justifiably
according to his theory, any outside influence or
? 7interference and any continuing place for property.
Stone sets out to concentrate on sentiment but the pattern
which he describes may have repercussions beyond the limits
of his intended scope. I would argue that the pattern
described by Stone is influential in the relations which
are maintained between the family and other social or legal
concepts, for example, property. The conclusions of a
restricted sentiment based study may characterise the
family and relations with it in a much wider sense.
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Before considering what effect the family forms that emerge
from Stone's account may have on relations between
marriage, property and law, I want to highlight some of
the dominant characteristics of the families that he
describes and to consider the pattern of progress that he
presents. In particular, three important trends emerge from
Stone's history. There is first, a move from a property
(power/status/economic) centred family to a family centred
on affect; second, the emergence of a closed family unit
which is increasingly inward looking and shut off from
outside contact and interference and thirdly, a progression
from community/continuity, based on interchangeability, to
individualism. In considering each of these three aspects
of Stone's work, I am concerned with the misleading
conclusions which can result from a wholly sentiment
centred approach, in particular in terms of the connections
between law, marriage and property. My concern is not that
his conclusions are in themselves wrong but that because of
their restricted nature they are misleading. The images of
marriage which emerge from these findings may obscure the
continued interaction of law and property with marriage.
The pattern which Stone produces in his account of changes
in marriage and the family is central to my discussion of
marriage, property and law. The three shifts that Stone
describes - property to affect, open to isolated and
community to individualism - are shifts that can be
detected in legal reforms relating to the property of
husband and wife. They describe developments which are
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reflected in the pattern of the law. They are also
influential in popular perceptions of marriage and its
relations with property and law. These shifts described by
Stone can therefore be discovered in concrete form in Scots
law. They are also present in images which seem to inform
our thinking and perception of marriage.
THE RISE OF AFFECT; THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PROPERTY
Stone sets up a major shift in family form from a family
which is grounded in property to one which is characterised
by affective relations. He begins by describing the pre-
16th century family as,
"a structure held together not by affective bonds but by
mutual economic interests.
The extended open lineage family, which Stone described as
typical of medieval times, incorporated a series of smaller
conjugal units. Each of these units developed from
carefully considered and strictly negotiated property and
power deals. Family property was an inheritance whose safe
passage and possible enlargement was to be secured through
prudent marriage. It was, said Stone,
"a family type which was entirely appropriate to the social
and economic world of the sixteenth century ... irt^which
connections and patronage were the keys to success."^
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With property and economic concerns so important in the
formation of marriages, it is not surprising that romance
played little part. Indeed,
"the accepted wisdom of the age was that marriage based on
personal selection and thus inevitably influenced by such
ephemeral factors as sexual attraction or romantic love was
if anything less likely to produce lasting hapniness than
one arranged by more prudent and mature heads."
Property was important to the medieval family or family
line at certain fixed points, for example, on marriage or
at death. The act of marriage was a point at which status,
power and property would be transferred and so it was at
this point of the relationship - the formation of the
marriage - that most external family control focused. The
main concern of the families was the choice of spouse and
the negotiations which would surround the conclusion of the
bargain of marriage. Stone emphasises the extent of
parental control which was exerted over choice of spouse
and, in contrast, he points to the lack of romance, affect
or individual preference which was present at that time.
It seems that the absence of personal feeling at the point
of marriage can be understood by looking at the overriding
concerns of property and status. Could romance and warmer
relations not be expected to follow as the relationship
developed? Stone suggests that there is evidence of close
loving relationships in some marriages of this time but
scarcity of primary material makes general conclusions
uncertain. He does, however, consider the position of
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affect within this family type. He suggests that the
individual personality type in this period had a generally
low capacity for affective relations. The family members
were unable to develop the level of feeling necessary to
sustain a close nuclear grouping. Family bonds, therefore,
were economic chains rather than the ties of affection
which were to follow.
"In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there
predominated a personality type with low gradient affect
whose capacity for warm relationships was generally limited
and who diffused wha± there was of it widely among family,
kin and neighbours."^
In the open lineage family Stone identifies two aspects:
the importance of property and the low capacity for affect.
These together produce a family unit which is tied by
economic concerns and which is characterised by very weak
affective relations. Behind the decline of this family
type, he highlights the decreasing importance of property
interests and the warming of personal relations. From this
point onwards his concern is sentiment - a study of the
interaction of family members as demonstrated by emotion
and affect. He follows the trail of changing personality
but apparently dismisses the notion of changing property.
Stone describes the declining importance of property as a
controlling factor in marriage. He describes the growing
emphasis on affect which results from the reduced
importance of property and the heightened capacity for
personal affect. He does not consider whether there is any
continuing place for property.
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At this stage in Stone's history there seems to be a split.
From being a slave of property, marriage is liberated and
given an existence of its own. It becomes a relationship of
personal significance. From here Stone follows the
development of personal sentiment, the path of affect,
ignoring the position of property. In the earlier family
network, the formation of a kinship system and the safe and
profitable passage of property rights was of supreme
importance. With the disappearance of this most obvious aim
of the family, Stone tends to see only the warming of
affective relations as taking its place. Stone's
description of the decline of property interests and the
rise of affect signals a point of divergence in marital
affairs.
In the restricted patriarchal nuclear family there are
still elements of property interest. In certain sections of
society, property continued to be an important
consideration in the marriage making process. For the elite
who continued to control large estates and for the lower
classes to whom, " a little capital was so important in the
establishment of a secure niche,commercial
considerations continued to be important. But there was
also a growing emphasis on the conjugal bond and a
realisation that a close relationship between the spouses
would not necessarily develop unless they were allowed some
freedom in choosing their partner. In this stage of family
development Stone considers the loosening of parental
control over the process of mate selection. In the
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increasing freedom of the individuals themselves and the
increasing emphasis on romance, Stone sees further evidence
of a shift away from property and towards affect.
In the final stage of the closed domesticated nuclear
family, supreme importance is given to the place of affect
within the family. The decline in significance of property
and status concerns was a necessary preliminary step in
allowing choice to be guided by personal preference but the
emergence of the affective family was also the result of an
increased individual capacity for affect.
"In the eighteenth century there predominated...a
personality type with 'steep gradient' affect, whose
general capacity for intimate personal relationships was
much greater and whose emotional ties were now far more
closely concentrated on spouse and child." ^
This new type of family was judged on the basis of its
affective relations. It was characterised by a very close
bonding between husband and wife and between parents and
children. There was evidence of increased personal intimacy
between spouses and romance, from being mistrusted, became
an integral part of courtship and marriage. At the centre
of this close nuclear family was what Stone described as
the companionate marriage.
The evidence which Stone presents does seem to suggest that
there was indeed an increasing emphasis placed on affect
and personal happiness in the type of marriage relationship
which developed from the 17th century onwards. The decline
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in the importance of heritable property and kinship
connections was an essential step in allowing affect to
flourish. Stone, however, in the pattern he presents, hints
at an apparent conflict between property and affect. He
demonstrates that in the property centred medieval marriage
there was no space for affect. Having described the demise
of this particular type of property, however, he does not
go on to consider whether in the affective family there is
any place for a new type of property. Family property as a
controlling factor in marriage disappeared and Stone does
not consider what other position property might occupy in
the new affective family. In this way I would suggest that
he supports and strengthens the dichotomy to which he
himself refers - the dichotomy between marriage for
interest and marriage for love - and the more general
notion of a split between matters of property and matters
of the heart. It is not his description of the growth of
affect that I dispute but his implication that within the
affective family there is no place for property.
This split between property and affect can be detected also
in the pattern of legal reform. The abolition of the jus
mariti and the right of administration apparently signalled
the end of a relationship between marriage and property.
At least in terms of law, marriage was of no consequence in
relation to the property of husband and wife. The property
of husband and wife was no longer regulated by specialised
rules of Family Law but was governed by the ordinary rules
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of property with no regard to the married status of the
owners.
Yet this new affective family, which stems from the
companionate marriage, is situated within property. The
companionate marriage is made possible by the setting of
the matrimonial home and it is therein that it flourishes.
In his discussion of the importance of romance and its
specific expression within the family, Stone concentrates
on the changing design of the family home. The affective
family of the upper classes lived in homes which displayed
three architectural innovations - the ha-ha, the dumb
O C
waiter and the corridor. ° These exhibited, according to
Stone, an increasingly romantic nature, a further isolation
of the nuclear core from outsiders and the intimacy of the
married couple. In his unfolding of the closed affective
nuclear family, Stone gives some indication of the property
that will be significant to it. His sanctif ication of
conjugal privacy and domestic bliss highlights the
ascendancy of the role of the matrimonial home. In his
physical isolation of the domesticated family, Stone helps
in the construction of a sphere of autonomy symbolised by
the matrimonial home. The companionate marriage, the
relationship that should develop within the closed
domesticated nuclear family, is set within the matrimonial
home. By idealising the affective significance of this
particular family asset, Stone leaves no room for
consideration of more selfish proprietary concern.^
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Although Stone uses family property to demonstrate the
sentiment based nature of the affective family, he does not
go on to consider the relationship between marriage and
this property. He discusses the type of property in which
the ideal marriage is situated but he does not consider the
link between the relations of marriage and ownership. In
the medieval family, property concerns were evident at the
inception of the marriage; in the later, affective family I
would suggest that property is an integral aspect of the
family form and existence and yet it is used by Stone only
to emphasise the focus of the family on personal, affective
O O
relations.00 Stone describes the physical proximity of the
affective family, the companionate marriage, and domestic
property, in particular the family home. He does not
recognise the consequent interaction between the legal
relationships of marriage and ownership.
Under the system of the open lineage family, the concern
was primarily with marriage as an incident of property
control and status and not with marriage as a personal
relationship. There was therefore no gap between two
possibly conflicting aims. The changing nature of
OQ
matrimonial property and the growth of emotional,
religious, romantic aspects of marriage meant that there
were now two strands to be considered. By the use of
sentiment alone, as the indicator of family form in the
later stages of development, Stone highlights only one.
What Stone describes is the substitution of affect for
property in the scale of values at work in the process of
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choice of spouse. He emphasises the changing pattern of
mate selection. Choice ceased to be dominated by property
and was increasingly informed by personal preference. He
does not proceed to consider whether or not the absence of
property at the contracting of marriage continues
throughout the relationship.
INCREASING ISOLATION: THE BIRTH OF THE PRIVATE
Stone's concentration on emotion and inter-personal
behaviour serves to emphasise the growing isolation of the
affective nuclear family. At the same time, it enables him
to deny the need to consider any continuing interaction
between family and society. In tracing the decline of the
open lineage family and the growth of the closed nuclear
family, Stone highlights a shift from an extended family
structure to a system comprised of individual independent
introspective units. The nuclear family becomes isolated in
terms of independence from familial and other external
control and it becomes isolated in terms of physical space.
Stone's line of argument in relation to the increased
isolation of the modern family is formed around the
withdrawal of kin and community and also the tightening of
the personal bonds between members of the nuclear unit.
With the decreasing control of kin over the contracting of
marriage and the community's declining censorship of
morality within the marriages of the lower classes, the
relationship is apparently released from external control.
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It becomes, according to Stone, an area of personal and
internal regulation. By this argument, Stone contributes to
the image that marriage and the family is a closed unit,
unregulated by and in isolation from the outside world.
This is an image which is perpetuated by Stone's
concentration on the disappearance of one specific example
of external control. As his consideration of property
centres on the point of marriage, so to a large extent does
his demonstration of the isolation of the nuclear family.
Throughout the restricted patriarchal nuclear family and
the closed domesticated nuclear family he describes the
reduction in parental control over courtship and spouse
selection. This is an indication of the couple's increasing
isolation. In the physical segregation of the family within
their private home there is further evidence of their
isolation within their own sphere of autonomy.
A similar pattern emerges from the law of husband and wife.
The married women's property reform legislation signals the
end of legal regulation of property as an incident of
marriage. With the removal of the jus mariti and the
husband's right of administration, law ceases to regulate
the property of husband and wife during marriage. There is
an apparent move both in law and in Stone's history towards
reduced regulation of marriage.
In the place of familial or legal control of marriage and
the nuclear family there is, however, evidence of newly
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emerging potential for control. The area of regulation
shifts from the property of the couple to the nature of
their relationship itself. In order to fit the woman for
her role as companion to her husband and educator of her
children, she herself required to be better educated. The
standard of education expected of women was generally low
with academic achievement being regarded as a male
preserve. Increasingly, however, girls would be educated in
basic communication and arithmetical skills and also in
domestic accomplishments. While some would go on to pursue
learning for self interest, the general attitude towards
female education was that,
"the accomplishments they sought to acquire would make them
attractive as potential wives."
There was considerable debate and argument as to the
content of female education. This was typical of a general
explosion of opinion and advice as to behaviour within the
family and I would suggest that in this there was the
potential for a diverse range of external controls to be
placed on the so called closed and isolated nuclear family.
Stone himself considers two aspects of this opinion and
advice - on child care and sexual relations. There was a
great spread of popular literature, educating and advising
on both of these subjects. Parents were encouraged to
devote much more care and attention to their offspring and
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specific attention was given to the encouragement of
maternal breast feeding in preference to the use of wet
nurses, the abandonment of swaddling, the adoption of
specially designed clothes for children which would free
them from the harmful constraints of adult fashion and the
importance of education. In relation to sex there was an
increasing level of, mainly medical, advice usually
promoting restraint. There was also, however, a great deal
of medical literature advising on general hygiene, health
and contraception. A plethora of rules existed as to when
sexual activity should and should not be permitted.
This increased external concern as to the inter-personal
relations of husband and wife and parent and child
demonstrates that, contrary to Stone's assertion that the
nuclear family is a closed and isolated unit, it is in fact
the object of considerable outside interest and influence.
Despite the physical privacy of the child's nursery and the
intimacy of the matrimonial bed, new lines of external
regulation have emerged which target precisely these
examples of the family's isolation.
Stone discusses in much detail the development of child
care and the increasing emphasis on personal and sexual
relations and to some extent he considers the tensions
which this emphasis on the personal relationship provokes.
Wives and mothers of the lower classes found compliance
with new standards of domestic order and hygiene difficult
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to achieve in substandard housing. There were also
potentially conflicting requirements:
"many wives found themselves torn between the two sets of
new affective responsibilities, towards their husbands and
towards their children.
His account of the closed nuclear family makes no allowance
for those who fail to achieve the affective ideal. His
portrayal of the apparent liberation of marriage from
external control only mentions briefly the drawbacks in the
form of increased tensions or the removal of social and
familial props for the couple. He does not proceed to
consider the outcome of the collapse of the nuclear unit or
of the misuse of the independence which it is apparently
granted. He describes the proliferation of advice and
opinion as evidence of increasing emphasis on the quality
of personal relations between family members. He does not,
however, highlight the potential for new areas of external
interference and regulation that may result from failure to
attain these ideals.^
Stone adheres firmly to his description of the nuclear
family as an isolated and closed unit. A.s a conclusion
based on the decline of the control exerted by the extended
family over property and choice of spouse this seems
reasonable. But the limited nature of his conclusion must
be stressed. Having witnessed the death of one very obvious
example of external control and interest in the nuclear
unit, he looks no further for the emergence of different
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lines of external control. In fact he spends many pages
outlining new areas of outside concern and influence in the
isolated family but he fails to make the connection. As a
result, Stone contributes to the image of the modern
nuclear family as an isolated, inward looking and private
unit.
One final thought on Stone's emphasis of the split between
the nuclear family and the outside world:
"These changes in human relations within the microcosm of
the family cannot be explained except in terms, of changes
in the macrocosm of the total cultural system."
If we are to accept that the nuclear family is in fact an
isolated unit, largely unregulated by external control, can
we also accept Stone's conviction that the microcosm of the
family reflects the macrocosm of society? The falsity of
this statement becomes apparent, I would suggest, in
further analysis of Stone's third major trend - the move
from community and interchangeability to individualism.
THE GROWTH OF INDIVIDUALISM: THE DEATH OF COMMUNITY
The third conclusion of Stone's history which I would
question is his account of a shift from interchangeability
and the importance of community to individualism. As with
much of his study, within the restricted sphere of
sentiment, the evidence which he presents supports his
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conclusion. It is a failure to look further than the area
of personal sentiment which threatens to make his
conclusions misleading.
Individualism, according to Stone, played a significant
role in the substitution of affect for property as the
dominant feature of family form and behaviour. In studying
the shift from property to affect and the release of the
nuclear unit from external control, the concept of
individualism figures strongly. Having outlined Stone's
discussion of the rise of individualism I would question it
on two grounds: first, his suggestion that individualism
within the family folloivs a general social trend^"^ and
second, his suggestion that the rise of individualism
marked the death of community.^
Stone argues from the basis that individualism within the
family is a reflection of individualism within society at
large. He begins by setting out the social view at the time
of the open lineage family.
"In the sixteenth century and earlier the standard world
view was that all individuals in society are bound together
in the Great Chain of Being and all are interchangeable
with each other.
This view of society fitted well with the family in that,
"one wife or child could substitute for another like
soldiers in an army. The purpose in life was to assure the
continuity of the family, the clan, the village or the
state, not to maximise the well being of the individual."
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This position changed in the 17th century to one of a
society composed of unique, self seeking individuals. It
was this stage of individualism which was identified with
the restricted patriarchal nuclear family. Society was now
seen as being made up of individuals, freed from their
kinship ties and each owing their independent allegiance
to the sovereign state. There was fear that this unbridled
individualism might lead to anarchy and this was a factor
in the increase of patriarchal authority within the
family. The final stage of individualism was that which
developed in the eighteenth century. Society was now seen
as a collection of unique individuals each legitimately
pursuing their own ends within a sphere of personal
autonomy, restricted only to the extent that was necessary
to allow similar freedom to their fellow individuals. It is
this final stage of individualism which is identified with
the closed domesticated nuclear family.
Stone explains that individualism had two sources. First, a
growing personal introspection and belief in the unique
nature of each being and second, the desire for a personal
sphere of autonomy in which to pursue one's own ends.^
This latter aspect also required toleration of the autonomy
of others. In society Stone identified many different
examples of the growth of both of these aspects of
individualism. Personal introspection was evidenced by the
passion for keeping intimate diaries and in the burgeoning
literature dealing with sentiment. Tolerance and personal
freedom were most obvious in the growth of the sovereign
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state and the liberal philosophies of laissez faire and
freedom of contract.
Both of these aspects of individualism, Stone argues, were
reflected in the microcosm of the nuclear family. I would
suggest first, that the evidence of individualism within
the family may be a distorted reflection of its expression
in wider social terms and second, that while individualism
was clearly emphasised at one stage of the marriage
relationship, it did not necessarily signal the death of
community within marriage.^
Individualism in society produced a vision of man as an
autonomous being, free to choose to enter into obligations.
This analogy was evident in discussion of the marriage
relationship as a contract. There was certainly evidence of
individual freedom in the loosening of parental control
over entry into marriage and, at least theoretically, in
the apparent shift from marriage as a compulsory obligation
to marriage as a freely entered into contract. Stone also
used the liberal concepts of free and equal individuals to
explain the shift from a family based on hierarchical
patriarchal authority to a vision of marriage as an equal
partnership. At this stage his argument becomes less
convincing. What Stone describes is the triumph of
individualism at one stage of the relationship - the point
of entry. He concentrates on the change from the selection
of a spouse by the extended family, on the basis of
economic criteria, to the personal selection of a partner
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on the basis of individual character and expectations of
affect. The suggestion is that the personal autonomy of the
prospective spouses will continue throughout the
relationship and yet he offers little evidence in support.
Stone does not consider the socially and economically
unequal positions of husband and wife and fails to tackle
the question of a split between public and private. While
individualism and equality may be present in that each
spouse may now call the other by his or her first name and
each spouse has important individual roles to play in
relation to the family, there is little to suggest that
individualism as present in social and economic terms was
reproduced within the microcosm of the family.
Individualism in terms of sentiment may indeed have been
characteristic of the closed domesticated nuclear family.
By his contention that individualism within the family was
a reflection of individualism in wider terms, Stone's
conclusion produces a misleading image. The gap between
individualism in each of these spheres will become apparent
when the relation between husband and wife and matrimonial
property is considered.
Stone's second implication as to the effects of
individualism can also be questioned. The facts as
presented by Stone clearly show that individual choice and
individual personality were the primary concerns at the
formation of the modern marriage which was at the centre of
the affective family. It is misleading however to assume
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that this signals a general shift away from emphasis on the
community and the continuity of the family. Stone refers to
a radical philosophy which emerged in the 18th century; a
philosophy that promoted the search for personal happiness
in this world as opposed to delayed gratification in the
next.
"By the early eighteenth century complete identification
had been made between the pursuit of gratification by the
individual and the welfare of the public."
Stone uses this philosophy as part of his explanation of
the growth of affect. It allows personal happiness and
private satisfaction to be regarded as legitimate goals
and therefore opens the way for the display of affect and
emotion. What he does not go on to consider, to any great
extent, is how this philosophy fits with the encouragement
of individualism in marriage. He does state that,
"those who wished to reduce the amount of adultery were
concerned to make marriage a companionate bond freely
entered into, so that sexual passion could be more
comfortably confined to the marriage bed."J^
He does not go on, however, to link the promotion of
individual choice to enter marriage and to select a spouse
with the desire to strengthen the community of the family
which they will form.
In this aim there is material to suggest that
individualism, meaning greater personal introspection and
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freedom of choice, is not a value which is inconsistent
with a relationship which favours community. J Stone is
correct to describe it as inconsistent with community in
terms of the open lineage family; community meaning the
extended family as a system based on property and status
considerations. He does not, however, go on to consider
what role community has to play in the domesticated nuclear
family. Stone describes in great detail the companionate
marriage, a closely bonded relationship based on
interpersonal expectations and satisfaction. Within this
marriage he concentrates on the individuals and fails to
consider the very strong community which ideally they
should create. Again, therefore, his emphasis on
individualism at one stage in the marriage process
contributes to an image of a shift from community to
individualism; an image which is discredited by
consideration of the strong community nature of the ideal
family which Stone describes as emerging from the
individually chosen spouse.
From Stone's presentation of changes I would highlight
these three shifts - property to affect, open to closed and
community to individual. These are shifts which are central
to the discussions in Part II of the continuing interaction
between marriage, property and law. Considering Stone's
account in isolation there seems evidence to support these
shifts. They are also reflected in the developments within
law. I will argue, however, that these shifts contribute to
the creation of misleading images or perceptions of
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marriage and the relations which it has with property and
law.
Stone's presentation is therefore important on two levels.
First, as the legal reforms explain changes within Scots
law of husband and wife, so Stone's account gives some idea
of changes which occurred within the personal relation of
marriage. It creates a history of marriage. Secondly, the
patterns of change which Stone describes may contribute to
the creation of images of marriage. They may cloud our
perception of marriage. These images, in turn, contribute
to the confusion which surrounds the relations between
marriage, property and law.-^
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NOTES
There was reference to the view of marriage as a
partnership and the increasing employment of women outside
and independent of marriage.
^ Scot. Law Com., Consultative Memorandum No. 57,
Matrimonial Property, 1983, p.2.
^ In Part II I intend to criticise those facts but
nonetheless to argue that their truths may have influenced
images - legal images - of the relations between marriage,
property and law.
^ If it was ray intention to suggest a perfect parallel
between the legal developments in chapter 2 and the
changing marital patterns suggested by Stone, there would
be two immediate opportunities for criticism - (1)
chronological inconsistency and (2) national difference.
That is not my intention. I do not suggest an interlocking
fit but instead aim to highlight images (false or
misleading) which emerge from both of these studies.
A.Macfarlane in his review of Stone's book in 1979 Vol.
XVIII, History and Theory at p.105.
^ For example, T.Parsons, "The Isolated Conjugal Family,"
in M.Anderson, Sociology of the Family.
^ P.Aries, Centuries of Childhood.
0
As discussed in chapter 2.
Q
His account has also been the subject of considerable
criticism, in particular by A.Macfarlane who disputes,
inter alia, Stone's description of the rise of
individualism: A.Macfarlane, The Origins of English
Individualism.
L.Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-
1800, p.85.
11 Stone, op.cit., p.85.
1 9
It is Stone's abandonment of this method of considering
the family's interaction with wider society, in his
consideration of later stages of marriage and the family,
that I would suggest contributes to certain misleading
conclusions: see chapters 5 and 6.
1 ^
Stone, op.cit., p.86.
M.Anderson, Sociology of the Family, p.45.
1 s
Stone, op.cit., p.89.
J.Donzelot, The Policing of Families, p.24.
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^ Stone, op.cit., p.87.
16 R.K.Marshall, Virgins and Viragos: A History of Women in
Scotland from 1080-1980, p.64.
19 Stone, op.cit., p.134.
? 0
Stone, op.cit., p.133.




Stone himself summarised his work from the original book
of 800 pages to the more manageable abridged version of 400
pages.
Aspects of these historical developments, as described by
Stone, will be considered in greater depth and re-examined
throughout this work.
2^ Relations between these three elements will be discussed
in Part II.
O £
For example, A.Macfarlane, Origins of English
Individualism, which disputes the shift from extended to
nuclear family as described by Stone and Macfarlane's
"Review of Lawrence Stone, 'The Family, Sex and Marriage
1500-1800'," 1979, History and Theory, Vol.XVIII, 103.
26 Stone, op.cit., p.658.
? 7
More detailed criticism of Stone's method is contained
in chapter 6.
28 This will be considered in Part II.
29 Stone, op.cit., p.118.
30 ibid.
31 Stone, op.cit., p.181.
32 Stone, op.cit., p.268.
33 S tone, op.cit., p.392.
34 Stone, op.cit., p.180.
35 This is: a split which will be reconsidered in Part II.
36 Stone, op.cit., p.395.
37 See chapters 7 and 8 - discussion of the Matrimonial
Home.
38 Changing types of matrimonial property and relations




R.K.Marshall, Virgins and Viragos, p.134.
Stone, op.cit., p.248.
^ For example, the Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection)
(Scotland) Act 1981 allows legal intervention on the basis
of misuse of the family's private, independent space: see
chapter 7.
^3 Stone, op.cit., p.150.
^ A split between liberal individualism within the market
and within the family is discussed in chapter 7.
^3 The contrast between individualism and community is
discussed in chapter 8.
^ Stone, op.cit., p.257.
^ ibid.
^■3 Stone, op.cit., p.223.
49 The description of marriage as a community is intended
to convey the idea of marriage as something more than two
individuals. These arguments are developed more fully in
chapter 8.





53 The co-existence of community and individualism is
considered in chapter 8.
3^ This argument will be developed in Part II.
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CHAPTER 4: HISTORY OF PROPERTY
Historical changes in the regulation by Scots law of the
property of husband and wife have shown the demise of the
common law system of combination and its replacement by a
system of separate property. Stone's presentation of
historical changes in marriage and family relations has
indicated a move towards a closed, isolated, domesticated
conjugal relationship which has as its focus affective
relations between family members. The third element which
remains to be considered, from the point of view of
historical change, is property. In order to complete the
study of the three elements of marriage, law and property,
I want to look at property as a separate aspect. A
consideration of changes in terms of property will provide
the third element of the relations between law, marriage
and property.
An understanding of changes in property will complete the
picture of the couple, their property and their relations
with law. As we have seen changes in both law and marriage,
so it is reasonable to expect that property will also have
changed. The prevalence of different types of asset has
altered, methods of property acquisition and transfer have
changed, there have been developments in relations between
family and property and there have been new theoretical
trends in terms of property and ownership. In discussing
legal reforms and changes in marriage, it is therefore
useful to consider the types of property that would have
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been significant at each stage. This brief historical
consideration of property will aim to provide some idea of
the type of property that is relevant at different stages
in the process of law reform and in the process of
development of the marriage relationship.
A presentation of historical change in aspects of property
and ownership is, therefore, one function of this chapter.
An understanding of property changes has a second and more
important function in this thesis. I would suggest that
recognition of the changing relevance of various types of
assets and of developments in ownership and theories of
ownership gives a different perspective on the histories of
law reform and marriage that have already been considered.
The patterns of change that emerge from historical
presentations of the legal reforms and of marriage can be
questioned when looked at in conjunction with changes in
property itself.^
Some discussion of property has already emerged in the
previous two chapters, from looking at legal reforms and at
Stone's account of developments within marriage and
families.
Legal reform
From the accounts of legal reform there emerge several
ideas about property. Most obviously there seems to be a
split between marriage and property. Under the common law a
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strict system of regulation was imposed on the property of
a married couple and in particular on the property of the
wife. Marriage was recognised as a significant event in
relation to property and it was the subject of legal
regulation and family intervention. The law of husband and
wife gradually inserted a series of adjustments and
refinements to the system before seeming to abandon
regulation of matrimonial property. The introduction of
separate property apparently signalled the end of law's
interest in matrimonial property. With the removal of the
jus mariti and the husband's right of administration, law
ceased to impose any scheme of regulation on the property
of husband and wife as an incident of marriage. Henceforth
the property of spouses would be dealt with under the
O
normal rules of property and regardless of marital status.
The legal reforms therefore suggested a split between
marriage and property.
In the process of the reforms there was also some
indication of the changing relevance of different types of
property. Pressure for reform and the resulting reforms, of
the jus mariti, highlight the growing importance of
moveable property. In a society where land was the most
important asset, the jus mariti was perhaps of limited
importance but its significance increased with the
expansion of moveables. That the jus mariti was finally
abolished in 1881, whereas the right of administration
remained until 1920 reflects, perhaps, the greatly
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increased importance of moveable property and the urgency
of achieving legal reform.
The legal reforms also give some indication of new sources
of matrimonial property and of changing relations between
owner and asset. The common law would have originally been
devised for a system whereby matrimonial property was
usually inherited or gifted or entrusted to the couple on
marriage.^ Later, it became more common for the couple to
acquire property individually in the course of the
relationship and for reasons unconnected with the marriage.
Signs of these changes can be seen in the legal reforms.
Early amendments to the basic regulatory system pick out
property which is acquired as the consequence of the
individual's labour, rather than property which is
inherited or acquired as a gift.^
Family history
From Stone's account of family history there also emerge
several ideas about property. Stone describes a shift from
a family type which had property as a central interest to a
family type concerned primarily with affect. In the
majority of marriages, property ceased to exert control
over the choice of spouse and over the family unit. Instead
the choice of partner and the subsequent existence of the
couple and their children was guided by personal emotion.
The lessening interest of parents and kin in the property
consequences of their children's marriage was an important
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enabling factor in the development of Stone's companionate
marriage. The declining importance of the property and
status of potential spouses made personal choice of partner
much more widely acceptable. The fall of the property
centred marriage cleared the way for the emergence of the
modern affective marriage.
There emerges from Stone's account a split between marriage
based on property and marriage based on affect. With the
rise of the affective marriage, the link between marriage
and property is broken. A separation develops in marriage
between property and affect, with the resultant claim that
matters of commerce and matters of the heart should not be
mixed. This is a sentiment which continues to attract much
popular support.-* Stone traces the development of this
split. He notes a move from an age when marriage and money
were closely and legitimately linked to an age where
thoughts of property seem to sully the personal
relationship of spouses. He explains that a conflict
between marriage for money and marriage for love did not
exist in medieval times. There was no dichotomy between
marriage for interest and marriage for love. In his
history, in the progress towards the modern affective
marriage, he demonstrates the emergence of this split.
Stone uses his theory, of the decline of property in
relation to marriage, as an important factor in the
emergence of modern marriage and families. The reduction of
parental control, which had been inspired by commercial
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concern, opened the way for the emphasis on individual
choice and individual affection which was essential to the
development of the companionate marriage. Stone does
recognise the continued existence of property in the modern
family. He gives some indication of the changing types of
property that are relevant to marriage. He explains that
the setting for the modern domestic family and the
companionate marriage is the matrimonial home. Domestic
accommodation, providing privacy for the nuclear family and
purpose for the wife, is an important aspect of the new
pattern of family existence. Stone devotes considerable
attention to the importance of the matrimonial home in the
functioning of the companionate marriage. This central
family asset, however, he considers in the discourse of
sentiment and affect, ignoring its more basic proprietorial
elements. He discusses the matrimonial home as a physical
setting rather than as an object of ownership.
From the historical discussion of the changing legal
regulation of the property of spouses and from Stone's
account of changing marital and familial relationships
there emerge, therefore, various indications of
developments in terms of property itself. To some extent
there is similarity in the property developments that
emerge from the discussions of both marriage and legal
reform. There is evidence in both of a split between
marriage and property. There is evidence in both of a
growing emphasis on the individual and the individual's
worth. From Stone's work there is also an indication of an
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asset of particular value to the modern family - the family
home. In neither of these two histories, however, is
priority given to these changes in property. The signs of
change that I have taken from both the legal reform and
from Stone's account are implicit.
To do any more than draw attention to these similarities
would be premature. First, I want to consider in more
detail the property element itself. The family centred
history and the law centred history have provided some
insights but I would like to consider separately the aspect
of property. As with law and marriage, property cannot be
defined as an enduring unchanging concept. It too is
susceptible to historical shifts and change and should be
regarded as the third variable in the developing relations
between law, marriage and property. In considering the
legal reforms and the familial changes described by Stone,
it is important to note that property may also have
changed.
To recount, in detail, developments in the law and theories
of property and ownership is quite clearly beyond the scope
of this work. This chapter is intended to be only a very
general look at some aspects of historical change. I will
look broadly at trends in terms of property which seem to
be of significance to matrimonial property. Changes can be
traced in the history of property in general; alterations
in categories of property, structures of ownership and
concepts and theories of property. Changes can also be
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traced in the more specific range of assets that might be
classed as matrimonial or the property of husband and wife.
HUSBAND AND WIFE AND THEIR MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
One preliminary matter to consider is what is intended by
the terms matrimonial property or the property of husband
and wife. At times there has been some indication in law of
what is meant by matrimonial property. Under the common
law, the married couple was regarded as having a combined
fund of goods - a primitive communio bonorum. This was
their matrimonial property. Outwith this category of
matrimonial assets, the individuals might also own some
separate estate. In the case of wives, this separate estate
was likely to be extremely limited. Despite the restricted
nature of their separate estate, there emerges some
distinction between property which is legally connected to
the marriage and property which an individual, although a
spouse, might hold separately from the relationship. One
example which was cited in relation to married women was
any property interest which the woman had which was
alimentary in character. Such provisions were regarded as
being so personal to the woman, as an individual, that they
could not be subsumed within the couple's matrimonial
property. Under common law, therefore, there was legal
recognition that some property belonging to spouses would
fall within the category of what might be termed
matrimonial property. In the case of married women, this
would cover almost all of their assets. There was also
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recognition, however, that a husband and wife might own
some property individually. They might hold assets separate
from the relationship and their status within marriage.
With the removal of the jus mariti and the husband's right
of administration it became more difficult to find evidence
of property which could be termed as matrimonial. For those
couples who entered into a marriage contract, some
proportion of their funds would continue to be set aside as
matrimonial. For others, Scots law ceased to control
property as an incident of marriage. There was no legal
categorisation of property as matrimonial. Husbands and
wives owned assets as individuals with no regard to their
marital status. There was some regulation of the property
of husband and wife in, for example, the rules of
succession but there was no provision for the separate
C
assets of husband and wife to be regarded as matrimonial.
While property was no longer legally defined as
matrimonial, some assets might continue to be classified as
such because of their practical relations to marriage and
their use by the couple. The couple's home, for example,
might be considered as matrimonial not because the law
defined it as such but because of its close connection with
the marriage relationship.
Thus what is meant by talking of matrimonial property may
have changed. At times there has been legal recognition of
certain property as matrimonial. Following the reforms of
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the common law, while there continued to be some regulation
of the property of husband and wife on death and later on
divorce, there was no legal classification of property as
matrimonial. In use, however, certain assets belonging to
husband and wife continued to be linked to the marriage
relationship and might therefore be regarded as
matrimonial. More recently, Scots law has once again
introduced the idea of matrimonial property in regulation
of the matrimonial home and in the division of matrimonial
property on divorce.^ Both of these measures continue to
recognise that there can be a distinction between property
which husbands and wives have in relation to their marriage
and property which they hold separately and regardless of
their status.
In discussing matrimonial property or the property of
husband and wife, therefore, I am referring to property
which is either regulated by law as matrimonial property or
which is in some way connected with the relationship of
marriage.
CHANGING PROPERTY
What follows is intended as a very general discussion of
some aspects of change within property. I will concentrate
on developments that have already been indicated by the
legal reforms and by the changes discussed by Stone. They
are developments that have occurred in general terms in
relation to property but which are also of particular
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significance to the property of husband and wife. There are
several aspects on which I want to concentrate - the
classification of property as heritable or moveable and the
balance between these two types; the growing importance of
the matrimonial home; methods of property acquisition and
the relationship between owner and asset.
HERITABLE OR MOVEABLE
Both in terms of the general law of property and the law of
the property of husband and wife, there is an important
distinction between heritable and moveable property.
Although these categories have been long established, the
legal rules governing them have altered significantly.
There have also been considerable shifts in the balance
between them, in particular with the expansion of moveable
assets. This shifting balance is reflected in the assets
that are likely to be owned by husband and wife.
The definition of some property as heritable is a
consequence of the rules of succession. Heritable property
comprises land and all buildings and fixtures attached to
it. For various reasons, particular significance has
attached to heritable property; it brought with it
important social consequences. Heritable property also had
a special relationship with marriage and families. Changes
in the legal rules governing aspects of heritable property
and changes in the relationship between heritable property
and families are, therefore, important elements to be
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considered in looking at historical developments in terms
of property.
In a feudal society, land was the most important asset. It
was a type of property which was significant politically,
forming as it did the basis for power and status, in
addition to providing personal wealth. Ownership of land,
under feudalism, originally required something in return,
ie. services, political or military, which it might be
O
argued restricted the freedom of transfer of land. Land
was not a commodity which could be transferred without
regard to the nature and ability of the transferee. The
power and status which were consequent on landownership
made heritable property more than a simple personal asset.
The feudal system in Scotland placed ownership of all land
in the sovereign. The king then granted tenure to a
relatively small number of landowners who, in turn, would
grant tenancies of the land in return for rent. The grant
of land was originally made in return for some kind of
service from the vassal. In Scotland, the earliest type of
feudal land tenure was known as Wardholding. Wardholding
required a personal obligation to the superior in return
for the grant of land. This obligation of service would
importantly include the obligation to provide military
service. In later and less troubled times it might more
commonly comprise the duty to provide hospitality. The
later system of land tenure was called Feuferme. This
required an initial payment to the superior in return for
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the grant of land, followed by a periodical payment of
feuduty. This later system has continued to underlie the
modern Scottish system of land tenure.
The original requirement of the feudal system for service
in return for land, and the political and social power and
status that flowed from land ownership, contributed to a
strong drive to retain land within a defined social group.
There were accordingly various legal devices designed to
regulate and restrict the transfer of land; devices which
to a large extent ensured transfer within a limited scope -
ideally, within the family. These continued to operate even
when calls for personal service had ceased to be made. They
maintained close links between a family and its land. The
law of succession and the use of entail were two such ways
of restricting and regulating the transfer of heritable
property. These two branches of Scots law demonstrate the
significance of heritable property and indicate its
important links with family structure and development.
Succession
The original delineation of the category of heritage is one
based on succession; the definition of heritage being that
property which would pass on death to the heir at law. The
rules of intestate succession granted to the deceased's
wife the right of terce whereby she was entitled to receive
a liferent of one third of her husband's heritable estate
at the date of his death. Later the husband was granted a
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similar right in his deceased wife's heritable estate -
courtesy. The husband was entitled to a liferent of the
whole of his wife's heritable estate. Thereafter the
remainder of the deceased's heritable property passed to
the heir at law. The law of intestate succession preferred,
as the heir, the eldest son. Only if there were no sons and
no issue of sons would the heritable property pass to any
daughters.
"Scots feudal law recognised primogeniture among male heirs
in succession to land and so favoured the maintenance of
landed property undivided on the death of the holder."
Thus where there was male issue, the eldest would take the
complete heritable estate, maintaining the family fortune
undivided.
"This was based on the necessity under the feudal system of
preserving the unity of landed estates so ^hat the
appropriate military services might be rendered."10
An heir would be sought first, down the line of direct male
descendants, next, among male collaterals and then, among
male ascendants. The principle of representation applied
fully with, for example, the issue of a deceased son being
preferred to a male collateral. In the absence of a male
heir, the heritable estate would pass to the female line.
If the estate was to pass to females, then it would be
divided equally amongst them. They were known as heir-
portioners.
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There was, therefore, a very clear preference for heritage
to pass to a male heir and for the heritable estate to
resist division. It was hoped that it would pass, complete,
to the deceased's eldest son. In that way, large estates
would be maintained and a close link continued between
particular heritable assets and the family line. Only where
no male heir could be found would the estate be divided and
shared among the female heirs collectively.
The rules of intestate succession were a very important
device for restricting the transfer of heritable property
and maintaining close links between a particular heritable
estate and a family line. They also contributed to a very
sharp divide between heritable and moveable property - both
in terms of the law of property and in terms of the
relationship between individuals, families and property.
It was of course open to a property owner to make a will
disposing of his estate on death. Testamentary bequests
purporting to disinherit the heir at law in terms of the
heritable estate were, however, invalid. Although the
1 1
testator was free to dispose of his moveable property, he
could not avoid the passage of the undivided heritable
estate to the heir at law. Gradually the rules governing
succession to heritable property were amended, increasing
the freedom to dispose of it by will or other testamentary
disposition. The Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland)
1 )Act 1868, s.20 permitted the disposition of heritable
property by testamentary writing. Following this enactment
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the landowner was no longer bound by the principles of
primogeniture and undivided succession. As a result, the
transfer of heritable property ceased to be so tightly
controlled by the law of succession.
It was not until the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 that
distinctions between heritable and moveable property and
inequalities between male and female, in terms of
succession, were finally removed but an important loosening
of the control of heritable property had already been
achieved.
Entail
A second effective way of restricting the dispersal of
heritable property and of linking it closely to a family
line was the legal device of entail. In Scotland, the use
of entail resulted from an "intense desire to perpetuate
the link between family and territory."-^
R.Burgess in his thesis on Perpetuities in Scots Law
explains that the desire to entail property was often,
"little more than an attempt to achieve immortality by
establishing a permanent connection with ... land."-®-1^
The aim of the entail was to alter the normal line of
succession, perhaps to ensure retention of heritable
property within a very narrow branch of the family or to
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exclude inheritance by females. An entail would set out a
line of heirs to whom the heritable estate was to pass,
undivided. It would prohibit the division of the estate
among heir portioners.
The deed entailing the estate would also reduce the power
of each successive owner in relation to the property.
Burgess explains that,
"the increasing relaxation of the restraints imposed by the
feudal system"
allowed greater power to the vassal to deal with and
ultimately alienate his feu. With the feudal system itself
affording less protection for the maintenance of land
within a family line, the entail was seen as an attractive
alternative. The owner would usually be prohibited from
selling any of the estate, sometimes even from granting a
lease in respect of it. The entail would also usually
forbid the contracting of any debts which would affect the
estate. A father could therefore ensure that his chosen
heir would have possession and control of the family land
during his lifetime but that he could not dispose of the
property or in any way burden it. On the heir's death it
would pass on to the next heir as laid down in the deed of
entail. The entail was a way of maintaining large estates
of land undivided and of sustaining a close link between
family and land. As with the rules of succession it
res trieted the f reedom to transfer heritable property and
-123-
it contributed towards the maintenance of large heritable
estates, closely linked to a particular family.
Various statutory amendments were made, increasing the
1 ft
powers of the owner over entailed estates. The final
demise of entails was signalled in 1914. By s.2 of the
Entail (Scotland) Act 1914 no new entails could be created.
In this way the use of entails as a means of controlling
heritable property began to disappear.
The rules of succession and the operation of entail
emphasised the importance of heritable property and its
links to a family line. They were clear attempts to retain
heritable property within the family line and to ensure
that it was not divided and dispersed, for example, by
passing to daughters who would then be subject on marriage
to the mixing of their property with that of their
husbands. They were also methods of restricting the freedom
of the current owner to burden or dispose of the property.
The reformed law of succession and the abolition of entails
therefore had a significant effect on heritable property.
It was no longer so easy to ensure that it would pass,
undivided, down through the family line.-^ There was
greater individual power in relation to heritable property.
There was also much greater freedom to dispose of heritable
property on death.
Changes in the rules of succession reduced the legal
differences between heritable and moveable property. They
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also contributed to the dispersal of large family estates
of land, with perhaps a more equitable division between
next of kin rather than the enforced inheritance by the
heir at law of the complete undivided heritable estate.
Another important weakening blow to the continuation of the
family estate was the demise of the entail. Succession and
membership of a family were no longer such important
factors in terms of acquisition of property.
These developments affected the general pattern of
landowning and the relative importance of heritable and
moveable property. They were also important in terms of
marriage and property. Concerns about property on marriage
were to some extent similar to the concerns that influenced
succession and the use of entail. In arranging a marriage,
there was a desire to protect family interests in land and
to guard against dispersal of family property. Property
deals on marriage needed to be fitted into the structure
already put in place by succession and the use of entails.
In a society where succession and entail were directed
towards ensuring the transmission of undivided family
wealth down through a family line, it was reasonable to
expect that similar considerations should be apparent on
marriage. Marriage offered the opportunity to acquire
greater wealth but it also posed a threat.
There were additional considerations on marriage, in
particular the protection of the wife and children against
the possible inadequacy of the husband. In this respect,
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A.W.B. Simpson argues that, in Scotland, the entail and the
marriage contract were in fact "antithetical
institutions".-'-^ He argues that the aim of the entail was
often to exclude the widow's right of terce from the
husband's heritable estate whereas the marriage contract
was often aimed at ensuring adequate maintenance of the
wife by means of settlement of the couple's heritable
property.
Marriage contracts could however be used to protect family
interests in heritable property. A marriage contract might
incorporate some form of entail. Succession could be
arranged and formalised within the terms of the ante¬
nuptial marriage contract and a trust could be set up to
ensure that property would not deteriorate in the hands of
1 9
a reckless husband or an indulgent father. Importantly,
marriage settlements could be used to ensure the adequate
maintenance of the new family and in particular its
dependent members. The legal rules governing the property
of married women also reflect the structure and the
priorities of the system of ownership. The right of
administration recognised the value of heritable property
to the family line by not allowing it to pass entirely into
the husband's estate. Ownership of the property was
retained by the wife, with the husband having only the
right of administration. The greater extent of the jus
mariti might be explained by the lesser value of moveable
property.
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Domestic Assets and Family Wealth
Changes in legal rules affecting heritable property were
accompanied by changes in the types of assets that were
likely to be comprised in a personal estate. The balance
between heritable and moveable property was shifting not
only in legal rules but in physical assets. These
developments are relevant in considering the nature of the
assets that might comprise matrimonial property. It might
be argued that, with the decline of the close ties between
families and heritable property which resulted from
changing laws of succession and from the disappearance of
entails and with changes in economic and social structure,
there was also a change in the type of property that was
significant in marriage.
Property, it can be argued, has always been of some
significance in marriage. There were, however, two levels
of property; that of basic significance to the conjugal
family - domestic property - and that of extraordinary
significance - land and family wealth. All couples would be
likely to own at least a small number of assets falling
within the first category whereas only a limited group
would have assets of the second kind.
"In order to set up a successful marriage in the years
between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was felt
necessary to have four types of asset."
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These were, according to Alan Macfarlane, accommodation,
furniture and clothing, income and savings. Clearly the
quantity and quality of these assets would vary according
to the social position of the spouses but this fund can be
regarded as forming the simplest requirements for family
life. Most couples would have at least some of these
domestic assets which would form their matrimonial
property. The law of entail, succession and marriage
contracts would have little interest in such goods.
These assets necessary to married life would, however, have
been superseded in importance in some families by heritable
property, comprising interests in land. It was the
ownership of such property which attracted most attention
and legal interest and which seemed to have the greatest
effect on marriage itself. This is the matrimonial property
which would have been subject to the control of entails and
which would have descended to the heir at law under the
rules of intestate succession. This was the property that
would have been most affected by the right of
administration. Family concern for the protection of this
type of property would have inspired the need for parental
control of spouse selection, as discussed by Stone.
There have been changes in both of these categories. As I
have already discussed, there was a decline in the links
between family lines and heritable estates, with the result
that such property was of less concern in the formation of
a marriage. Developments in the economic structure of
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society made the need for a fund of heritable property less
important. Previously the property brought to the marriage
by the wife would, along with her husband's contribution,
have been settled to produce an income for the family or
would have been used to finance the husband's business.
"The growth of life insurance, the decline of family
businesses, and the growth of joint stock companies all
contributed to making a wife's property less essential to a
husband's financial success than in the past."
A move away from land based income - rent for the landowner
and agricultural produce for the tenant - and towards
industry, reduced the fundamental importance of land to the
family.
There was also gradually an increase in the volume of
moveable assets - furniture, personal belongings, income -
which a couple would be likely to own. In this way, there
was a shift in the form of property owned by, or in some
way attached to, husband and wife. There was a shift in
balance between heritable and moveable property and many of
the particular concerns which had been directed towards
heritable property were no longer relevant. Through various
changes in heritable property, the structure of
landownership and the transfer of land, the significance of
heritable property declined. In particular, heritable
property was no longer so closely linked to particular
families.^2
-129-
Awareness of this shift is important in considering the
legal rules relating to matrimonial property and in
analysing the reform of these rules. The common law rules
dealt with both heritable and moveable property. The right
of administration had its foundation in the desire to
protect family land and to implement the ambitions of those
arranging and forming contracts of marriage, with a view to
property protection and gain. By leaving ownership with the
wife it reflected the desire to maintain land within a
family line. By placing control in the husband it
recognised the need for land to be ably administered in
order to provide income and support for the nuclear unit.
The jus mariti was apparently more far reaching. It granted
to the husband ownership rather than the lesser power of
control, but in practice its effect was originally limited
by the lesser importance and the limited extent of moveable
property.
THE MATRIMONIAL HOME
Heritable estates may have diminished and their links with
marriage and families may have weakened but the importance
of one specific type of heritable property continued and
indeed greatly flourished. This heritable asset was the
matrimonial or family home. The growth in significance of
this particular asset merits some attention.^ At this
stage I want to consider it mainly in terms of property and
ownership.
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No doubt it was always desirable for the newly married
couple to have some independent residence in which to live
and to raise their children. This however was often an
unfulfilled ideal with scarcity of housing preventing
achievement of the goal of one family per house.
9 S
Macfarlane, in listing "somewhere to live"ZJ as being one
of the assets necessary to the foundation of a successful
marriage, qualifies this by admitting that, particularly
among the lower classes, this would often not equate with a
home of one's own. He suggests that a shortage of
accommodation was in fact an important restraint on
marriage among the poorer sections of society, requiring
couples to postpone marriage until they had acquired
sufficient money to pay for accommodation.
Domestic accommodation has however assumed much greater
significance in relation to husband and wife and their
children. I would suggest two ways in which the matrimonial
home has increased in its importance. First, the nature of
modern family life and in particular the promoted roles of
wife and mother emphasise the domestic living space of the
family. This is usually equated with the family home.
Second, there has been a considerable increase, through the
19th century and to an even greater extent through the 20th
century, in house building and home ownership. In the
majority of present day families there is unlikely to be a
large collection of assets, with the most common and
important asset being the family home, either owned or
9 fc\
rented. Therefore the home has become an integral part of
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the existence of each marriage and family and it has also
become a very significant asset within the property of
husband and wife.
The matrimonial home has become an asset that is closely
linked to the specific family unit and is vital to the
current ideal of the domestic family. To some extent the
home may still represent the financial status of the family
members but concurrently it has a much more specialised
role. It is no longer simply a measure or means of wealth
but it is directly entangled with the relationship itself.
The home emphasises specific aspects of the modern marriage
- privacy, isolation, self sufficiency. It has become much
more than the bare provision of accommodation and shelter.
It is a way of marking out the domain of the family. It is
in this sense that Stone discusses the matrimonial home.
Stone describes the changing architectural structure of the
house, using its environs as the setting for child rearing
and marital companionship. Within its walls lurk the
endless domestic tasks that would provide a worthwhile role
for the wife and the peaceful haven that would be the
reward for the hardworking husband.
The home is linked very closely to the family. It defines
and provides the setting for many of the functions that the
modern family is expected to perform. As such it attracts
the title "matrimonial". It might be argued that the family
home is matrimonial property because of its physical use by
the couple and their children. It is not property that
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bears the title matrimonial because it is affected by the
act of marriage, but merits that title because it is of
particular relevance to the nature of the marital
relationship.
Beyond providing a setting for family life, however, the
matrimonial home has also become an important piece of
property - an increasingly widespread heritable asset. It
is matrimonial property in that it is essential to the
existence of the marital and familial relationships but it
is also likely to be the property of husband and/or wife.
A variety of factors contributed to the growth in
housebuilding and the growth in home ownership. The
development of land, perhaps by the building of houses on
it, would in earlier times have been seen as part of the
role of the major landowners. The building of houses and
the subsequent lease of them was one way of utilising land
to produce income.
"Houses were in a significant .way a source of revenue
through rents for their owners.''
By the 19th century, house ownership had become an
important form of property although personal occupation was
not always the primary purpose. House building and
ownership provided a potential source of income in a
similar way to that of agricultural use of land in previous
centuries.
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"For many of the 'propertied classes', houses or the land
on which they were built, comprised part of the family
property and might well be settled on trust to provide a
secure income."
Gradually the importance of house ownership changed, with
owner occupation becoming much more widespread. This was
the result of a variety of developments. As I have already
described, there was likely to be greater and more
equitable division of heritable property. Instead of the
eldest son inheriting the complete estate it was now more
likely that the deceased's heritable land would be shared
among the children. As a result each had the opportunity to
build their own home on the land which they received. This
situation to some extent replaced the previous position of
the sole heir using some of his inherited land for
development purposes; building houses for rent.
The development of centralised control over planning and
development may also have been influential. It was no
longer left to the landowner to build as he wished. The
improving landowners of the 18th century who might have
redeveloped their estates, providing houses for their
tenants and workers, were gradually replaced by the
industrialists and the expansion of urban settlements. With
the development of towns, there emerged also an increasing
body of rules and requirements governing planning and
building. All of this contributed to the more organised and
centralised development of urban domestic accommodation.
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From the 18th century onwards an organised and strong
banking system began to develop. Of great significance in
the increase in housebuilding and the increase of owner
occupation was the growth of bank lending and in particular
the setting up of building societies. Permanent building
societies began to be established in the early 19th
century, encouraging saving and allowing for the building
and purchase of housing. This extended the scope of home
ownership to a much wider range of families. Instead of
paying rent to a landlord throughout one's lifetime, it
became possible to purchase a home of one's own. This was
generally achieved, through building society or bank loans,
by spreading payment of the purchase price over many years.
These specific developments against the background of a
more stable society and rapidly increasing economic
strength, contributed to an increase in housebuilding and a
strong desire among the population to own domestic
accommodation. Particularly among the growing middle
classes, home ownership was an important sign of status and
stability.
Therefore the home became a domestic asset of considerable
significance. It could be termed as matrimonial property
because of its central position within the newly emerging
ideal of marital and familial existence. As a result of
increasing housebuilding, increasing affluence,
industrialisation and urbanisation, it also became more
common for husbands (and occasionally wives) to own a
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house. Therefore a house was likely to form part of the
property of husband and wife.
PROPERTY AS A REWARD FOR LABOUR
"During the greater part of historical time there has only
been one kind of property of general practical importance,
that is land."
Land as a source of revenue to the landowner or as a means
of subsistence to the peasant was, for the majority of the
population, the most significant asset. For the landowner,
his land produced rental income from his tenants. For the
tenants, land provided work and livelihood. In the 17 th
century,
"it was reckoned an inferior and less desirable thing to
receive a wage for work than a fragment of ground in the
farming community."^
Thus in the feudal society of that time,
"landless labourers and indoor farm servants ... who
received some wages in money"31
occupied a social rank beneath even the meanest crofter.
Land, however, gradually gave way to the rising importance
of moveable property and, in particular, money. A society
based on the status which attached to land and ownership of
land was replaced by an economic and commercial society.^
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An important element in this transition was the rising
incidence of paid employment.
"Closely connected with property is employment, that is
service rendered for pay."-5--5
Increased numbers of people who worked in return for money
had a significant effect on concepts of property. Income in
monetary terms developed as an important type of property,
with increasing numbers of individuals and families relying
for support on an earned wage rather than on income from
land. The increase in paid employment, however, also had a
close link with the developing nature of property and
ownership. It has been argued that work in return for
remuneration can only operate successfully in a society
where rules and concepts of property are at an advanced
stage.
"Security of enjoyment of the fruits of one's labour was
the reason for property.
So said Bentham and it was a philosophy that gained much
support in the 18th and 19th centuries. With the decline of
succession as a primary source of acquiring property, with
changing agricultural practice and with the vast expansion
of industry, individual labour became an important means of
amassing wealth and assets. The wage earner emerged as the
key to property acquisition rather than inheritance,
marriage settlement or land. With the establishment of a
market economy, individual enterprise and labour became
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more decisive in the attribution of rank and status.
Property became a reward for labour to a much greater
extent than it had been previously. The dominant idea of
property became something which could be acquired in
exchange for labour or money, rather than being transferred
through succession or marriage. The benefit of ownership
and personal assets were seen as an incentive to labour.
"Unless labour leads to property, neither our self love nor
our affections for others will make us work."
Such views of the relationship between labour and property
emphasised the personal link between owner and asset.
Property was to be looked on as a reward for diligence and
enterprise. In a developing industrial society, which had
great demand for labour, the promise of private income and
property was seen as an important incentive.
"The common interest of all requires that all should be
obliged by their own necessities to some sort of industry;
now no man would employ his labours unless he were assured
of having the fruits of them at his own disposal."--'"
It could be argued that the changing source of property
acquisition affected the way in which the relationship
between owner and property was perceived. Property was
increasingly considered as a personal reward for individual
labour. This was a philosophy which was also relevant to
matrimonial property. The changes brought about by
industrialisation and the developing modern capitalist
structure, together with legal changes, contributed to the
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lessening of the importance of inheritance as a source of
property and placed greater emphasis on individual labour.
In a feudal society and in a society of primogeniture,
impartible succession and entail, property and wealth was
to a large extent determined before birth. It was based on
one's family and not on individual enterprise. With the
emergence of the wage earner, however, property and
matrimonial property became more likely to be acquired
during the currency of the marriage relationship.
"The trend was for more and more household relationships to
involve a cash nexus."
A shift, therefore, from inheritance or settlement to
income altered the mode of acquisition of the property of
husband and wife and it made it more likely that such
property would be acquired gradually throughout the
relationship, rather than the couple starting out in
married life with a fund of assets which could be used to
produce income. The shift to earned income also had
important effects on the way in which property was viewed.
Property, meaning income or the assets purchased with such
income, was considered as a reward for labour and the
individual's right to such reward was to be protected.
Therefore property increasingly meant income and assets
acquired as a result of income. The wealth of a married
couple and their issue was more likely to reflect the
earning ability of the spouses rather than the inherited
status of their ancestors. This growth of income was
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accompanied by a concept of property as a reward for
individual labour.
A further development in terms of income, was the
development of the "family wage." Rapidly increasing
affluence among the middle classes emphasised the idleness
of the middle class wife. The ability to "keep" a wife was
an indicator of financial success.
"The practice of keeping women as pets, regardless of their
(economic) usefulness, is a modern innovation, a result of
the industrial revolution and the rise of the
bourgeoisie.
It was a practice that the working classes were eager to
emulate and it gave rise to the campaign for a family wage.
During the late 19th century and on into the 20th century,
trade unions campaigned for a family wage for their
members. Despite some success the family wage remained, for
many workers, an unachieved ideal but it was nonetheless an
important ideological concept. It was an incentive to
greater effort among the workforce and it reinforced the
image of a single male breadwinner supporting his wife and
children who remained within the home. By giving to the
male worker a family wage, it would enable him to provide
the property of the family. The family wage would continue
to make it the husband or father's,
"prerogative to go out and work for [the family's] living,
to attend to its needs, and to control and administer its
capital."^
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Thus, for an increasing number of individuals and for an
increasing number of families, property was likely to be
the product of labour. Personal property was an incentive
and a reward for work. The property of husband and wife was
more likely to be the earnings of one rather than the
contributions of two. The ideal of the maintenance of wife
and children through the efforts of the husband was
strengthened by the campaign for a family wage.
PROPERTY AS THE ASSET
Discussion so far has tended to concentrate on changes in
particular types of property and in their significance to
individual owners and to families. Theories of ownership
have also changed. Not only the forms of property but the
nature of the concept of property is significant and
changes can be detected in it. One development which is
evident in the previous discussions of heritable and
moveable property, the family home and earned income is
that of viewing property as a particular asset itself
rather than as a right in the asset. Under feudalism it
has been argued that it was not the asset itself but the
particular rights in it that constituted the property.
Under feudalism,
"property had generally been seen as a right to a revenue
(whether in the form of services or produce or money)
rather than as a right to specific material things and had
not been seen as the material things themselves."
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Property was important not only or primarily for its
material form but for what it yielded. Land which was
inherited might provide an income in terms of rents.
Property brought by a woman to marriage would often be used
to provide an annuity for her in the case of her husband's
death. It might be combined with property contributed by
the husband to maintain husband, wife and children or to
form a financial base for the husband's business. The
heritable property of husband and wife might be conveyed to
trustees to provide a secured income for the couple.
In a feudal system,
"a man did not have property in an object, but only in a
certain interest in an object, and ... a number of estates
of property belonging^ to a number of persons might inhere
in the same object."
When one piece of land afforded rights to several
individuals, the worth was vested in the right rather than
in the land itself. Property held on trust might provide
rights of income for husband, wife and any children
although none of them had the right to dispose of the
capital. Similarly, when land was held on entail it
provided income for successive owners but each was
restricted in his use of the land.
The weakening of the kinship network, previously in control
of large landed estates, resulted in heritable property
becoming much more closely and specifically attached to
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individuals rather than to a family or kin group. The
individual was seen as having a right to the land itself
rather than having a right to something from the land. He
could make use of the land or sell it for money instead of
simply deriving income from it.
The rising importance of moveable property also highlighted
the particular asset. With the move towards waged labour,
earned income became the most widespread type of property
which might be used to accumulate specific assets. These
assets in turn were less likely to produce income but would
be for personal use. Income would increasingly be used to
furnish the family with the necessaries of domestic life
and to satisfy individual desires for adornment, leisure
and acquisition. In the light of these developments it can
be argued that a much greater identification was achieved
between the concept of property and the physical asset
itself.
Property came to be regarded as an end rather than as a
means to an end. With a changing economic structure based
on industrialisation and capitalism, income was
increasingly the result of labour. As a result, property
was no longer primarily regarded as a source of income.
Property was increasingly seen as an end - privately owned
assets which in themselves provided some use or benefit to
the owner. This is a development which can be seen in the
decline of family heritage, the expansion in moveable
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property, the increase in owner occupation and the emphasis
on personal income.
The foregoing discussion has been intended to highlight
aspects of change within terms of property and ownership.
It makes no pretensions to the creation of a comprehensive
history of property. To discuss legal reforms relating to
the property of husband and wife and to examine the
apparent disappearance of property from the relationship of
marriage without considering the nature of such property
renders any emerging conclusions of limited value. In this
chapter I have aimed to sketch roughly a background of
property developments to the legal reforms and social
changes that were presented by the legal writers and by
Stone. This is an element of change to which, I would
argue, they paid too little heed and it is to that
proposition that I will turn in the following chapters.
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NOTES
1 In this chapter, I will outline some historical
developments in terms of property and, in particular,
property of husband and wife. The importance of these
changes when considered in conjunction with historical
patterns of change in legal reform and marriage will form
the basis for Part II.
O
Scots law continued to intervene in the regulation of
property of husband and wife through the law of succession
and later through the law relating to financial provision
on divorce but that is outwith the scope of my study. There
will be some discussion of property division on divorce in
Part III because of the close links between the nature of
the marriage relationship and the approach which is
subsequently adopted on divorce.
O
This is the system discussed briefly in chapter 2 of the
wife's tocher and the husband's contribution which together
would form the financial base for the marriage union.
^ Section 1 of the Conjugal Rights (Scotland) Amendment Act
1861 and s.3 of the Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act
1877 both offered protection for property acquired by the
wife as a result of her own employment or industry.
^ "There is a nobility of purpose in marriage and in the
union of two human beings that a pre-nuptial contract
offends." B.Amiel, The Sunday Times, 16 June 1991. This
perceived and promoted separation between marriage and
commerce will be discussed in chapter 7.
^ It might be argued that there is a very limited exception
to this in the wife's praepositura which is, perhaps,
evidence of a very limited recognition of property that was
for the combined domestic use of the couple.
^ Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981
and Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985.
O
The system of landownership in Scotland of course remains
feudal in structure, although the giving of service in
return for land has been replaced by payment of a feuduty
which in turn is being phased out. The Land Tenure Reform
(Scotland) Act 1974, abolished the creation of new
feuduties and provided for redemption of feuduties either
voluntarily or compulsorily on the sale of property. Thus
although the feudal structure of superior and vassal
remains, the element of service has been removed. The
future of the feudal system is itself under consideration
by the Scottish Law Commission: Discussion Paper No.93,
Property Law: Abolition of the Feudal System, 1991.
^ W.M.Gordon, Land Law, p.3.
^ M.C.Meston, The Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, p.5.
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H Freedom to dispose of moveable property was subject to
the legal rights of a surviving spouse, the jus relictae
and the jus relicti. By these rights, the surviving spouse
was entitled to either one third or one half of the
deceased's moveable estate, depending on whether or not
there were issue.
12 (31 & 32 Vict., c.101).
I2 A.W.B.Simpson, "Entails and Perpetuities," 1979 J.R. 1.
R.Burgess, Perpetuities in Scots Law, p.9.
Burgess, op.cit., p.11.
^ For example, the Rosebery Act 1836 (6 & 7 Will IV c.62)
and the Rutherford Act 1848 (11 & 12 Vict c.36) extended
the powers of the holder of entailed land.
1 7 The result of these changes was not the immediate
disintegration of all heritable estates. Maintenance of
large holdings was, and continues to be, possible through




There is an apparent distinction between the woman's
interest, which is protected in the marriage contract, and
the family interest, which is protected by entail. This is
a distinction which S.Staves argues is frequently found in
legal histories which exclude women from an integral place
within families: Married Women's Separate Property in
England, 1660-1833, p.203.
1 9 There is further discussion of the use of marriage
trusts in chapter 8.
O Q
A.Macfarlane, Marriage and Love in England, 1300-1840,
p.263.
O i
D.Gittins, The Family in Question, p.77.
9 9
For some families there remains a strong link with
land. In Scotland, the continuing pattern of landownership
is that "the majority of land Lis] held by a few large-
scale landowners. For example, 60% of Scotland's land area
is owned by 1,430 landowners": Robin Fraser Callander, A
Pattern of Landownership in Scotland, p.9. Or as the 7:87
theatre company indicates, 84% of the country's wealth is
owned by 7% of the population. The importance of heritable
property was therefore concentrated within a very small
group of families.
23 The significance of the changing nature of matrimonial
property in relation to the legal reforms and the pattern
of marital development will be discussed in chapter 5.
2^ The dark side of the matrimonial home, exhibited in the
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incidence of domestic violence, is discussed in chapter 7
and the rights of husband and wife to occupy the
matrimonial home are discussed in chapter 8.
O CT
A.Macfarlane, Marriage and Love, p.263.
o r
Manners and Rauta, Family Property in Scotland, 1981,
H.M.S.O. The findings of this study, which are reproduced
in Scot. Law Com., Consultative Memorandum No.57,
Matrimonial Property, 1983 at p.14, suggest that, "apart
from ownership or tenancy of a house, many married couples
in Scotland own very little property...household goods,
some small savings and, possibly, a car."
22 W.T.Murphy and H.Clark, The Family Home, p.2.
28 ibid.
2^ G.D.Valentine, "Persons and Funds," 1936 J.R. 256.




One example of this could be seen in the feudal land
tenure system itself, in the replacement of the requirement
of service in return for land by the payment of a feuduty
in cash.
88 G.D.Valentine, op.cit., p.258.
o /
C.B.Macpherson, "Capitalism and the Changing Concept of
Property," in Kamenka and Neale (eds.), Feudalism,
Capitalism and Beyond, p.113.
or
P.Stein, "The General Notions of Contract and Property
in Eighteenth Century Scottish Thought," 1963 J.R. 1, at
p. 6.
o r
Francis Hutcheson, Introduction to Moral Philosophy,
II.5.4.
o 7
L.Davidoff, "The Rationalisation of Housework," in
Barker and Allen (eds.), Dependence and Exploitation in
Work and Marriage, p.132.
O O
S.Kappeler, The Pornography of Representation, pp.70-71.
8^ F.Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, p.116.
C.B.Macpherson, op.cit., p.110.
^ G.D.Valentine, "Persons and Funds," 1936 J.R. 256.
Land in Scotland continues to be held under a feudal system
but feudalism as discussed here refers to a feudal society







In Part I of this thesis I have set out separate
presentations of change, in Scots law as it relates to the
property of spouses, in marriage and in property. These
presentations have produced patterns of change and
developments from the past. They are not the product of
personal empirical study but are collected from the work of
others.
What I have presented are historical accounts of change in
law, in marriage and in property. In this thesis these
accounts have several functions. First they provide
information about what has changed in each of these three
elements. They provide histories of law, marriage and
property. Secondly, I want to use the method and structure
of these histories to demonstrate how they have contributed
to the confusion of relations between marriage, property
and law and to pick out particular images that they have
helped to create. Thirdly, I want to analyse continuing
relations between marriage, property and law in the light
of these images.
I. HISTORICAL CHANGE
In Part I, I presented accounts of historical change in
law, marriage and property. They provide some background of
factual
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change in these three elements. But, in particular in terms
of legal reform and marriage, the historical accounts are
more than simple factual change. They are presentations of
these changes which include judgements, imply expectations
and point towards patterns and trends of progress. Not only
do they recount change but they contribute to perceptions
of how things have changed. In particular, the pattern of
reform of the married women's property rules and its
discussion by legal writers and the pattern of progress
described by Stone both point towards similar
characteristics of marriage and similar trends in its
relations with property and law.
II. IMAGES OF CHANGE
In Part I, I have already begun to question these
perceptions; to question the patterns of change that
emerge. These are perceptions which may distort the precise
nature of developments from the past and may in turn
obscure our understanding of contemporary relations between
marriage, property and law. In Part II, I want to use the
three histories to suggest that by their method and their
structure they have contributed to misleading images.
I will begin by reconsidering the historical presentations
of legal reform and of marriage. I would suggest that their
conclusions can be re-examined in the light of changes in
property. The misleading nature of the conclusions that
emerge from the legal reforms and from Stone's account can
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be exposed if the parallel changes in property are
considered. Recognition of significant developments, in
types of asset, in relations between families and property
and in concepts of ownership, enables property to be
re-inserted where the legal reforms and Stone's history had
suggested its disappearance.
Having re-established a relationship between marriage and
property I want to proceed to consider in more general
terms the misleading images that may emerge from histories
which try to look at the elements of law, marriage and
property in isolation. In Part I, I presented isolated
accounts. I would now suggest that this method of
historical study distorts change and implies misleading
conclusions. It contributes to the creation of images -
images of law, marriage and property; images that obscure
their interaction.
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CHAPTER 5: CHANGING PROPERTY: CONSTANT LINK
"The linkage between family, law and property is constant
..1
• • •
This statement seems to be in strong contradiction of the
histories of law and marriage as presented in chapters 2
and 3. At first glance, both the history of the legal
reform and Stone's history of marriage and family life
would seem to suggest quite the opposite. They suggest
breaks between each of the elements of marriage, property
and law. They suggest a split between marriage and property
which accords well with popular presentations of a split
between romance and commerce, love and money. They also
suggest a split between law and matrimonial property. This
chapter seeks to investigate Glendon's claim that there is
a constant link between family, law and property. It argues
against the apparent break displayed both by the legal
reforms and by Stone's history. It seeks to re-establish
the link.
SIGNS OF A SPLIT
In the presentation of the legal reforms there is a split
between law and marriage/ matrimonial property and an
apparent split between marriage and property. The reforms
produce a break between law and matrimonial property. They
also suggest a break between marriage and property.
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The legal reforms produced a break between, on the one
hand, law and, on the other hand, marriage and the property
of husband and wife. There was a move towards reduced legal
intervention. The most obvious example of legal regulation
had previously been the jus mariti and the right of
administration. These were devices which operated
automatically, by force of law. They represented
significant legal intervention in the marriage
relationship. With the removal of these two rights there
was a break between law and marriage/ matrimonial property.
Marriage no longer occasioned legal regulation of the
property of husband and wife. There may have been some
expectation on behalf of the reformers that the property
aspect of marriage would be handed over to voluntary
private regulation. By improving the position of wives
through the reforming legislation, however, a significant
impetus to private regulation of property on marriage was
removed. Marriage contracts, although they often did more,
were generally used to exclude the husband's jus mariti and
right of administration in order to afford the wife some
separate estate. With the universal exclusion of these
rights by legislation, the need for private regulation was
O
apparently reduced. So, not only was there a split between
the basic legal system and matrimonial property, there were
also signs of a split in the decreasing use of private
regulation of property on marriage.
In the legal reforms there was a clear split between law
and matrimonial property. To a great extent there ceased to
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be any law of matrimonial property. There were also signs
in the reforms of a split between marriage and property.
Under the common law system with its jus mariti and right
of administration, there was a very clear link between
property and marriage. The position of owner and his/her
rights in relation to assets were to a great extent
affected by marriage. The position of a woman as a property
owner was, in particular, affected by marriage. Ownership
and interests in property were closely connected to status
and marriage was an important determinant of status. There
was a close link between property and marital status.
Marriage was a significant event in the transmission of
property and, in particular, heritable property. At the
time of marriage, negotiations were common between husband
and wife and their respective families as to the transfer
of property to the new couple and as to the subsequent use
O
and eventual disposal of such property. Marriage, between
spouses of the property owning classes, would normally
involve a marriage settlement clearly stating the property
to be brought by each party to the union and defining their
subsequent rights in such property.
With the passing of the Married Women's Property (Scotland)
Acts^ and with the declining importance of marriage as a
method of property transfer,-* there appeared to be a split
between marriage and property. Under the reformed legal
structure, marriage ceased to have any significant effect
on the property of spouses. Separate property in effect
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meant that individuals held property regardless of their
marital status. With the removal of the jus mariti and the
husband's right of administration, the need for a marriage
contract became in many cases less urgent. The wife no
longer needed the protection of a marriage contract,
excluding the husband's rights, to enable her to own and
administer property. In the removal of jus mariti and the
right of administration, there were signs of a break
between marriage and property. Marriage ceased to have an
effect on the property of individuals; on the property of
husband and wife. With the declining importance of land as
a source of wealth and with the rise of earned income,
there was a break between marriage and property.0
Previously marriage had been an important incident in
ownership and transfer of land. Increasingly marriage as a
factor in ownership gave way to individual labour and
personal earnings as a means of acquiring property.
Thus, far from supporting Glendon's claim of a constant
link, the historical presentation of the legal reforms
seems to suggest the appearance of cracks between law,
marriage and property - a loosening of ties between these
three elements. As a consequence of the reforms there was a
clear split between law and matrimonial property. Law no
longer intervened in marriage for the purpose of regulating
the property of husband and wife. The legal reforms also
suggested a split between marriage and property. In the
abolition of the jus mariti and the right of administration
there appeared to be a break between marriage and property.
Entering into the relationship of marriage ceased to have
any effect on the property of the spouses. Henceforth
ownership was to be attributed with no regard to marital
status. Therefore in the legal reforms there is little to
support the claim of a constant link between marriage,
property and law.
What of Stone's history of family and marriage? It too
seems to refute rather than support Glendon's claim of
constancy. It suggests a split between marriage and
property and a declining role for regulation of marriage
and property.
Stone has, as a central theme in his history, a move from
marriage that is grounded in property concerns to marriage
that is characterised by affect. He describes the gradual
transition from a system where,
"property and power were the predominant issues which
governed negotiations for marriage,"
to a system where personal affect and,
"romantic love [were seen as] respectable component[s] of
marital strategy and married life. °
In Stone's history he suggests that there has been a basic
shift in the focus of marriage from property to affect. In
the open lineage family, marriage, particularly among the
upper classes, was strictly controlled by property
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concerns. Marriage was viewed as an incident of property
control and a question of kinship alliance rather than as a
personal relationship. Gradually, through the restricted
patriarchal family to the modern domestic nuclear family,
the connections between marriage and property were
weakened, leaving the modern companionate marriage as a
relationship of purely personal and affective significance.
According to this pattern, property no longer exerts
control over marriage and the family unit - a unit which is
held together by private, personal emotions. Marriage
centres on affective relations rather than on property
interests.
In the declining importance of property to marriage, Stone
also sees a decreasing level of external regulation.
Marriage becomes a relationship increasingly controlled by
the spouses and their own personal preference and desire.
Parents and kin, freed of property concerns over the
marriage of their children, lost the justification to
interfere or to seek to control the choice of spouse. This
would later (and outwith the timescale of Stone's account)
be reflected in the reforms which gave legal recognition to
the private, non-regulated, nature of the marriage
relationship and which left regulation of property to the
spouses themselves.
Thus, in both the legal reforms and in Stone's family
account, there is evidence to suggest that, contrary to
Glendon's claim, the link between family, law and property
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is not constant. The law reforms produced a break between
law and matrimonial property. They resulted in the
disappearance of a scheme of legal regulation which was
imposed as an incident of marriage. There was, therefore, a
clear break between law and property. The removal of the
jus mariti and right of administration also suggested a
split between marriage and property. There was no legal
recognition of any continuing link between marriage and
property. A similar split between property and marriage is
indicated by Stone's account of family change. It is
important to note that, whereas a split between marriage
and property was implied both by the law reforms and by
Stone's account, a split between law and matrimonial
property was express.
The system of separate property which existed as a result
of the reforms provided for no link between law and
matrimonial property. It was clear evidence of a break
between these two elements. Discussion of recent
legislation shows that there has been a move away from this
extreme position. Legal measures such as the Matrimonial
Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981 and the
Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 demonstrate a renewed link
between law and matrimonial property. These will be
discussed more fully in chapters 7 and 8. There I will
discuss situations in which law shows an interest in
matrimonial property; instances of legal regulation of
marriage and the property of husband and wife. Strict
application of a separate property system does deny a link
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between law and matrimonial property. Recent refinements of
e
the separate property system, ho\*|ver, make it clear that
law maintains a link with matrimonial property.
In this chapter I want to concentrate on the relation
between marriage and property. Both the legal reforms and
Stone's account suggest a break between marriage and
property which contradict Glendon's assertion of a constant
link. What of the apparent split between marriage and
property? In this chapter I intend to concentrate on
re-establishing a link between property and marriage. I
propose to reconsider the reforms and Stone's account of
change and to suggest that they present a misleading image
of a break between marriage and property. Their
presentation of change fails to take account of changing
types of property and thus suggests the disappearance of
property from marriage rather than considering that
property itself may have changed.
Mary Ann Glendon argues that,
"the linkage between family law and property is constant,
but its elements - family behaviour, the forms of wealth
and their relations to each other - are not."
Failure to take note of developments within each element
have tended to obscure the linkage. Legal writers have
considered changes in the element of law. Stone has
considered changes in the marriage element. What neither
has adequately considered are changes in property and the
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effect that such changes might have on the relations
between law, marriage and property.
Both of these portrayals of change use the demise of one
set of property based rules as evidence of a much greater
split between property and marriage. They assume the
continuation of property as a constant element. They
demonstrate a failure to acknowledge the changing form of
property and the consequent changes in its relations with
marriage and law. As with law and marriage, property is a
variable concept. Its form cannot be taken as fixed and
enduring. Types of property that were relevant to the
marriage for which the common law rules were devised may
not be relevant to Stone's modern affective family. Failure
to consider the variations in property, therefore, casts
doubt on the break between marriage and property which is
suggested by both the legal reforms and Stone's historical
account. Relating changes in property to the reforms and to
Stone's account suggests the disappearance and the
emergence of different types of property rather than the
complete rejection of property as a concern of marriage and
of family law.
M.A. Glendon argues that "new property assumed an important
place in family property"^ ancj that a failure to consider
the nature of this new family wealth contributed to a
clouding of the relations between property, marriage
(family) and law. I propose to reconsider the account of
the legal reforms and Stone's account of the changing
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marriage relationship from this standpoint. The relations
between marriage and property, considered from the point of
view of Stone's history of marriage or from the historical
legal account of the Married Women's Property reforms, tend
to be misrepresented because of an omission to trace the
history of property. Instead they simply assume its
disappearance on the basis of an outdated image of
property. In Part I, there were three separate histories.
The history of the legal reforms and Stone's history of
marriage both suggested a split between marriage and
property. By inserting into those histories, some aspects
of change within the third history of property, I will
question their conclusions.
Some kind of property, it might be argued, is and has been
relevant to most marriages. There could be two levels of
property that were significant to a marriage.H Most
couples were likely to have some assets which fell within
the ordinary domestic category, for example, household
items, income and accommodation. A more restricted class of
couples would also have an interest in heritable property -
family land. A consideration of the changing extent and
importance of these two types of property perhaps clarifies
some of the confusion surrounding the relations between
marriage and property. Recognition of changes in property
questions the split between marriage and property that
emerges from the legal reforms and from Stone's account.
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There were changes in both of these types of property.
There was a great decline in the link between a family line
and heritable estate and in more general terms there were
significant changes in relation to heritable property.
There was also considerable growth in volume and ownership
of moveable assets and of the type of property which could
be regarded as domestic. These developments were
influential in the legal reforms governing the property of
husband and wife and I would suggest that they also help to
complete the image which Stone portrays of a changing type
of family and marital relationship. By including a
consideration of property it is possible to highlight
significant changes in property rather than accepting its
disappearance from marriage.
To assess the importance of the common law rules relating
to matrimonial property it is necessary to look at the type
of property that they were designed to regulate. The
reforming legislation of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries may suggest an increasing gap between marriage
and property. The removal of the jus mariti and the right
of administration points towards a break between marriage
and property and indicates an end of legal interest in
matrimonial property. A closer look, at changes in property
and the types of property affected by common law rules,
might show that the reforms indicated something other than
the apparent clean break. The reform of those rules may
signify changes in particular types of property rather than
indicating a general change of policy towards the
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importance of property within marriage.
DECLINE OF FAMILY HERITAGE
Glendon points to several factors that contributed to the
link between family law and property being hidden. She
argues that the legal rules outlived the economic structure
for which they had been created and consequently the link
between the law, marriage and the property of husband and
wife was distorted.
"Even when the economic and family behaviour of members of
the groups for whom the rules had been primarily designed
changed, the rules did not."1
This may be a helpful way of looking at the right of
administration and its ultimate abolition. The right of
administration had its foundation in the desire to protect
family land and to implement the ambitions of those
arranging and forming contracts of marriage, with a view to
property protection and gain. The husband's right of
administration was designed primarily to regulate, not the
domestic type of property, but the type of property that
was of concern to a wider group than that of the nuclear
family. It was designed to control heritable estates in
which other members of the family might have an interest.
It allowed the husband control of property which was
closely linked to the maintenance of the family and which
might be an integral part of the husband's business.
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Marriage was important to the protection of family land and
to the formation of kinship links and property expansion.
The land itself was unlikely to be directly related to the
marriage relationship as is heritable property in the form
of a home. It was more likely to provide a source of
income. The changes in heritable property that have been
considered in the previous chapter weakened the need for
the right of administration. The decline in the importance
of the relationship between land and family, the break up
of large family estates, the changing rules of succession,
the disappearance of entail, the decrease in the political
and social consequences of land ownership and changing
business and economic structure questioned the necessity of
this measure of control. The demise of the right of
administration can to a large extent be explained by reason
of the demise of the type of property which it had been
designed to protect.
Relating the reforms to changing needs, based on changing
property, disputes the suggestion that the reforms were the
product of a general change in direction of the law towards
property or indeed of the rejection of property as a valid
concern of marriage.
In a similar way, I would suggest that an understanding of
the composition of matrimonial property questions to some
extent the clearcut division between property and the
affective marriage that is presented by Stone. The
abdication by parents and kin of control over the making of
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marriages may be of less significance if we also recognise
that the parents and kin had lost their interest in the
match.
Stone concentrates on the supremacy of property in relation
to spouse selection. If marriage, to the landowning
classes, was a means of acquiring and protecting property
then clearly the choice of spouse was of prime importance.
In charting the fall of the property centred family, Stone
bases his argument to a large extent on the changing
behaviour and relations of those members and branches of
the family previously linked together by mutual economic
interests and previously capable of exerting control over
spouse selection. In the weakening of this control he
identifies the disappearance of property. Stone
concentrates to a large extent on the upper classes in his
study of the extended patriarchal family. It was in this
group, where financial risks were greatest, that the
controlling power of property was most obvious.
"Authoritarian control by parents over the marriages of
their children inevitably lasted longest in the richest and
most aristocratic circles where the property, power and
status stakes were highest."1-5
From the ashes of this old family he sees emerge the modern
family, based on individual affect and freedom from
constraint as a result of outside interests. With the
declining importance of marriage in relation to control of
land, he identifies the withdrawal of outside regulation of
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the marriage relationship and he sees the disappearance of
property from marriage. Having traced the decline of family
land as an influence in allowing a new freedom in marriage,
he does not proceed to consider what place there may be for
new types of property within this marriage.
It could be argued that, by the time reform was achieved,
the right of administration had to a large extent become
redundant. There was little property left of the type for
which it had been designed. A developing labour market,
changing economic structure and increased commercial
borrowing contributed to the lessening importance of land
as a source of income. There was less need for the control
of family land to be placed in the hands of the husband.
Changes in the spread of ownership and in the importance of
heritable property questioned the continuing relevance of
the right of administration. It may, therefore, be unwise
to credit its removal with indicating any general change of
policy. Instead it may have been a belated attempt to bring
the law up to date with property developments.
Recognition of the changing nature and importance of
heritable property might similarly question the apparent
disappearance of property from marriage as described by
Stone. What he portrays is the decline of a particular type




Whereas with the right of administration it could be argued
that it had become redundant, the problem with the jus
mariti was that it was being overused. By the time it was
reformed it had become much more significant because of its
widespread and perhaps unforeseen application.
"A ... factor that submerged the link between family law
and family property was the application of the old rules to
great numbers of persons who did not have significant
wealth."14
This seemed to apply in particular to the jus mariti. The
jus mariti was apparently more far reaching than the right
of administration in that it gave to the husband ownership
rather than simply control of his wife's property. In
practice, its effect was originally limited by the lesser
importance of moveable property. Whereas the right of
administration may have been abolished because of a
reduction in the type of property which it was designed to
control, I would suggest that the abolition of the jus
mariti was more the result of an increase in the type of
property which it affected. The jus mariti can be
criticised on many grounds but to some extent its survival
can be understood in terms of the type of property which
was in existence. As Lee Holcombe has argued,
"when personal property was of relatively little importance
compared with land, and when it was produced or used by the
family or household functioning as an economic unit rather
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than by individuals, perhaps it mattered little in practice
that married women could not legally own such property."1-5
With changes in production and economy, particularly
following industrialisation, the form and content of
matrimonial property was likely to change. Income and
moveables became much more prevalent, with this new type of
property spreading quickly through the burgeoning middle
classes. A particularly important development in relation
to matrimonial property was the increased access of women
to paid employment.
As stated in the Petition of the Married Women's Property
Committee in 1856,
"the law expresses the necessity of an age when the man was
the only money-getting agent; but...since modern
civilisation in indefinitely extending the sphere of
occupation for women has, in some measure, broken down
their pecuniary dependence upon men, it is time that legal
prot^gtion be thrown over the produce of their labour
• • •
It has been argued that women's increased activity in
employment and the economic sphere was largely responsible
for the dismantling of the common law system of regulation.
The inequities suffered by women do seem to have provided
the impetus for several of the earlier reforms which
specifically exempted from the jus mariti earnings which
the wife received independently of her husband. It was
difficult to argue against a wife being given control of
her own earnings in the face of the philosophy that
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property offers an incentive to labour and the importance
of guaranteeing property in the fruits of one's own
labour.Perhaps an even stronger impetus to change was
the desire to avoid the need for public support of
abandoned or neglected wives and children. Speaking of the
reforms in England it was argued that,
"if the husband failed to support his family it was
considered better that the wife go out to work than the
family come onto the poor law. This was a major
consideration in the debate over the Married Women's
Property Act of 1870, which gave legislative protection to
women's earnings.'"
The growth in moveable property resulted in a growth in
significance of the jus mariti. It applied to all moveable
property and thus affected earnings. As increasingly women
would have income or moveable property of their own, the
jus mariti acquired a much greater significance. The
operation of the jus mariti was also questioned by the
increasingly personal nature of property - the importance
of the link between owner and asset. This trend in
philosophy made the jus mariti difficult to sustain.
Consideration of changes in the nature of property and the
type of property that was relevant to marriage emphasises
the specific nature of the reforms of the Married Women's
Property legislation. Legal accounts of the legislation
suggest a break between marriage and property, a lessening
of legal control, a preference for liberalism and private
autonomy. Stone suggests similar conclusions - the
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replacement of property with affect, the closing off of
marriage from external regulation. The reforms may be
discussed within terms of the general sweep of liberalism
or the emancipation of women. To subsume them in this way,
within a change of policy, may be misleading. The legal
reforms in themselves were much more specific.
The disappearance of one specialised form of property
removed the need for a legal regime to deal with it. Even
where such property was concerned it had become usual
practice for a private agreement to be negotiated to govern
ownership and control. Thus the right of administration was
often avoided even in the situation for which it had been
intended. Marriage contracts were also increasingly used to
exclude the husband's jus mariti. Failure to concentrate on
the original link between marriage and property; the link
which had produced the common law rights, may have
contributed to the total abandonment of legal regulation of
matrimonial property. The immediate necessity of reform was
simply to remove the anachronistic rules. There was no
attempt to consider those rules in relation to specific
property and to consider what property might now be
significant and what rules it might require.
Therefore, following the legislative reforms of the late
19th and early 20th centuries, there was no legal
regulation of matrimonial property. The indication was that
property and marriage were quite separate. There was no
link between property and marriage and there was to be no
-170-
link between law and matrimonial property. It has been
said of the property system that existed after the Married
Women's Property reforms that it had,
"two main defects - firstly that there is no system and
secondly that there is no matrimonial property."
Recent legislative reforms have shown signs of recognising
that, contrary to the apparent break between marriage and
property which was indicated by the reform of Married
Women's Property laws and contrary to the image that Stone
portrays, there is a link between marriage and property and
) 0
it is a link that law has been forced to regulate.
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CHAPTER 6: IMAGES OF THE FAMILY
"'The family' ... is not merely an economic unit, nor
merely a kinship structure; it is also an ideological
configuration with resonance far beyond these narrow
definitions.
The developments in the regulation of matrimonial property
may have been intended by the legal writers to be read
within the narrow bounds of law reform. The developments in
marriage that Stone describes may have been intended for
use within the confined scope of sentiment. Within those
restricted areas, the conclusions that emerge may be
unobjectionable. As Barrett and Mcintosh argue, however,
these descriptions may contribute to the construction of a
O
widely diffused ideology of marriage.
Criticisms may be made of traditional presentations of
legal reforms or of sentiment based histories of marriage
but their conclusions, the trends and characteristics which
they produce, are still influential in the creation of an
image of marriage. Having outlined an historical account of
marriage and of legal regulation of the property element of
marriage, I would suggest that several characteristics have
emerged. An image of marriage and its relations with
property and law has developed. In using the term image, I
intend to convey the idea of an outward appearance. It is
the appearance of marriage as perceived by those within and
without the relationship. In using the term image, I also
want to include the suggestion of illusion, meaning "a
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false or deceptive appearance."^ Therefore, the historical
accounts tell of real change but they can also contribute
towards an image of change which contains elements of
deception and illusion.
One aspect of this image has already been considered. I
suggested that the historical accounts of legal reform and
of marriage, that are discussed in chapters 2 and 3, give a
false picture of the disappearance of property as a concern
of husband and wife. The reform of the Married Women's
Property laws did not result in the introduction of a new
system of matrimonial property regulation. The jus mariti
and the jus administrationis were removed but nothing new
was put in their place. Instead the general rules of
property were left to govern the property of all
individuals, regardless of their marital status. The
pattern of reform suggested the disappearance of
matrimonial property as a specific category of property.
The principle of a separate property system, that marriage,
in itself has no effect on the property of the spouses,
contributed to the image of marriage and property as
unrelated.
Further support for this image was found in Stone's
description of historical progress in marriage and family
relations. A fundamental shift in Stone's history is from
marriage based on property to marriage based on affect.
Stone charts the decline of kin and family interests in
heritable property, which had previously operated as a
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controlling factor in marriage formation. In the absence of
these property interests within marriage, he finds only
personal affective relations. He seeks no place for a new
kind of property. As with the pattern of legal reforms,
Stone's presentation of marriage suggests that the link
between marriage and property has been dissolved.
The contribution of these separate developments to the
creation of the image of a break between marriage and
property has already been discussed.^ When changes in
property, marriage and legal regulation are considered in
conjunction, however, the constancy of a link between these
three elements once again becomes evident. This link
between property, marriage and law can be seen in recent
legislation which departs from strict separation of assets.
Recent legislation suggests that it is now recognised, in
some situations, that property remains as an important
aspect of marriage. In the final two chapters I will
discuss situations in which a link between marriage and
property has been recognised by law. These are instances
where, contrary to the image of a break between marriage
and property, legal regulation demonstrates continuing
relations between them. First I want to consider other
characteristics that have emerged from the historical
presentations of marriage, property and law and to use them
in later analysing the continuing relations between these
three elements. The histories of legal reform, marriage and
property have cast up various common characteristics which
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contribute towards a perception of marriage, property and
law and their interaction.
A perception of marriage may influence the ways in which it
is regulated by law. In this chapter I intend to consider
some of the limitations of traditional family histories and
also to recognise the influence that they may have on the
way in which families and marriage are perceived.
Traditional methods of analysing marriage contribute to the
creation of an ideal of marriage; an image of marriage.
This image may in turn influence the relations that
marriage maintains with property and law. Criticisms that
can be made of traditional family accounts are also
applicable to the way in which legal histories have been
presented.
FAMILY HISTORIES
"It has become an essential ritual of our societies to
scrutinize the countenance of the family at regular
intervals in order to decipher our destiny, glimpsing in
the death of the family an impending return to barbarism,
the letting go of our reasons for living ..."-)
This ritual can be seen in the many historical accounts
which have been produced of marriage and the family. There
exists a vast literature analysing, recording and comparing
family life and form; a literature which presents a
confusing and often contradictory pattern. Within many of
these accounts there are three tendencies highlighted in
this quotation. First, it is frequently assumed that there
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is one universal family form. Secondly, marriage or the
family itself is taken as the starting point - the point of
scrutiny is "the countenance of the family". This pattern
of study is frequently family centred. Thirdly, there is a
tendency to look for changes - to search for "the death" or
"the letting go."
These methods of studying family relations contribute to a
portrayal of marriage and families as isolated, fixed and
linear. Developments in these relations are frequently
presented in terms of progression and as distinct from, for
example, social and economic existence. The restricted
nature of such studies can produce a distorted vision of
marriage. Interpretation of isolated change within marriage
may produce a distorted image of change.
THE UNIVERSAL FAMILY
Family accounts have often been criticised for their
failure to recognise the existence of multiple family
forms. To talk of "the family" is to disregard variations
produced by locality, class, religion, age, individual
preference etc. In an area of study where agreement is hard
to find it has been said that,
"the one unambiguous fact which has emerged ... is that ...
there is not, nor ever has been, a single family system."
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There is nonetheless a tendency to talk in terms of The
Family; a universal form. To some extent both Lawrence
Stone and the legal reforms are influenced by a single,
dominant family.
Stone, in his account, does describe developments within
households of different social classes. Within each stage
of family development - open lineage, restricted
patriarchal and closed domesticated nuclear - he considers
changes within families of differing social status. At each
stage, however, his concentration focuses on one dominant
family, with practices in other social and economic classes
being presented as variations.
In the open lineage family Stone describes the importance
of the wider family and kin network. Their influence on
individual marriages is largely the result of their
property interests in the marriage. The restrictions on
courtship and choice of spouse that are characteristic of
the open lineage family are the product of the economic
concerns of property owners. The absence of close nuclear
bonds that characterised the open lineage family was also,
according to Stone, to be found in the families of the
poor. For them, however, there was less obvious need to
restrict marriages and choice of spouse. Property concerns
were of little significance in the formation of marriage
among the poor. Among the propertyless, however, Stone
suggests that the interference of neighbours and community
hindered the development of close personal relationships.
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Stone concedes that within families at this economic level,
marriages may indeed have been made for love but, in the
absence of historical evidence, he devotes little time to
this possibility. He argues that a wide network of kin and
a low level of affect was characteristic of the open
lineage family. He gives convincing evidence of why that
should be among property owning classes, where property
concerns simply left little space for love to enter into
the formation of marriage. His explanations as to why this
family type should also prevail among the lower classes is
less compelling. I would suggest that the open lineage
family that he describes is predominantly the family of the
propertied classes.
In later descriptions of the closed domesticated nuclear
family, he concentrates on the family of the middle
classes. With some exceptions, they are free from the
restraints previously imposed by property interests.
Changing economic structure has released them from
dependence on family assets as a primary source of income.
They are able to indulge in the modern form of
breadwinner/housewife family and to live in the newly
designed, private family home. Stone points to the
difficulties experienced within working class households of
conforming to the bourgeois model. The propertyless and
those of limited wealth continued to be more closely
concerned with the economic base of any marriage
relationship. The very rich also continued to have an
interest in property and kin. In so doing, he recognises
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the existence of variations throughout social classes but
prioritises the model of the middle class marriage. This
form of marriage and family is presented as The Family,
with couples in other social strata being measured against
this model.
Stone therefore recognises the co-existence of various
family types depending on their social and economic status.
He himself warns that "generalizations about family change"
must be "qualified by a careful definition of the class or
status group.In his presentation, however, he tends to
prioritise one type of family as being The Family, with the
others referred to as variations. He devotes much greater
attention to the families of the upper and middle classes,
tending to pass over the lower classes with the excuse of
inadequate evidence or the explanation of a time lag.
In the legal rules of matrimonial property there is also
evidence of the influence of a particular family type. The
jus mariti and the jus adminis trationis are more easily
understood in terms of a property owning family. They can
be considered as primarily aspects of the general property
system rather than as aspects of marriage. As M.A.Glendon
argued, the family law of the 18th and 19th centuries was
O
shaped by the needs of the property owning classes. The
increasing need for reform of these rules was emphasised by
the rejection of them by those families for whom the rules
had been devised. Property owning families used marriage
contracts to avoid the jus mariti and right of
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administration and to negotiate private marriage
settlements. In England, they turned to Equity to escape
the effects of the common law system. The legislative
reforms to a large extent were based on the private
arrangements that propertied families were already
accustomed to make for themselves.
It can be argued that the law reformers were guided by the
pattern of property arrangement within families that owned
significant assets.^ Developments in social and economic
terms, however, had resulted in property being owned in
smaller amounts but by a much wider section of society. By
the time that the common law of matrimonial property was
reformed, matrimonial property was likely to have changed
in nature and to be owned by many more couples. It seems,
however, that, in the reforms, the legislators continued to
be guided by one particular family form.
There is a tendency for both Stone and the legal reformers
to concentrate on and give precedence to one particular
family type. In the case of Stone this may result in an
overly stark presentation of the shift from property to
affect as the focus of marriage and family relations.
Privacy of the nuclear family from kin intervention might
be seen as a development only in landowning families,
rather than as a general trend at all levels of society.
The move described by Stone is most noticeable in the
families of the propertied classes because it is
reasonable to assume that it was within those families that
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parental control had been most strict. In relation to the
reforms, the apparent benefits of a separate property
system and of legal withdrawal might have been questioned
by recognition of a variety of family types, rather than
concentration on those that owned significant assets.
Changing characteristics may therefore be given excessively
wide application because of a failure to detect various co¬
existent family types. To present a change in The Family
may imply a more significant development than would be
shown if this family is recognised as only one of several.
To base legal reforms on one type of family may result in a
system that prejudices others.
FAMILY CENTRED
Even in those studies that emphasise the variety of
familial forms that co-exist, there is still a tendency to
begin with the family or the various families; to analyse
the countenance of the family rather than to look at its
points of interface. Many writers, in charting developments
within family relations, present their theory as the
definitive image of the family. The family exists in the
described form for the reasons and to fulfil the aims which
they outline. It has an independent existence outwith the
individual elements of its members. It is a pattern to
which the members conform or against which they rebel
rather than being viewed as the result of interaction
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between family members and between members and the outside
world. Analysis centres on the family.
It is a common feature of family histories that they
present a linear progression; a changing but unitary
picture of the relationship. Historical studies of marriage
and families provide many examples of a tendency to make
definitive statements on the nature and change of family
life and form. Such accounts have attracted criticism for
many reasons: their scope was too narrow or too wide, the
data on which they relied has been discredited but
ultimately their fault lies in attempting to find one
single, linear, family centred progression. There is a
recurrent tendency to credit the family with an autonomous
existence; to posit it as a pre-given institution. To take
marriage or the family itself as the constant starting
point and to attempt the creation of a monolithic theory of
marriage or the family is itself a flawed pursuit.
Stone himself warns against "the many pitfalls of any
unilinear theory of history."^ And yet, it seems that
Stone fails to take his own advice. Stone's study falls
within the category defined by Donzelot as "family
centred." His mammoth task involves an attempt to chart
changes in the family over three hundred years, assessed by
means of consideration of personal feelings. Although Stone
identifies a wide variety of causes and influences, and
recognises, to a limited extent, that variations exist
between social classes, he still produces a linear,
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historical account of families; a progression from an open,
loosely connected group to a closed nuclear unit.
In presenting a picture of change that in general is "one
of inexorable progress"-^ Stone does create a linear
account of family development. Alan Macfarlane in his
review of Stone's book argues that Stone proceeds from the
basis of "a whole set of assumptions about progressive
evolution from the past"^; assumptions that Macfarlane
believes to have been discredited. He also recognises that
an important contributory factor to Stone's linear account
lies in his "isolation of the 'family' as an institution,
thus taking it out of its embedded context. would
argue that this method of looking at the "countenance" of
the family, studying it as an isolated institution, is a
significant factor in the production of a misleading image
of family relations.
It has been argued that,
"much of the work on the history of the family is
conceptually wedded to an acceptance of the distinction
between the family itself, and the larger world .,."1^
In his history Stone explains how this gradual distinction
between family and society was achieved. Stone presents, as
a central element, a shift in the focus of the family from
property to personal affect and having identified this
shift he is then free to concentrate only on internal
personal feeling while ignoring, justifiably according to
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his theory, any outside interaction. He explains (creates)
this separation by concentrating his gaze within the
family. He uses external developments to explain
developments within the family. He does not consider points
of contact between family and society but produces an
account of the family as a reflection of society. He uses
changes in social mores, in philosophy and in personality,
to create an image of the modern family. In so doing he
shuts out the world external to the family. Stone's
extensive study of the historical development of the family
suggests an introspective, family centred pattern which
conflicts with the pattern emerging from a more diverse
study of intersections between family, property and legal
regulation.
Stone describes the separation of family from society, the
closing off of the nuclear unit. He explains the rise of
the closed, affective family based on sentiment and
personal emotion. He recounts how the family shuts itself
off and thereby justifies his method (and that of others)
of studying families as if they exist in isolation. In his
history Stone produces evidence to allow us to look at the
family in isolation. There is no need to consider its
continuing interaction with other aspects of society
because, as he has explained, the family is separate and it
is inward looking. Stone's work helps to demonstrate the
creation and sustenance of an image of the family as
isolated, self-centred and inward looking.
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There is evidence too in the historical presentation of the
legal reforms of a linear progression. Domination to
equality, legal regulation to private control, community to
individual, the demise of matrimonial property: these
straight progressive developments emerge from a law centred
presentation of the reforms. The reforms are shown from
the point of view of law and legal rights. As such they
create expectations of equality, freedom from legal
regulation and personal autonomy.
The common law of jus mariti and jus administrationis gave
legal recognition to the importance of the link between
marriage and property. Property was regulated as an
important incident of marriage. On the removal of these
rights no new system of regulation was introduced and,
therefore, from a legal point of view, property seemed to
have disappeared from marriage. Considering the reforms
from a legal perspective, there was no need to look for a
changing relation between marriage and property because
matrimonial property had disappeared from the law's scope
of concern.
The jus mariti and right of administration imposed a legal
system of hierarchy and domination. They gave to the
husband legal rights over his wife and her property. With
the reforms introduced by the Married Women's Property
legislation, this system was replaced by a regime of legal
equality. Husband and wife were to be treated by law on a
gender neutral basis. Each was to have equal legal rights
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to own property. Therefore a linear, law centred discussion
of the reforms presented the achievement of legal
equality. From a law centred approach, there was no
discussion of economic or social status.
Equally clear from the legal reforms was a move from a
system that combined the assets of husband and wife to one
that treated them as entirely separate. From the
perspective of law reform, all aspects of community had
been removed. Legally the property of each spouse remained
his or her own. The removal of the right of administration
and the jus mariti signalled the end of the submergence of
the wife's property in that of her husband. Instead each
spouse retained the right to own his or her separate
assets. The reforms, presented by a law centred analysis,
took no notice of the practical community of marriage.
In Stone's history we have a family centred history. In the
presentation of the legal reforms we have a law centred
history. Each presents developments from a single isolated
perspective. In so doing, I would suggest that the
developments imply expectations and consequences that may
not be fulfilled when viewed in terms of relations between
each isolated element. In studying the family in isolation,
Stone produces characteristics of modern marriage and
familial form which may be misleading. They are
characteristics that describe the sentiment aspect of
marriage and family but which do not reflect the position
of this element within a much broader range of relations
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that converge in marriage and family existence. In
presenting the legal reforms in isolation, legal
expectations are created that may not be fulfilled when
the legal rules are inserted within marriage and property
relations.
Recognition of the limits of traditional historical studies
influenced the approach adopted by Donzelot in his account
of family regulation. He rejected the conventional
approach, replacing it with a method which would,
"posit the family not as a point of departure but as a
moving resultant."
Donzelot, in discussing the historical writings of Philippe
17 1 RAriesx/ and Jean-Louis Flandrin, highlights a problem
with their work which can equally be applied to Stone. He
asserts that,
"the disadvantage of this fascinating and meticulous
restitution of the familial past is in the haphazard nature
of this separating out of mentalities, in the fuzziness
that it allows to settle in between this domain and that of
economic and political transformations."1
Donzelot is looking at relations between the family domain
and the politico-economic domain. I would suggest that the
criticisms he makes could be directed to Stone's familial
account in terms of its failure to consider relations
between the family domain and, for my purposes,
transformations in terms of property and law. Siting his
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analysis within the family, Stone sees the disappearance of
property which had previously operated as a barrier to
affective relations. His narrow range of vision does not
allow him to detect new points of intersection between
marriage and property. Similarly from the point of view of
sentiment, Stone finds an increasing privatisation of the
relationship; a discovery which then prevents him from
looking for alternative public intrusions into the family.
Individualism is also found within the scope of sentiment
and Stone's restricted range does not allow him to locate
other instances of community.
The law reforms and their presentation might also be
criticised for their narrow vision, their focus on legal
rights. Their introduction of legal equality takes no
account of social and economic inequality; their setting
free of matrimonial property from regulation takes no
account of the effects of non-regulation and, their
emphasis on individual legal rights takes no account of
practical community. Thus their presentation in isolation
creates legal expectations that may not be fulfilled.
In this study I would suggest that the relations between
law, marriage and property can best be traced by studying
the connections that are maintained between them instead of
tracing isolated change; looking for the disappearance of
one aspect, or indeed the end of the relationship. Instead
of detecting points of intersection, Stone identifies
disappearance. This is an unavoidable result of his
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restricted vision. Stone "posits the family" as his "point
of departure," just as the legal writers posit the legal
rules as theirs. And so each produces only one aspect of
the relationship.
DEATHS AND DICHOTOMIES
One consequence of adopting a family centred approach is a
narrowing of vision. By concentrating on developments or
changes within the family, such accounts are blind to the
re-emergence or re-alignment of aspects which seem to have
disappeared from their previous place within the family. It
is characteristic of much writing on marriage to pick out
"deaths": the death of the family, the breakdown of the
nuclear unit, the demise of the property centred marriage.
It is a tendency which appears in Stone's history and which
is also evident in presentations of the legal reforms. In
Stone we see the death of the property centred family, the
death of external regulation of the family and the death of
community. Similarly in the legal reforms there is
presented the death of legal regulation of matrimonial
property and the death of community. With the discovery of
these endings, these deaths, I would suggest that there is
a narrowing of vision.
With the presentation of these endings we tend to expect
change, to anticipate new policies. Stone's account
suggests the gradual abandonment of an old philosophy of
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marriage and families and the substitution of a new
approach. Despite Stone's recognition that
"generalization ... imposes an artificial schematization on
a chaotic and ambiguous reality,"
he proceeds to create such an artificial scheme. The
legal reforms are seen as signs of change - they are
presented as turning points. In the reforms we look for new
aims and new motives. Both contribute to the creation of
splits between the old and the new; they add to the
divisions which are apparent in marriage and in its
relations with property and law; they strengthen and fix
the existence of the family.
In addition to narrowing the scope of investigation, the
identification of splits supports the creation of dualisms.
There is in liberal thought a "tendency to a dichotomous
distinction."^ It is a tendency that is evident in Stone's
history and also in presentation of the legal reform of the
Married Women's Property laws. Stone supports the existence
of three main dualisms - property/affect, public/private,
community/individual. Throughout his account he presents
the demise of the first element of each of these pairs and
the rise of the second. He presents these elements in
opposition, thus creating apparent conflicts between them.
Similar splits are presented in relation to the legal
treatment of matrimonial property between enforced public
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regulation and private arrangement and between community
and separate property.
This discourse of dualisms insists on categorisation into
one or other domain. It constrains relationships within the
requirements of only one side of a balanced pair. This
method of discussion presents illusory distinctions. It
imposes artificial divisions. The imposition of these
artificial divisions has implications for the development
of relations within the family and between the family and
the outside world. It also has implications for the scope
of legal reforms.
The dichotomy most often discussed in family terms is that
of public/private. Fran Olsen in her discussion of the
split between market and family highlights the restricting
and confining nature of this division. She argues that the
dichotomy "reifies ... abstractions" and "renders us
9 9
powerless." So long as existence is divided into two, the
potential for reform is limited. Reforms can only attempt
to make each side more like the other or more like itself.
Changes within the family are constrained by a conception
of what the family should be and what the market should be.
Her demonstration of the restrictive nature of analysis and
experience based on this dichotomy can be applied to the
patterns of change that have been presented in terms of
marriage and its relations with property and law. Within
those patterns there is evidence of the limitations of
legal reforms that can do no more than try to make the
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family more like the family - privatisation - or try to
make the family more like the market - individualism.
RESULTING IMAGE
In this discussion of three tendencies found frequently in
family histories, I have indicated some of the ways in
which relations between marriage, property and law have
become mystified. A failure to recognise variations between
families, an obsession with searching for change within the
family and a method of discussion that divides everything
into pairs, contribute to the creation of a confusing and
misleading image of marriage, which in turn influences its
contact with property and law.
From the histories that I have discussed, the image that
emerges of marriage has three main characteristics. There
is a split between marriage and property. Marriage is an
affective relationship, unconnected with property. Secondly
there is a split between marriage and the outside world. In
various ways, marriage has become a private relationship.
Thirdly there is an increasing emphasis on individualism
within marriage. The individuals have taken precedence over
the community. By looking at methods of traditional
historical presentation, the ways in which these
characteristics have developed become clearer. They can now
be used for the purpose of analysing continuing points of
contact between marriage, property and law.
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^ M.Barrett and M.Mcintosh, The Anti-Social Family, p.130.
2 The political and ideological background to law is
discussed by S.Staves in the recent Married Women's
Separate Property in England, 1660-1833. My intention is to
point out the circular nature of ideology or images. Behind
and surrounding, the legal reforms; changes within
marriage, and developments in terms of property, there were
political and ideological forces. These changes in turn
gave rise to a specific ideology, a set of images, of
marriage, property and law. The influence of these images
is discernible within the continuing relations between
marriage, property and law.
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In Part II I have reconsidered the histories of Part I. It
has been my aim to question the historical patterns that
emerged by looking at the histories of law, marriage and
property in conjunction and by recognising the limitations
of their presentation.
History in this thesis has two functions. It provides,
first, a background picture of change. Secondly, it is used
to suggest that, beyond what may have been relatively
narrow and specific historical changes, there is also
created an image of change.
From the histories that I have discussed, the image that
emerges of marriage has three main characteristics. There
is a split between marriage and property. Marriage is an
affective relationship that is unconnected with property.
Secondly, there is a split between marriage and the outside
world. In various ways, marriage has become a private
relationship. Thirdly, there is an increasing emphasis on
individualism within marriage. The individuals have taken
precedence over the community. By looking at methods of
traditional presentation, the ways in which these
characteristics have developed have become clearer. They
can now be used for the purpose of analysing continuing
points of contact between marriage, property and law.
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Having highlighted characteristics of an image that
emerges from the isolated histories of Part I and having
suggested why these mislead, I will proceed in Part III to
consider their reflection in relations between marriage,
property and law. The characteristics that have emerged
will provide tools of analysis.
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CHAPTER 7: PRIVACY
A common characteristic emerging from the historical
accounts of both legal reform and marriage is the
increasing privatisation of marriage and of the relations
of husband and wife. Lawrence Stone points to the privacy
of the modern nuclear family, its existence within a sphere
of private regulation and its physically private setting.
The legal reforms indicate a preference for private
ordering of the domestic affairs of husband and wife. These
accounts contribute to the characterisation of marriage and
family life as private. Analysis based on a split between
public and private has frequently been employed in
discussion of families. The recognition of such a split is
traditionally traced back to Aristotle, being later taken
up and developed by liberal political theorists. More
recently, it is a method of analysis which has been widely
used by feminist writers, aiming to display the inadequacy
of equality within the public sphere if accompanied by
continuing inequality within the private. While not
wishing to subscribe to a widescale form of this theory I
would like to borrow aspects of it in considering some
stages in the developing relations between family and
property. I do not intend to develop a theory of marriage
and property in terms of a public/private debate but to
look at some instances in relations between marriage and
property where privacy plays a part.
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The foregoing historical discussions have contained
evidence of trends towards the privacy of both marriage and
property, and the withdrawal of law from these areas. The
historical pattern of legislative reform, Stone's account
of marital and familial developments, and changing types
and concepts of property highlight the increasing
importance accorded to the privacy of marriage and the
family.
The historical discussion of legislative reform in chapter
2 charts an apparent move towards non-regulation by law of
the property of husband and wife and of the property
element of marriage. Abolition of the jus mariti and the
right of administration signals an end of specific legal
involvement in matrimonial property. Chapter 3, in
dealing with historical accounts of the family and,
particularly, in considering the family histories of Stone,
suggests a trend towards a private family. Privacy is
emphasised in terms of the marriage bonds - personal
relationships and affect - and in terms of isolation of
physical domestic space. Stone describes the closing off of
the nuclear family, its confinement within a private
domestic space and its increasing emphasis on the private
personalities of its members. In chapter 4, in the
discussion of the changing nature of property,there is also
a growing emphasis on privacy. There is to be seen a move
in family property from the assets of an extended kin group
to the specific goods of a nuclear unit; a shift from
assets with some form of wider public worth, for example,
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land providing work, accommodation, farming etc. - to
property of a much more personal value.
From these accounts, privacy has emerged in various guises.
It is, as I have argued, a characteristic that may lead to
unfulfilled expectations.^ Privacy, nonetheless, remains as
a dominant image of marriage. Being characterised as
private may affect the connections which spouses, or the
relationship of marriage, maintains with property and law.
In this chapter I want to consider some of the elements of
privacy that have been emphasised in terms of marriage and
discuss how they are involved in aspects of relations
between marriage, property and law. I have outlined
historical accounts which highlight the private nature of
marriage and the private nature of regulation of domestic
affairs. I have also suggested that, to some extent, this
characteristic of privacy is little more than an image. I
intend now to use the idea of privacy, and its distinction
from the public, as a means of analysing aspects of
relations between marriage, property and law.
What does it mean to talk of a split between public and
private? Although I do not want to be trapped within pre¬
determined limits of a public/private debate, an
understanding is necessary of what others have meant when
speaking of the privacy of marriage and families in
opposition to the public sphere.
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For Aristotle, there was a natural disinction between men
and women which required that they be kept separate. Both
had natural virtues but only men were capable of displaying
the virtues necessary to create and sustain a good city.
Only men therefore should participate in the life of the
polis - the public. These early discussions of a split
between public and private were closely linked to a sex-
based distinction. When the public/private distinction was
taken up and developed by liberal theorists, the
male/female division was much less overt. By the late 17th
century, liberalism, based on individual freedom and
supremacy of contract, had apparently replaced a social
structure based on patriarchy. Patriarchy had previously
moulded all individual relations, within the family and in
society. Society was,
"one long chain ... within which an endless cycle of
command and obedience is repeated."
Liberalism attacked the position that everyone is born in
subordination to another and replaced it with the theory
that every man is born free.
How could this collection of free individuals live together
and co-operate in society? In explaining how free
individuals could live together and avoid anarchy, the
distinction between public and private was important. It
was within private that there should be complete individual
freedom. Within the public it was necessary for these
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individuals to act as one - to form a society. For Locke,
the split within each individual was between reason and
desire. Reason was something that each man knew equally and
it would therefore guide his public actions. Desire was
personal and individual and was allowed to govern fully
only in private.
"In our public mode of being
of reason ... In our private
at the mercy of our own sense,
we speak the common language
incarnation, however, we are
impressions and desire.
The existence, within liberalism, of a distinction between
public and private is certain but there is less agreement
as to which activities fall within each sphere. Political
activity is firmly placed within the public whereas the
setting of economic and commercial affairs gives rise to
some debate. Ownership is considered as private, although
there might be, for example, private ownership of property
that is intended for public use. Although the setting of
particular matters may be uncertain, it is clear that
everything can be placed within one of these two
categories. Whatever doubts might arise about the private
or public nature of matters such as business and commerce,
marriage and the family are quite distinctly private.
The distinction between public and private was developed
further in the writings of J.S.Mill and it began to take on
a clearer content. There was an increasing tendency to
think of the split,
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"in terms of the division between home and market ... with
the opposition between the realm of legitimate public
regulation and the realm of freedom from intrusion,
personal autonomy and private choice."^
Recently, the public/private split has become an important
theme of much feminist writing and action. This work
centres around the need to recognise the split between
public and private and its significance in maintaining a
patriarchal structure. Much recent feminist analysis is,
"directed at the separation and opposition between the
public ami private spheres in liberal theory and
practice.
It is argued that equality is impossible to achieve without
consideration of the interlinking of public and private, an
argument that has been popularised under the slogan of "The
Personal is Political."
Much feminist writing is also engaged in deconstructing
liberal thought by demonstrating its failure to recognise
women as full public individuals. It is essential to
liberalism that each individual has two aspects - public
and private. Each individual has the potential to act
within these dual spheres. Feminist argument attempts to
demonstrate that this dual nature was not intended to
extend to women. When liberalists spoke of individuals they
often avoided the issue of whether that term was to include
women. Mill, although he campaigned for the extension of
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full political freedom to women, continued to envisage the
home as their natural and primary sphere of occupation.
While some of these arguments are inherent in my discussion
of family privacy, I do not want to be constrained solely
within these boundaries. The image of marriage and property
as increasingly private elements owes much to liberal
thought. Feminist analysis of liberalism contributes
significantly to an understanding of some of the conflicts
that arise in the relations between marriage and property.
The ideal of privacy, however, has other applications in
terms of marriage and property.
In using the terms private, privatisation, privacy, my
understanding of them may differ from classic
public/private arguments and the meaning attributed to them
may change when applied to different areas of discussion.
Privatisation of the family from a legal viewpoint may mean
non-regulation or limited regulation of the family by law;
in terms of property, privatisation suggests physical
privacy - the family home - or the personal nature of the
family's assets. In another sense privacy of the family may
describe the apparent lack of social significance attached
to the marriage relationship - a decreasing emphasis on
status and an increasing emphasis on private emotions and
relationships. In economic terms it describes the split
between production and consumption. An understanding of how
privacy became important in these various contexts and of
the results of the interaction of these aspects is my aim
-205-
in this chapter. I would wish to demonstrate in some ways
the increased emphasis on privacy in the family and the
significance of this emphasis and characterisation in view
of the differences between it and the public domain; to
consider the idealisation of privacy in relation to the
family and some of the conflicts which arise because of the
perceived split between public and private, particularly in
the context of property.
THE UNREGULATED FAMILY
Neither public nor private is fixed nor do they correspond
consistently to male/female or property/family. In one
sense it can be argued that family and property are
private: they are ideally matters of individual regulation
not subject to legal interference.
"In classical liberalism both property and the family lie
in the 'private' domain, where state and law should not
enter."6
Thus it can be argued that there is an apparent conflict
between 'public' law and 'private' property and family.
O'Donovan concentrates on this aspect of the public/private
split in her image of the family as a "black box,"^ an area
into which law will not intrude. I would suggest that this
is an image, a split between public and private, which is
more effective ideologically than the facts would seem to
justify. The image may remain of the desirability of
private regulation in these areas but they are in reality
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quite clearly accessible to law and state. Intervention,
however, continues to be portrayed as the exception, the
abnormal. A. study of the Married Women's Property reform
legislation contributes to this image of deregulation of
the family, although, as has been previously argued,
regulation may only have shifted rather than disappeared.
The portrayal of the family as legally unregulated, whether
or not that image is upheld in practice, is I would suggest
an important aspect in the study of family and property
relations.
Ironically the privacy of marriage, its non-regulation by
law, has been and continues in some contexts to be
threatened and disturbed by the privacy accorded to and
emphasised in other aspects of the modern nuclear family -
for example, physical privacy. In particular I will discuss
three aspects of family and property relations which
demonstrate some of the conflicts arising from the
uncomfortable cohabitation of marriage and property,
influenced and divided by the terms public and private: the
conflicting values of public and private as evidenced by
the disparate position of women emerging in the nineteenth
century in the two spheres of public life and private
family, the unbalanced effects of liberal theories in
relation to public and private endeavours, and the
creation of the goal of the private family home, with the
horrible secrets which this goal can produce if misused.
The first two aspects demonstrate the conflict between
public and private. The third is the most obvious and
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dangerous example of the potential undesirability of the
idealised image of a private family. In each of these
scenarios I would aim to give some indication of the way in
which the private element was stressed and maintained; to
demonstrate how that element can come into conflict with
public aims and values - perhaps by being abused; to
consider the interaction of these private elements with the
apparent unwillingness to allow legal intervention and to
indicate in what circumstances and by what means the law
will intervene.
PUBLIC/PRIVATE POWER
In discussing legislative reform and the changing image of
marriage it has become clear that by the 19th century the
two were quite seriously out of step. Disparity could be
seen, in particular, in relation to wives. While many women
had risen from a position of complete submission, according
to the law they remained quite firmly merged with the
persona of their husband. The existence of a wife was tied
very closely to the existence of her husband and her
familial duties. A married woman existed by means of her
role as a wife or mother rather than on the basis of her
individual merits. It has been seen from considering the
system of property regulation that a woman's property, to
which she may have become entitled by reason of her
marriage, was merged in the property of the family and in
many ways she would have no independent right of ownership
or control over it.
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By the late 19th century the private balance of power, so
clearly evidenced by the common law of property, under
which virtually all rights to a woman's property vested in
her husband, was no longer widely acceptable. Increased
public economic activity of women and general trends of
political, economic and philosophical thought were
highlighting the anachronisms of the private relationship.
The influences of liberalism favoured individualism and
personal equality. The upsurge of romance highlighted the
role of companion for the wife in an affective marriage.
Neither of these accorded well with the gross inequality of
property rights in marriage and of the wider concept of
marriage as an extreme example of female subordination.^
These anachronisms were to a great extent emphasised by a
contrast, within the existence of the family, between
public and private in terms of family economics.
By considering specific aspects of the Married Women's
Property legislation I would suggest that the importance
and the influence of a public/private split becomes
evident. Before discussing some of the conflicts and
problems to which the split gave rise and the specific
legislative reforms which were introduced I intend to
consider how this division might have occurred or how the
perceived division was strengthened.
Changes within the family and isolation of the family are
sometimes explained as being the consequence of change in
the public sphere. Whilst broadly rejecting functionalist
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theories which portray the family as a direct product of
the changing social or economic structure, I would agree
that these external shifts are significant as one influence
of change within the family. To argue that the modern
private family occurred as a result of industrialisation,
or that industrialisation required that particular family
form, is to create a seemingly straightforward exchange
which exists neither factually nor logically. While there
are obviously points of interdependence between industrial
capitalism and the modern nuclear family, family
relationships are the product of a much more complex and
fragmented system of influences and requirements.
Industrialisation and the modern capitalist structure,
however, did various things which were of significance to
family form and to the relationship between family and the
wider society.
Historical data disputes the assertion that gender roles
and division of labour emerged simultaneously with
industrialisation. It seems reasonable to suggest that to
some extent these differences existed long before the 19th
century. With industrialisation, however, they became much
more clearly defined and their effects became of greater
significance. I would argue that a split in physical terms
between public and private can be attributed partly to
industrialisation and a changing work pattern.
The pre-industrial family is often described as forming an
economic unit of production; it is seen as a partnership,
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albeit unequal, of husband and wife. Work was part of the
family tasks often being shared amongst its members. Some
things such as housework and childcare always tended to be
the domain of women, but for the family of earlier times
such matters were of considerably less importance than they
are to the modern family. In addition, although such tasks
were identified as women's work, the woman was not
necessarily the wife or mother, but may have been a
neighbour, servant, daughter or other female relative.
Thus while there may have been gender differentiation in
family roles prior to industrialisation, it was not a
matter of equal import as neither role was specialised to
the extent that it is in the modern context and, in terms
of physical space, the tasks of each sex were not
necessarily or commonly separated.
Industrialisation first moved all adult members out of the
house and into the mill or the factory but gradually with
increasing prosperity the women and children were sent
home.
"At some point in the nineteenth century ... the family
wage emerged as an important bargaining point for the trade
union movement and with it came the idea that, ideally, the
wife's place was at home."-1-0
An important change accompanied the introduction of a
family wage, or the promotion of it as an ideal. It was no
longer essential, or desirable, for all members of the
family to devote their time and labour to supporting
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financially the group. One member could now earn a family
wage, thus freeing the others to concentrate on the family
itself. While in theory all were working for the benefit of
the family, tasks could be divided between waged labour and
purely family based, private labour. To be able to afford
to keep a wife became a sign of status for men. The move
towards keeping women at home was also encouraged and
increasingly necessitated by the growing emphasis on
domesticity and revolutionary ideas in childcare. With the
rise of the child as a principal object of family activity
so the tasks and the time of the wife and mother became
more precious and desirable. Thus developed the pattern of
male breadwinner and female housekeeper. Both, it can be
argued, now performed vital but different roles for the
benefit of the family. Each, however, was acting in a
distinct sphere which attributed different values and the
conflict of these values can be seen within the confines of
marriage and property. There was,
"a division of labour whereby one spouse works [in public]
for earnings and the other [in private] for love."1-1-
While recognising and glorifying the position of the woman
in the family she was, in the process, effectively being
denied access to public life. Ideologically it was
desirable for her to be at home. Physically,
industrialisation made the combination of work in the home
and the factory difficult. The spatial separation of work
and family tended to confine the woman to the private
-212-
sphere of the home and to some extent, or at least for some
time, it removed the man from the home.
What was the significance economically of the spatial
division of the family from the market and of the
confinement of women to the home? I would suggest that an
important consequence was that there was now considerable
potential and, in legal terms at least, justification for
selfishness in relation to property. What greater incentive
was there to work than the knowledge of the subsequent
acquisition of one's own property? Property had
increasingly become something that men acquired in return
1 9for their public endeavour.1^
These changes in family structure and purpose developed
ahead of the ever lagging legal reform. The property laws
of the pre-industrial period were designed with a
particular family and property system in view. It was a
system in which property would tend to be donated on behalf
1 Sof both spouses J and in which personal rights and control
were not entirely unfettered nor even desirable. It was a
family form existing in a society where property was not
directly connected to labour. It was a system in which
inheritance and marriage were important means of acquiring
property.
Thus there was a possibility of conflict between the
emerging modern family and an increasingly inappropriate
and anachronistic system of law. There was a potential
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conflict between a legal system which treated husband and
wife as one person, possessed of a relatively well-defined
fund of family property, and an economic and family system
moving towards a strict division of roles and activity
between public and private, with a tighter link between
individual and property.
Having sharply divided the family from public life and
identifying the former with the female and the latter with
the male, what would now be the effect of either party
stepping outwith their gender specific role? Two problems
are foreseeable: one, where the husband fails in his role
to the detriment of his dependants and two, where the wife
exceeds her role by moving outwith the private.
Change in, for example, production, ownership and economic
structure had resulted in the likelihood that the bulk of a
family's property would be the produce of the husband's
labour, as opposed to the agreed and balanced contributions
of husband and wife and their families. To some extent the
creation of the husband as breadwinner and supporter of the
family meant that the economic fate of the wife and
children was being placed in the hands of a single man.
Thus if the husband now failed in his familial duties the
outcome could cause considerable hardship.This emphasised
the fragility of the wife's position within the marriage.
For the 19th century wife,
submergence in her husband's
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marriage meant complete
legal persona. With the
teachings of puritanism, the cult of domesticity and the
birth of the child centred family, her homely domain was
given an almost saintly aura and appeal. In a modest way
her endeavours were recognised and their value to her
husband and family rewarded.^ Outwith the narrow confines
of this sphere, however, her power and status were strictly
limited. She dealt vicariously with the outside world,
1 s
being legally represented by her husband. A wife and home
were status symbols for a man but for a woman, a husband
was often a practical, economic necessity. For her
existence within the private sphere, a woman would be
dependent on her husband's financial provision. Without the
safety net of a marriage contract and without the certainty
of inherited or contributed wealth, what guarantee did a
wife have of continuing support from her husband?
What if the wife herself was to venture outwith the
confines of the domestic sphere? Could not that provide one
solution to her position of dependence? The possibilities
for female work outside the home had increased, although
they were still limited and unlikely to produce an income
sufficient for comfortable existence. Female occupations
prior to industrialisation had tended to be restricted to
the familiar areas of dressmaking, millinery, the provision
of accommodation and shop keeping. While female entry to
gainful employment was clearly limited, it was nonetheless
an important factor in the economic structure of some
households and it could provide some financial security for
women.
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More discouraging, perhaps, than the restricted range of
employment available, was the highly unjust and
economically inappropriate method of legal treatment of
married women's earnings. Under the common law regime, any
income of the woman would fall within the scope of her
husband's property rights.^ The source of such property
was not of itself sufficient to dislodge the long
established claim of the husband. The personal link between
worker and reward gave way to the superior right of husband
over wife. Ideally, of course, the husband's duty was to
deal with it, as with all other family property, for the
benefit of the family. So long as he did so then
practically the effects of the law might pass largely
unnoticed. The inequities of the system would become
obvious where the husband, having become entitled to the
property or income earned or acquired by the wife, then
failed to support her. Where the woman had access to some
form of self acquired income and her husband was failing in
or neglecting his role of support towards her (and their
children), there seemed just cause for change in the law.
Kahn-Freund discussing the legislative reform in England
said that,
"the mediaeval common law ... took no account of the needs
of married women who were gainfully employed outside the
house, and who through their own earnings contributed to
the maintenance of the family."
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In Scotland, in a similar way, only those women who had the
benefit of a marriage settlement would have any independent
right to property but that in any case was a method
originally devised to secure the rights of women over
inherited property. It was part of the old system of
property whereas the question of a woman's right to enjoy
the fruits of her own labour was an aspect of the modern
form of family property.
Theoretically the denial to women of the enjoyment of the
product of their labour was an increasingly impossible
position to justify. It contradicted an economic system
which now recognised a close link between work and reward,
and a loosening and fading of the old ties between property
1 8and inheritance. From a practical, economic stance it was
pointless to deny to women what, in the face of lack of
support from their husbands, would be their only or at
least their most obvious and reasonable form of support.
Thus, on both a theoretical and a practical level, the
position of the wife working outwith the private sphere of
the family questioned the continued operation of the common
law rules.
When change finally came in legislative form, one of the
first areas of married women's property to be exempted from
the control of the husband was the independent earnings of
the wife. The Conjugal Rights (Scotland) Amendment Act 1861
provided for the exclusion of property acquired by the wife
by her own industry, where she had been deserted by her
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husband or where she had obtained a decree of separation^:
a provision to fit exactly the two routes described above
by which spouses might diverge from their divided
public/private roles.
This, in terms of a changing attitude towards matrimonial
property, was a limited step as it was in fact dealing with
a situation of marital breakdown. In terms of the
public/private distinction, however, it was a recognition
that the changing economic base of society could conflict
with the private lives of family members. It dealt with the
most unfair example of the conflict affecting the woman
maltreated in the private sphere and also denied her due
reward in the public sphere. Her husband, by deserting her,
had failed in his duty as supporter and in this situation
there could be little justification for further depriving
the woman, by denying her the fruits of her public labour;
nor would such denial make economic sense.
The provision was however very limited. The privilege
granted by the reform would last only for so long as the
spouses remained apart. In this situation the ideal roles
of male provider and supporter and dependent, private wife
were sacrificed to the needs of economy. Without seriously
disturbing the promoted familial roles the legislation
exempted from the general rules one problematic area. Thus
the basic position would appear to remain that the woman's
first source of support should be her husband and in return
she should surrender the care and control of her assets to
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him. Where, however, such support was not forthcoming and
the wife showed willing and able to support herself, then
to prevent her from doing so would be philosophically
unsustainable and financially unwise.
With the Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act of 1877
the protection for wages and earnings was extended to all
women still living in matrimony. The jus mariti and right
of administration were excluded in terms of s.3 of the
Act-
(1) From the wages and earnings of any married woman
acquired or gained by her after 1st January, 1878,
(a) in any employment, occupation or trade in which she is
engaged, or
(b) in any business which she carries on under her own
name.
This provision protected the income from a woman's
employment but did not affect any stock in trade she might
have which would continue to be governed by the common law
rules unless it had been gifted to her by her husband. Thus
adequate protection was given to ensure that the wife could
benefit from her income which might provide a barrier
against poverty, particularly in situations where the
husband was unwilling or unable to provide for the family,
but there was no substantial attack on the basic underlying
policy of granting control or ownership to the husband.
From the nature of these two statutory provisions I think
it can be seen that they were to a great extent piecemeal
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provisions designed to adapt the outmoded law to deal with
particular problems. The restriction of the earlier
provision to those situations where the couple were no
longer living together demonstrates an unwillingness to
interfere with the basic system and to disturb the private
roles of husband and wife. It was designed to protect a
wife's public enterprise only where her husband was failing
in his private duties. The later provision, by dealing
solely with the income, also shows an unwillingness to
disturb the common law any more than absolutely necessary
and I would suggest highlights the ad hoc nature of the
provision, rather than suggesting it as a component of a
more wide scale and comprehensive pattern of reform.
These provisions are a reflection of one of the conflicts
which emerged from the strict separation of private family
from aspects of public life. In theoretical terms the split
highlighted the oppressive and inegalitarian nature of the
family hierarchy. This was an influence which was of
ongoing importance to the legislative reforms of the
property system, to changing attitudes towards the family
and to behaviour within it. In a more concrete way, the
physical split between public and private, and consequently
between the promoted spheres of work and existence for male
and female, contributed to, and perhaps forced, the reform
of aspects of the common law. The legislation was adequate
to protect, the wife who was mistreated in private from
being doubly prejudiced by being denied both private
support and the public means of support ie. waged
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employment. Later, protection was extended to all women who
sought to supplement their own or their family income by
working outwith the home. The protection was afforded, for
a few years at least, without substantially disturbing the
continuing private control of marital property.
To have allowed the system to continue unaltered might have
lessened the willingness of women to conform to marriage
and have raised wider questions of equality and, yet, to
have weakened the husband's basic powers would have
undoubtedly been met with considerable disfavour and
opposition.
PRIVATE REGULATION
As briefly mentioned above, one aspect of the
public/private discussion which is often highlighted is
the apparent split between the family and law. The family
is argued to be a legally unregulated area. It is on this
aspect of the public/private split that Katherine O'Donovan
concentrates in her book, Sexual Divisions in Law. She
demonstrates the continuing inequality of women, stemming
from the non-regulation of familial relationships. While
this is a contention which I would dispute, I would suggest
that the characterisation of the family as such a sphere of
non-intervention is influential in its existence and in the
way it is controlled. The portrayal of the family as non-
regulated contributes to the split between public and
private, by emphasising the family as something natural,
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uncommercial - a collection of all the good things which
modern public life has lost or forsaken. In Stone's
account, we witness the demise of a regulatory system that
suppressed individual personalities and, with its demise,
natural feelings are allowed to flourish.
I would suggest that there are two problems which arise
from the image of the family as legally unregulated.
Firstly, it contributes to a false image of the family as
something complete and separate and denies to the members
the legal remedies and rights available in public life.
Secondly, because of the concrete split between public and
private as suggested above, and particularly as it affects
sexual division of labour, non regulation, which is
presented in terms of liberal public life as being a
benefit of the family, may in practice disadvantage some
members of the family. It is the link between these two
aspects which can produce unfair and prejudicial results
for one spouse. As O'Donovan summarises the problem:
" law leaves it to the couple to sort themselves out in
private; but dominance within personal relations is
determined by structures external to the family.'
The whole question of the regulation or non-regulation of
the family involves vast and diverse areas of legislation
relating to, inter alia, welfare and social security which
to a large extent remain outwith my sphere of
91
consideration. For many families, talk of legal
intervention and control is of a hypothetical nature. State
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intervention instead has become much more of an issue for
them. Through the system of social security and through a
chain of connected social control agencies, state
intervention and support have become, perhaps, more
significant than the question of the intervention of
private law. While recognising that much of the control and
regulation of familial matters is now located in laws not
so obviously or solely devoted to the family and,
therefore, as previously discussed in relation to Stone,
regulation has diversified or shifted rather than
disappeared, my concern here is to consider the image of
legal non-regulation of the family and, more specifically,
family property.
The Married Women's Property reform legislation of the 19th
and early 20th centuries to a large extent contributed to
the creation of the non regulated image of the family and
its property. With the completion of the reforms, law
appeared to withdraw from the arena. Under the resulting
system (or absence of system) of separation of assets, law
retained no right to interfere during a marriage. It
reserved and has developed considerable power over property
on the breakdown of marriage. Unlike legal systems which
operate by means of a comprehensive code, the separation of
property in Scotland was rather the result of a series of
individual reforms than the considered application of a
complete scheme. What then were the combined effects of the
physical split between public and private - the separation
of workplace and home - and the more theoretical split
-223-
which separated law from marriage and property? The result
of the Married Women's Property reform legislation was to
abolish the peculiarities of regulation previously applied
to property in terms of marriage. In other words, the laws
of property would now apply apparently equally to all,
regardless of marital status.
In the absence of any specific rules or guidelines to be
followed in relation to property within the family, the
rules of ordinary property law fell to be applied. These
rules were formulated in the atmosphere of liberalism and
free market thinking which was prevalent in the public
sphere. While liberalism was a welcome alternative to the
oppressive paternalism that had preceded, it must be
welcomed with the warning of double standards. Its presence
in the private sphere of the family was a very watery
version of what existed in public and it introduced a
philosophy which was contradictory in many ways to the
ideal family form. It encouraged individualism in an
institution based on merged personalities. It appeared to
introduce the principles of equal treatment and freedom of
contract and will to a group comprising highly unequal
members who were accustomed to submerging their individual
9 9will to the common good of the group. z
For the law to withdraw from regulation of matrimonial
assets was apparently in keeping with the general liberal
aim to protect property, to the greatest practical extent,
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from legal intervention. This policy in tandem with the
concrete split in spheres of activity which was prevalent
in many modern families meant, however, that its
consequences within the family setting were often unfair
and far removed from the desired effect developed and
envisaged in the public commercial sphere.
It is this aspect of liberalism and the public/private
dichotomy that has attracted feminist analysis. Non-
regulation of marital and familial affairs was a benefit in
terms of liberalism; granting to the individual a private
domain within which to be oneself, to act free from legal
constraint. Liberalism, however, posited this private
domain as a balance to the public sphere of activity. How
would the non-regulation of the private sphere affect those
who had no existence within the public?
"Conventional analysis by legal writers presents a picture
of a linear progression by emancipated women out of the
private sphere into the public.
Stages in this progression included the granting of
suffrage to women and the changes in the legal rules
governing the property of married women. Women too could
participate in public life and they were to be given the
consequent powers, such as the power to own property. There
is much to suggest, however, that many women remained one
dimensional - they remained purely private. Female vision
showed little desire to enter the public, with even those
who campaigned for suffrage doing so on the basis that the
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political would benefit from private feminine values. Women
would bring their natural morality to the public sphere of
immorality and reason. Opportunities to participate fully
in public affairs were limited, with women's entry to
education and the professions being severely restricted.
Domestic ideology encouraged women to remain in their
private domain. Simply by giving to women equal public
rights did not guarantee that they would become fully
participating members of the public. J.S.Mill, for example,
assumed that women, given freedom of choice, would continue
to choose to remain within the familial sphere.^ The
majority continued to be private women, who now had the
power to engage in one public activity, that of voting.
The private family was presented as a liberal ideal but it
was an ideal only for liberal individuals and that did not
necessarily include women. Feminist analysis of liberalist
thinkers argues that their theories were not intended to
extend to women. Liberalism allowed men to further their
own interests within the privacy of marriage and the
family. That, in effect, left them free to maintain a
structure of patriarchy within their own family.
Patriarchy, which had apparently been overthrown, continued
to flourish within the private family and it was able to do
so because,
"the dichotomy between the private and the public obscures
the subjection of women to men within an apparently
universal, egalitarian and individualistic order."
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What exactly did the legislative reforms relating to the
property of married women achieve? They replaced a system
of property grounded in hierarchy and strict control with a
system of freedom and self regulation. They removed a set
of rules designed for an outmoded social structure and left
in its place the private autonomy promoted by liberalism.
They failed to allow for the continuing anachronism of
marriage - the private refuge of patriarchy.
More specifically, the legal reforms extended to all women
the protection which Equity (in England) or marriage
contracts might have previously afforded, making individual
arrangement no longer necessary. In other words they
provided for the retention by women of their own assets
regardless of whether or not they were married. Just as
those women who would have benefited under the early
provisions, concerning income from employment, were women
already participating to some extent in the public world,
so too those who would previously have sought legal
protection, by means of marriage contract, were women who
already had some claim to a position in public society as
property owners. Thus the legislation only extended to all
women, a system of protection that was already available
for women who owned property of their own. It did not
consider, or at least it declined to provide for, those
women who had no actual assets of their own - women who
only had a private existence and who had no direct means of
access to property through the marketplace.
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Unfairness and unexpected results may flow from treating
those with a purely private existence as if they also had a
public being. The legislation treated women as dual persons
by applying to them the same rules and standards which
applied in the public sphere. It treated them as liberal
individuals - a categorisation which may never have been
intended. It introduced a specific system devised to
benefit those who existed publicly as well as privately and
it was broadly based on the popular public notions of
individuality, equality and freedom. On both counts it
overlooked the wholly private woman.
Lenore Weitzman provides one concrete example of the
practical unfairness of apparently equal rules when applied
to women existent only in the private sphere, in her
discussion of the "divorce law revolution" in some American
states. She discusses the introduction of no-fault divorce
law and the irony that rules devised to treat both spouses
equally have in fact economically deprived many divorced
women. These rules, which assume the existence of spouses
who are equally adapted in economic terms, introduce,
"new norms for dividing property ... [that] eliminate the
anachronistic assumptions in the traditional law and treat
wives as fuW and equal partners in the marital
relationship."^b
In Scots law the continuing conflict between public and
private spheres of activity has again emphasised the
failings of the present property system. The law appears to
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treat men and women equally in relation to property but in
a similar way to that discussed by Weitzman, a gender
neutral, matrimonial property policy may produce
inequitable results.
Removal of legal constraints on female ownership of
property was in line with the entry of women to the labour
market as discussed above. Non-interference in the
relations between individual spouses and their property
accorded with liberalism and modern notions of ownership.
The legislative reforms, however, did not tackle the
separation of home and work, the split between public and
private and the distribution within the family of the
income and assets of the economically active partner.
As previously discussed in the changing nature of
o 7
property, assets and income were now more likely to be
the produce of individual labour rather than inheritance or
marriage portion. Such remunerated labour was also much
more likely to be the husband's or at least his share of it
was likely to outweigh greatly that of the wife. It is
against this background that the apparently just and equal
treatment of property within marriage must be considered.
"This property regime of 'to each her own' focused on legal
forms of subordination but leaves untouched questions of
power and economic distribution within the family."
Although female employment was highlighted as one cause
behind the legislative reform, that occupation was still
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limited and its importance was to a large extent
overshadowed by the emphasis on domesticity and the role of
the wife as horaemaker and mother. The Married Women's
Property legislation did not only signal the end of legal
regulation on an automatic basis it also heralded an
antipathy towards legal interference in all domestic
matters. In particular in relation to property and private
economic arrangement, the characterisation of the family as
a sphere into which law should not enter meant a reluctance
to give legal sanction to private agreements. The case law
is well rehearsed of judicial reluctance to enforce private
contracts between spouses on the basis that they are
9 9domestic agreements and not intended to have legal force. y
"Natural love and affection are judged unsuitable for legal
regulation ...
Easier divorce and the tendency of financial provision on
divorce towards a clean break principle and towards
provision for a period of readjustment rather than lifetime
support, considerably weakens the position of the
completely private wife who may question the detriment she
suffers as a result of attempting to fulfil her ideal role.
The sometimes harsh effects of separate property, of an
apparently equal treatment of husbands and wives, was
recognised to some extent in the Family Law (Scotland) Act
1985. It admitted that legal equality may not produce
equitable results when applied to persons who have existed
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in separate spheres. It had become clear that a strict
separation of property could lead to disadvantage,
particularly in relation to women who had devoted years of
their married life to unpaid domestic work. In considering
what changes might be made, the Scottish Law Commission
reviewed the whole system of separate property and the
possibility of adopting in its place some form of
community. They concluded that the main point of
significance, in terms of who owns the matrimonial
O i
property, is the breakdown of a marriage. x While a
marriage exists, ownership of matrimonial goods is rarely a
matter of concern. Therefore, they decided that the non-
interventionist separate property system should continue to
operate throughout the relationship, provided that there
was adequate provision for fair sharing of property on
divorce. The Family^/ (Scotland) Act reflected the
conclusions of the Commission.
The main scope of its provisions relates to financial
provision and sharing of matrimonial property on divorce.
What happens on divorce does not fall within the scope of
my study but it may be noted that the provisions for
dividing property on divorce reflect the conflict between
public work for money and private work for love which can
exist during marriage.
Section 9 sets out principles which shall be applied by the
court in deciding what economic adjustments should be made
between spouses on divorce.^2 The first is that, "the net
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value of of the matrimonial property should be shared
fairly between the parties to the marriage." Section 10
provides that matrimonial property will be taken to have
been shared fairly "when it is shared equally." Therefore,
on divorce, separation of property is in most cases to be
abandoned. The starting point is to be that spouses share
equally in the fund of matrimonial property. Special
circumstances, such as an agreement between the parties as
to an alternative scheme of division, or the source of a
particular asset, may justify departure from the principle
that fair sharing means equal shares. On divorce,
therefore, the courts are not bound by separate property
rules; they are not bound to award assets only on the basis
of strict legal ownership.
The starting point is a fair sharing of matrimonial
property but the court may also make an additional order of
financial provision. The principles in s.9, which they must
apply, expressly direct the court to take note of the
public/private split between husband and wife. Paragraph
(b) of s.9(l) provides that the court should take,
"fair account ... of any economic advantage derived by
either party from contributions of the other, and of any
economic disadvantage suffered by either party in the
interests of the other party or of the family."
Section 9(2) makes the aim of this principle clear by
defining "contributions" to include
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"indirect and non-financial contributions and, in
particular, any such contribution made by looking after the
family home or caring for the family."
Thus on divorce, the private contributions of a spouse must
be taken into account and may be enough to secure a share
in the family's publicly earned wealth.
The provisions of the 1985 Act, as they relate to financial
settlement on divorce, could be argued to have introduced a
form of "deferred community" of property. This can be seen
as an attempt to evaluate in economic terms, the non-
financial contributions to a marriage and as an attempt to
rebalance the economic strengths of both spouses, in
particular where one has been financially active and the
other has been purely devoted to the private family.
During the existence of the marriage, however, the Family
Law (Scotland) Act upholds separation of property.^ It
continues to maintain a separation between marriage and
legal regulation. Section 24 of the Act reaffirms that
marriage itself will not affect the rights of spouses to
their property nor their legal capacity. Thus the benefits
gained by means of the Married Women's Property reforms are
not to be lost. The legal advantages of the separate
property system require to be considered in the light of
its application and separate property ought not per se to
be greeted as desirable. In dismantling the previous regime
a system was introduced which had no regard for the
economic imbalance of the spouses but rather assumed that
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the application of rules on an equal and gender neutral
basis would have equal results. For the reasons outlined
above, in particular the split economically between public
and private and the coexistent reluctance to allow legal
regulation of private ordering of property and finance,
such equal results have not always been achieved.
A slight disturbance of the strict separation of assets is
effected by s.25 of the 1985 Act which introduces the
presumption that household goods are equally shared. This
would seem directly designed to accord with the belief of
most couples that they jointly own household effects.
"Most married couples in fact share certain types of
property_ .and regard them not as 'his' or 'hers' but as
ours 1 .
The presumption in s.25 recognises this commonly held view.
It provides that in respect of the,
"rights of ownership of the parties to a marriage in any
household goods ... it shall be presumed, unless the
contrary is proved, that each has a right to an equal share
in the goods in question."
In relation to the whole economic imbalance of many
relationships its significance is extremely minor. The
presumption of equal ownership applies only to "household
goods" which means "any goods (including decorative or
ornamental goods) kept or used at any time during the
marriage in any matrimonial home for the joint purposes of
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the parties to the marriage." It is however some
recognition of the highly disfavoured position of many non-
earning spouses under the present marriage and separate
property system. It is a system which did not even give the
non-earning spouse a share in the domestic goods which
furnished her private sphere.
By introducing the method of a presumption the provision
can be directed towards those whose interests it was
intended to protect while leaving largely intact the basic
separate and non interventionist property system. This
provision represents an exception to the rule against
special treatment for the property of spouses; a cosmetic
measure perhaps, designed to forestall more fundamental
questioning of the regime.
PRIVATE ABUSE
In the above discussion I have considered the importance of
a split between public and private in terms of family roles
and economy and in terms of legal regulation. I now intend
to consider the importance of a split in relation to
physical property and in particular in relation to the
specific asset of the family home. Whereas the problems
outlined above have resulted from conflict between public
and private, the problems in relation to the matrimonial
home are more easily understood as resulting from abuse of
privacy. As with the presentation of the private sphere of
domestic activity and the legally unregulated area of the
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family, so the private matrimonial home is apparently a
great benefit conferred on the family. Its nature in
practice can be extremely ambivalent.
In physical terms the privacy of the modern family can be
regarded as being symbolised by the home, the private
domain of the nuclear family.
"The ideal of happiness has ... taken material form in the
house ... it stands for permanence and separation from the
world.
Over the last two centuries the structure of the relation
between one family and one home has gradually become more
significant and more prevalent.
"Thus in the nineteenth century, although owner-occupation
of the home was not unknown and indeed became much more
common in the course of the century, there was by no means
as firm a link as today between ownership and occupation of
the home."
Houses would at one time be regarded primarily as part of
the family estate. Their significance stretched beyond the
simple provision of accommodation for the owning family.
House ownership was one aspect of landownership and, for
the propertied classes, houses would represent another
source of income in the form of rents. The changing rules
of inheritance, the gradual diminishing of the private
rented sector, the growth in house building and the greater
accessibility of house ownership to a larger sector of
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society all contributed to the more widespread emergence of
Q 7
the family home.
The family home can be seen as a concrete symbol of the
emerging split between public and private, between family
and commercial life, as described above. It was in the
family home that the private family life existed. In terms
of property, the home was the most important example of
private family property - an asset linked specifically to
one family; in terms of privacy from the law, it
represented the sphere of private control into which law
would not trespass and in terms of the spatial split of
work and family life, it provided the physical space in
which the private was situated - normally the domain of the
wife. The surge towards home ownership was hailed as
allowing to each family the individual privacy of the
family home and an area of personal regulation beyond the
reach of legal control. The accuracy of that claim to
freedom can be disputed and there is also evidence that in
the creation of the private domestic sphere new forms of
control emerged.
The home was significant in the privatisation of the family
in that it provided a physically segregated area for each
family and also in that it provided an occupation for the
unemployed wife. The home became more than a simple shelter
for the family, it became the woman's domain, her
responsibility and her work. With the gradual and
continuing process of the extension of home improvement to
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all classes and with the moves towards a more reasonable
family wage, the woman was freed to devote her time to
tending the home. As domestic conditions improved, so
standards of cleanliness, tidiness and thrift were expected
from the wife. With the increased emphasis on the home and
domesticity, so the role of the wife was more clearly
defined. Thus the family home was significant in the split
between public and private labour in that it encompassed
the main area of private work and concern associated
normally with the wife.
In purely physical terms the family home was also of great
importance in relation to the increasingly private nature
of family life. The nuclear family would find in the family
home a sphere of private existence, in relative isolation
from kin and community. Clear distinctions emerged between
family and non family. Previously a household might
comprise family members, a wider group of relations and
possibly servants and apprentices. It now became much more
likely, amongst those of the middle and upper classes and
to a lesser extent amongst the poorer sections of the
population, that living accommodation would exhibit
barriers between family and servants and even between
members of the family group itself. Stone described some of
the architectural examples of division and isolation.
"The great houses of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
had been constructed of interlocking suites of rooms
without corridors, so that the only way of moving about was
by passing through other people's chambers. In the late
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, house plans
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allocated space to corridors, which now allowed access
without intruding on privacy."
While conferring greater privacy on individual family
members Stone also emphasises the importance of these
developments in segregating family from non family members
of the household. In his later discussion of the
"companionate marriage" he highlights two important aspects
of the eighteenth century house (of the elite) - the
corridor and the dumb waiter. The corridor in particular
was important removing as it did,
"the ever present and inhibiting threat of a stranger
walking through one's bedroom to reach his own room."
These beginnings of physical segregation can be seen to
become even more detailed and specific, in particular in
the separation within the home of male and female domains.
For the men there were billiard rooms, smoking rooms,
libraries and gun rooms, while for the women there was the
boudoir and the dressing room.^ There was also provision
for separation of family and servants, adults and children.
Within the boundaries of this private sphere the family was
apparently to exist free from sanction and legal or social
control.
"The cult of domesticity and beliefs in family harmony and
bliss made the idea of outside intervention in domestic
affairs seem a needless violation of the sanctity and
privacy of the home." 1
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In the process of creating this sphere of privacy, however,
the possibility of new channels of intervention were
secured. With the increased importance attached to the
family home and the greater free time of women, the
emphasis on the domestic sphere grew. Donzelot considered
the significance of the cultivation of the domestic sphere
and of the female role of good mother and thrift conscious,
houseproud wife and the ways in which she was used to
/ 0
introduce new means of control into the family. The
condition of the family's living quarters was regarded in
some ways as an indication of their conformity and of their
moral rectitude. While the home was shut off from the
prying eyes of neighbours and relations and the
interference of the law, it was opened to the controlling
force of the welfare agencies. Whereas previously the
controls had been of a more administrative nature
regarding the formation of marriage, the legitimate birth
of children, the control of property - they now centred on
the very existence of the family. In setting standards for
the cleanliness of their home, their morals and their
health, a whole new set of potential failings was
introduced for the control of which intervention was
possible and permitted. In the raising of domesticity as a
goal of the private family, greater potential for
shortcomings and deviance was created in the existence of
the family, thus legitimating outside control. The new
sphere of the domestic opened up to replace the more
traditional objects of regulation - choice of spouse,
property control and transfer. Regulation of the family
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could be disguised in the model of privacy while
simultaneously rejecting the more obvious intervention of
law.
In terms of ownership, however, law remained firmly
excluded. Attention focused on the people and disregarded
the house in which they lived. The matrimonial home
facilitated the development of the new family based on
affect, individual feeling and concern and yet in the legal
concept of this human centred family, property apparently
had no place.
The benefits of this privacy have been amply documented.
Stone highlighted the significance of privatisation of the
relationship and of physical privacy and many historical
accounts record the gradual amelioration of private family
existence. Donzelot discussed the social benefits of
getting husbands and children off the streets and into
their homes. Above I have considered some of the apparent
advantages of home ownership in that the family was granted
some form of escape from the public, commercial world and
an element of self determination and self regulation. The
privacy symbolised and in fact provided by the home was in
keeping with the professed aims of the modern family of
private affective relationships and freedom from economic
pressure and external control. The extent to which this
privacy from regulation remained intact has already been
questioned above but it has been suggested that these
methods of control concentrated on the individuals
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themselves rather than on the property. In addition they
were methods of control which the private home allowed to
come into operation.
Further questioning of the privacy, ie. non-regulation,
accorded to the family in the form of the family home can
be based on the more fundamental problem of abuse of the
privacy.
The most obvious and dramatic display of the alter ego of
privacy is domestic violence. Such behaviour completely
contradicts the image of the home as the centre of safety,
affection and protection of the modern family. It may be
argued that such behaviour results from over intensity of
family relations; from an inherent male characteristic;
from an extension of the underlying belief in the husband's
right to control. Whatever the explanations it is a form of
behaviour closely linked to family property and affected by
the characterisation of family and home as private. With
the increasing emphasis on the private nature of the
family, the concentration of all that is good within and
all that is bad outside, attention was diverted from abuse
of the privacy which might result in violence within the
home. Public reluctance to intervene in domestic disputes
and the apparent willingness of others to turn a blind eye,
reflect the attitude that the home and what happens within
it are private.
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The potential for legal intervention was limited. For the
spouse threatened by domestic abuse, the civil remedy of
interdict was available. A wife might seek an interdict
against her husband molesting her but such a remedy was
only available during court hours and it was extremely
difficult to enforce. A court order was, in most cases,
unlikely to withstand the husband's continued violence. For
a wife still living with her husband, the process of
seeking interdict might also be seen as an irreversible
move, further damaging their private relationship. To seek
police protection against domestic violence was likely to
be more immediately effective in restraining the aggressor.
Pursuing a criminal prosecution against a violent husband,
however, was often seen as too drastic a step for a woman
to take against her husband. In addition, the corroboration
necessary to secure a conviction is difficult to procure in
relation to a private dispute.
The available legal remedies against domestic abuse were
therefore extremely inadequate. Not only were they
ineffective against abuse, but they failed to tackle the
underlying problem that, for a wife who did not have a
legal right to the home, her alternative was often to
tolerate the abuse or to face homelessness. It is
increasingly common for husband and wife to take title to a
home in joint names but for those where the home was owned
in only one name or where the home was rented by only one
spouse, the separate property system recognised the other
spouse as having no right to the property. The separate
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property system thought it better to deal with property
disputes between spouses,
"upon the mere right of property ... and not to mix i£ouP
with ... the question of the inter-conjugal relations."
Scots law, therefore,
"equate[d] a wife who has no property title to a precarious
occupier and so denies to such a wife the ability to regard
the family home as a place in which she will be able to
live and bring up a family secure from the possibility of
sudden dispossession by her husband.
For the spouse who was neither owner nor tenant of the
family home, the separate property system denied the
existence of any legal right to the home. The Matrimonial
Homes (Family Protection)(Scotland) Act 1981 strengthened
the right of the non-entitled spouse to occupy the
matrimonial home and used this as a base for relieving the
effect of domestic abuse. In seeking to alleviate the
position of victims of domestic violence, the Act was
primarily directed not towards the behaviour of the
aggressor but towards the practical solution of providing
safe acommodation. It provided for regulation, not of the
entitled spouse's basic right of ownership, but of the use
of the property. In so doing it recognised the centrality
of the private home to the family and the damage which
violation of this domain could cause to the image of the
family as private.
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The Matrimonial Homes Act operates by affording to the non-
entitled spouse occupancy rights in the matrimonial home.^
The Act does not go so far as to give co-ownership of the
property. It gives only a right of occupancy to the non-
entitled spouse. The right of occupancy is an automatic
incident of marriage although exercise of it, in the face
of resistance by the proprietor spouse, requires leave of
the court. The legislation, therefore, departs from the
separate property system in that it recognises the interest
of a spouse in property to which he or she has no legal
right but which is closely linked to the marriage
relationship. The granting of occupancy rights to a non-
entitled spouse is recognition that, in terms of property,
husband and wife are not the strangers which a separate
property system deems them to be.
Having established the right of a non-entitled spouse to
occupy the matrimonial home, further intervention in the
rights of the entitled spouse were necessary to protect
against domestic abuse. The Act therefore introduced
exclusion orders empowering the court, on the application
of the victim spouse, to exclude the aggressor from the
A £
matrimonial home. ° The court will only grant an exclusion
order where it is considered necessary for the protection
of the applicant spouse or any child of the family from
conduct or threatened conduct of the other spouse which is
or would be injurious to physical or mental health. The
court must also consider whether, in all the circumstances,
the making of an exclusion order would be unjustified or
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unreasonable.
The separate property system is being very slightly eroded,
although ownership of the matrimonial home is not itself
disturbed. The granting of occupancy rights and the
availability of exclusion orders are signs of legal
intervention in matrimonial property that are contradictory
to the separate property system; a system which does not
take account of the private marriage relationship in
applying rules of property. They do not depart from the
basic principle that marriage does not affect ownership,
but instead they allow for regulation of the use which is
made of a matrimonial home that is the property of husband
or wife.
To some extent the right of occupancy is a private right.
It lasts only for so long as the marriage lasts. It is a
right which exists in recognition of her (or his) private
role. The non-entitled spouse is not given a right of
ownership to be used or disposed of at will. The non-
entitled spouse is given an automatic right of occupancy,
but it can be no greater than the right of the legally
entitled spouse to occupy. It is effective against
outsiders - third parties involved in the purchase of the
property.
Law, however, continues to deny property as being a normal
legitimate concern of marriage and family relations. The
operation of the Act demonstrates a concentration on
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individual behaviour, with the breakdown being seen as the
result of individual flaws rather than of a potentially
flawed system. It makes no provision for equal rights in
the matrimonial home but has ironically been forced to
intervene because of the misuse of this central piece of
property. Both the problem of domestic violence and the
solution which the Act provides, emphasise how vital the
home is to the family. Yet in regulating occupancy by means
of the Matrimonial Homes legislation the problem is
confined within the private sphere. The family, minus one
member, is reconfined within its private existence without
much questioning of the fundamental problems.
It seems that the impetus to legislate on this problem was
not simply the horrific and harmful existence to which many
women were subjected but also what would happen when such
women finally decided they could suffer no more and left
their husband and home. The aspect of domestic violence on
which the law chose to concentrate was the scene of the
violence, the private circumstances in which such behaviour
was able to take place. In the privacy of the successful
relationship legal technicalities of ownership may be of
little obvious import but when the relationship is
threatened by the aggressive behaviour of one party and the
behaviour threatens to cast the victims into the public
sphere in search of shelter the question of home ownership
and the provision of accommodation becomes of greater
significance. By legal regulation of the occupation of the
matrimonial home, a problem which could have become a much
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more widespread and public issue, can be contained to some
extent in private. Privacy continues to be held out as the
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CHAPTER 8: INDIVIDUALISM
Running throughout the histories of law, marriage and
property, as discussed in chapters 2,3 and 4 there is an
apparent move from community to individual. Values based on
an idea of community seem to have given way to a value
system linked to the individual. This trend is demonstrated
in various ways in relation to the separate elements of
marriage, property and law. Individual or community may
have different meanings and different implications in
relation to each element, but there are signs of a common
shift from community in favour of individual.
The terms community and individual have different
applications in discussion of marriage, property and law. I
do not intend to set out precise definitions of them at the
beginning because I want them to be sufficiently flexible
to include a variety of developments and trends. In general
I will be using individualism in the two ways described by
Stone: first, meaning a growing interest in individual
personality and a growing introspection, and secondly,
individualism in the liberal sense, meaning personal
autonomy and including the principle of freedom of
1
contract. I am using community in a vague sense, to convey
the opposite of individual: based on an idea of some sort
of distinct unit or combination which is more than simply
the aggregate of individuals. A contrast between community
and individualism may also imply a split between altruism
and selfishness. In this way it has many similarities to
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the dichotomy between private and public as discussed in
the previous chapter.
An emerging image of marriage, property and legal
regulation is that they are characterised by individualism.
In this chapter I intend to consider this apparent shift
from community to individual. I want to consider first,
how a move towards individualism has been evident in the
historical discussions of law, marriage and property.
Having traced this trend from community to individual, I
propose to question the existence of this distinction and
to consider its effect on relations between marriage,
property and law. To what extent are relations in marriage
and relations between marriage, property and law now
characterised by the individual rather than as previously
by notions of community? A move from community to
individual and a tendency to set up these two models as an
opposing pair is prevalent in much discussion of
developments in marriage, ownership and legal reform. The
nature of developments in each of these elements and of
relations between them is, I would suggest, much more
ambivalent than such a straightforward method of
presentation suggests.
BREAK UP OF SPOUSAL UNITY
There is clear evidence of a shift from community to
individual and of a distinct split between them in the
legal reform of the rules of Scots law governing the
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property of husband and wife. Marriage under the common law
could be argued to favour the unit of the married couple
rather than the individual spouses. In legal terms the
image of marriage was one of merger or even of submergence
of two into one. Blackstone said that,
"by marriage the husband and wife are one person in law ...
the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during marriage or at least is incorporated into that of
her husband."
Fraser applied this doctrine of spousal unity to Scotland,
explaining that,
"marriage operates in regard to the wife, so as to sink her
person in the eye of the law. The husband and wife are
one.
Although this doctrine was questioned and criticised,^ its
influence was evident in the legal regulation of the
property of husband and wife'-* where,
"the theory of the law is thnt the property of the spouses
constitutes a common stock."
In Scotland on marriage the moveable property of the wife,
with some very minor exceptions, (for example,
paraphernalia) passed into the ownership of the husband by
virtue of the jus mariti. The wife's heritable property,
while remaining under her nominal ownership, was fully
controlled by the husband, by virtue of his right of
administration. So on marriage, the wife's property passed
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into the control and to some extent ownership of the
husband. Her assets became mixed with those of her husband.
Under common law the image is familiar of the wife, and her
property, merging with or into the legal personality of her
husband.
The common law regulation of marriage, particularly as
evidenced by the control of property, shows marriage as a
relationship creating a community; a community which
overshadowed the previously separate individuals. It has
been argued that the property rules of the common law did
not produce a true community property system.'' Certainly it
was not a system which granted equal rights to each spouse.
It was a system by which the rights of the community were
closely identified with the husband.
"There is a communion of goods betwixt the married persons
... but ... the administration during the marriage of the
whole is alone in the husband."
But there was nonetheless a combination of property and I
am using the term "community" to mean some form of
combination, however inequal.
Under this system there were legal rules - jus mariti and
jus administrationis - which imposed a scheme of community
on the property of husband and wife. The wife's individual
legal persona was largely obliterated. The relationship of
marriage was based on the doctrine of unity and this was
reflected in the consolidation of their property. In both
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contexts the wife merged into the husband and control
remained with him. Explanations of the submergence of the
wife in her husband are various based on, for example,
religion, natural supremacy of the male or simply good and
efficient management of the marital assets. As Fraser wrote
"Nature inculcates the utmost possible identity of
interests and community of will between married persons;
the husband being 'the head of the wife'; and this natural
subordination upon the part of the wife has led to the
positive law that in all civil matters having reference to
their united means the husband should represent both."
Stair at 1.4.9 traces the lordship of man over his wife to
Genesis iii.16 and this Christian justification is echoed
in Fraser's writing where he describes the designation of
the husband as master in all matters of business as being
evident in all Christian societies, contrasting them with
savage societies where the woman is the breadwinner while
1 0the husband stays at home.
Thus it can be seen that for whatever reason marriage was
clearly regarded as bringing about the consolidation of two
persons into one - that of the husband. Although during the
currency of the relationship the communal nature of the
goods might be rather overshadowed by the powerlessness of
the woman and the merging of her assets into those of her
husband the law did provide to some extent for the
combining of the assets of both and for the distribution of
the goods on the dissolution of the relationship to both
husband and wife.
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This legally enforced community was gradually dismantled by
the reforms of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
There was a recognition of husband and wife as
individuals. The wife's separate status emerged first where
she had been deserted by her husband or had obtained a
1 1
judicial separation. x Later, her separate status as an
income earner was permitted-^ and finally her full
individual status as a property owner was recognised. In
particular the Married Women's Property (Scotland) Acts of
1881 and 1920 abolished respectively the jus mariti and the
right of administration. Thus Scotland was left with
complete separation of property in marriage. Marriage in
itself was to have no effect on the property of individual
spouses.
It can be seen therefore in the reform of the laws relating
to the property of husband and wife that there was a
gradual but extreme swing to a system based on
individualism. The abolition of the jus mariti and the
right of administration left a system which recognised
marriage as having no effect on the property of spouses or
on their status as property owners. The legal rules related
only to individuals and took no notice of any marriage
relationship. There was no recognition of a common fund of
matrimonial property with the law dealing only with the
separate assets of husband and wife. The law now treated
spouses equally as individuals and disregarded their sex
and their marital status. The basis of the law was
individual legal rights with no concept of joint enterprise
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or existence. The question of the continued unity of
husband and wife within marriage was irrelevant to their
individual rights as legal persons and property owners.
RISE OF AFFECTIVE INDIVIDUALISM
There were signs of a similar change of philosophy in the
relationship of marriage itself. A central theme within
Stone's history of marriage is that of a move from a type
of marriage which was influenced by and open to community
interests to one which concentrated on the individuals
within the relationship. This swing from community to
individual takes various forms in Stone's account.
Community can be used to describe the extended family or
the neighbourhood. Community can also be used to emphasise
the importance of the married couple as a unit - the idea
of spousal unity. He describes the decline of community
involvement in marriage, meaning the involvement of either
the community of an extended family or kin network or the
community of neighbourhood. He also describes the
increasing importance of the individual spouses rather than
the community of the married couple. With the decline of
community in these two forms, he charts the rise of the
individual spouses and the importance of their individual
happiness and relationships.
Stone begins with the open lineage family which formed
only part of an extensive community of family and kin
connections. It was,
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"no more than a loose core at the centre of a dense network
of lineage and kin relationships."1"^
The nuclear unit was open to the interference and control
of this community as a result of its common interests in
the unit. The open lineage family was controlled by the
need for safe preservation and passage of property and thus
it was open to the interference of the community whose
status and well being would depend on prudent marriage.
Marriages were often arranged by the extended community of
the spouses' kin.
"Since the kin formed a community, marriage meant not so
much intimate association with an individual as entry into
a new world of the spouse's relatives, uncles, nephews and
distant cousins." ^
Among the lower classes this element of community
involvement in marriage and family life was more likely to
be provided by neighbours. For the property owning classes,
the economics of marriage were important to the kin groups
of the spouses. For the poor, the economic structure of
marriage and the family unit was more likely to be the
concern of the community of neighbours. The village
community would often control decisions about the
agricultural functioning of the village and this would
influence the internal structure of the nuclear unit. In
addition,
"domestic life in the village was unable to develop so long
as it was overshadowed by the luxuriant growth of
neighbourly activity and scrutiny."
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The village community played an important role in the
control of individual behaviour and private morality
through an extensive network of gossip and the threat of
1 £
exposure of "violations of community norms."
Michael Anderson points to one example of community
censorship and control in his description of the powerful
Kirk Session which was,
"fed by a continual supply of gossip from the villagers
[and which] could summon the immoral or undutiful before it
and apply a wide range of possible penalties."1'
There was, therefore, emphasis on community, meaning the
kinship or village system of which the nuclear unit formed
only a small part. Within this system the community of the
couple was also emphasised rather than the individual
spouses. It was the unit of the married couple which was
important. What mattered was continuation of the family
line. The open lineage family was interested in the couple
as a link in kinship lines. As Stone said,
"the purpose in life was to assure the continuity of the
family ... 14fiot to maximise the well being of the
individual.nl°
Stone said that in the 16th century and earlier the
standard world view was that
"all individuals in society are bound together in the Great
Chain of Being, and all are interchangeable with each
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other. One wife could ... substitute for another like
soldiers in an army."iy
In this way the family line could be preserved with little
regard for the individuals.
The decline of this type of marriage with its emphasis on
the unity of the couple and on the influence of kinship
and neighbourhood structure was partly due to the decline
of a particular form of property and ownership. With the
O A
breakdown of large estates, changing economic and
agricultural structure and new methods of property
transfer, marriage and the family were no longer such vital
elements of property acquisition and control. Marriage as a
) 1
kinship link lost its significance.
According to Stone, however, the main reason for the demise
of this concept of marriage was the rise of affective
individualism. The development of this new philosophy is
central to the changes which Stone charts in marriage.
Stone argued that affective individualism was the product
of two influences - a greater general interest in the
9 9individual and a change of personality type. ^
Individualism itself was the product of two potentially
conflicting sources. There was first a growing interest in
the individual. This was evident in increased personal
introspection and in the recognition that all humans are
unique. The second source of individualism was a desire for
personal autonomy. In accordance with liberal philosophy
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each individual should have an area of personal autonomy
and should recognise the personal autonomy of others.
In Stone's history affective individualism was part of a
general social and economic trend. It was part of
Renaissance culture, romantic literature, greater personal
and religious introspection and commercial and industrial
enterprise. According to Stone, there emerged a new belief.
Far from humans being merely links in a great chain, all
humans are in fact unique.
The changing nature of assets and a changing structure of
ownership meant that property was no longer such a
restrictive force on marriage. Stone describes how these
changes and the decline of a society based on kinship and
community had freed individuals to make their choice of
partner on personal grounds. As a result marriage was no
longer controlled to such an extent by concerns of property
and status. The way was apparently clear for some new
influence to shape marriage and according to Stone the new
influence was affective individualism. Increased interest
in personality, in personal emotion, in personal autonomy
and in personal pleasure were influential in the emergence
of a changed image of marriage.
This new emphasis on individualism was most obvious in
relation to the choice of spouse. Increasingly it would be
the individual prospective spouses who would make their own
choice of marriage partner. Selection would no longer be
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made or greatly influenced by their parents or kin. It was
not a question of property alliance or kinship connections
and the choice would be based on judgement of individual
personality rather than on property or status
considerations. A spouse would be chosen on the basis of
desire for individual happiness rather than a requirement
to further the common good of the family. At the heart of
this emphasis on individualism, Stone argued that there was
a new philsophy. It was a philosophy which placed,
"the selfish pursuit of pleasure in world at the
centre of human psychological motivation.
This formed the basis for Stone's description of the
emergence of a new form of marriage centred on affective
individualism. The progress towards this form of marriage
was not entirely straightforward. There was a temporary set
back in the restricted patriarchal nuclear family. Although
this family was relatively free from interference by the
community of family or neighbours, it was subject to the
authority of the father. It recognised the importance of
individual choice of spouse, it recognised the unique
quality of individual personality but it also recognised
the chaos which the cohabitation of free and equal
individuals might cause. It was feared that the result
would be "the war of all against all" and therefore an
attempt to maintain control was made "by the imposition of
stern patriarchal power.It thus gave personal autonomy
to the father who might in return restrict the individual
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freedom of the other members of the family. This family
type signalled the closing off of the individual nuclear
unit from the interference of community. It also gave
limited recognition to individuals but it favoured the
individual freedom and power of the father.
It was finally in the closed domesticated nuclear family
that individualism triumphed. Within this family,
individual qualities, individual happiness and individual
freedom were supreme. The unit itself was free from
community interference and involvement. The purpose of the
marriage was individual development and its focus was the
relations between individual family members.
To some extent a common image emerges from both Stone's
historical account and from the changes in property rules.
In both there are signs of a shift from community to
individualism as a guiding force in the nature and form of
marriage. Stone suggests a move from the supremacy of the
family as a unit to the importance of the individuals. He
also describes the decreasing involvement of a wider
community, of family or neighbours, in marriage. This trend
was facilitated by economic and political changes in
society but it was directly the result of the rise of what
Stone terms affective individualism. This emphasised the
freedom of choice of individuals and it emphasised the
individual personalities and relations within marriage. The
legal act of marriage was no longer of such great
importance simply as a link in a property or kinship
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structure. The legal rules governing the property of
husband and wife show a similar trend. The changing legal
rules demonstrate a shift from an imposed combination of
assets to a system which had no effect on the property of
individual spouses. The reforms produce a system which
guarantees individual legal rights and makes no recognition
of marital community.
INDIVIDUAL ASSETS
So far I have dealt only with individualism in human terms.
Individualism, however, is not a term applicable only to
personal relationships. It can also be used in relation to
property. A shift can also be detected in terms of property
from community to individual.
Under the common law system of property regulation and in
what Stone described as the property centred marriage the
most important type of property was land and the income
derived from it. This type of property was to a large
extent determined before birth and prior to marriage. It
was based on one's family and not on one's individual
worth. Within a feudal system and through the operation of
family settlements, entails and rules of succession, rights
to such land were rarely unrestricted individual rights.
With changing rules of landownership, industrialisation and
a new economic structure, income and the power to acquire
property were less likely to be a consequence of birth or
marriage. Instead income and property would more often
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result from individual labour. Property was a reward for
the individual rather than a consequence of membership of a
community - a family or kinship group. The bulk of
matrimonial property would no longer be granted to the
couple on account of their marriage. It would be acquired
for the quite separate reason of individual labour. In
these ways there was also a shift in terms of property from
community to individual.
TENSION
There emerges, from studies of each of the elements of
legal reform, marriage and property, an apparent shift from
community to individual. In each of the elements, the
specific form of this shift is different but there is
nonetheless an apparently common direction. I would
suggest, however, that it is misleading to fit developments
in marriage, property and law into the confines of a
straightforward move from community to individual. Such a
simplistic structure hides the continuing involvement of
both of these concepts. An emphasis on individualism does
not necessarily mean the disappearance of community.
"There is an eternal tension in matrimonial law, in social
attitudes and in every marriage between the community of
life that marriage involves and the separate autonomous
existence of the individuals who are associated in this
community of life."^-5
This quotation describes a tension between individual and
community which can be detected in the historical
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discussions of marriage, legal reform and matrimonial
property and in the relations between these three elements.
From the historical discussions of marriage and law,
individualism has emerged as a dominant characteristic of
the modern image of marriage and its relation with law and
property. The characteristic of individualism has emerged
apparently to overshadow community. At the centre of
Stone's history is a shift from a system of marriage that
showed little concern for the individual spouses and that
protected the interests of the community to one where
individual choice and satisfaction was paramount. A similar
shift was presented in terms of legal reform, from a system
of combined assets of husband and wife to a system that
treated them as entirely separate individuals. In terms of
property, increasing emphasis on the rights of the
individual can also be seen with, inter alia, the demise of
entail and the growth of waged labour.
Closer analysis shows, however, that the rise of
individualism did not consistently signal the death of
community. I would argue that, in marriage, individualism
and community are not mutually exclusive. In terms of
property, although there is a closer link between
individual and asset, there is also a closer link between
the domestic nuclear family and its property. It is only in
the legal reform that individualism clearly replaced
community. Thus community has not been consistently
replaced by individualism. Instead both co-exist and thus
give rise to a tension such as described by Glendon.
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Individualism in terms of legal rights is fixed and
inflexible. It does not take account of failings within the
relationship of marriage to achieve the extremes of
community or individualism nor of the falsity of this
split. The legal rules, which followed the removal of jus
mariti and the husband's right of administration, are
clear. They do not allow for the mixture of community and
9
individual which may exist within marriage. °
Stone seemed to suggest that marriage was now to be viewed
as a relationship between two individuals rather than as a
unit. This was an image which gained support in the new
approach of law to the property of husband and wife. But
the individualism which Stone described had only a limited
role to play in the marriage relationship. I want to look
at two models of marriage which demonstrate how the
community of marriage might still overshadow the emphasis
on the individuals. They show that although individualism
was emphasised at the formation of marriage, it is
misleading to assume that it signals the death of
community.
THE COMPANIONATE MARRIAGE
Stone describes the rise of affective individualism, and
its specific effect on marriage, as increasing the
importance of the individual spouses. In particular, he
emphasises the importance of the individuals at the point
of entry into the marriage. Parents allowed their children
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much greater freedom to arrange their own marriages and the
process of selection was less influenced by kin and
property concerns. He then goes on to consider how the
relationship between these two individuals developed.
Spouses previously had been bound together by property
concerns. What was to tie the individuals together within
the new marriage which apparently had no interest in
property? One answer to this question can be found in
Stone's description of the companionate marriage.
The companionate marriage, as the name suggests, was a
marriage based on companionship, affection and personal
relationships. Increasingly the choice of partner would be
made on the basis of emotional satisfaction rather than
ambition for status or wealth. It was hoped that from this
beginning affection would develop. Stone describes the new
companionate marriage which was centred around the cosy
domesticity of the matrimonial home. The wife was
increasingly educated so that she could be a better
helpmate to her husband and a teacher to her children;
there was greater privacy and isolation of the conjugal
couple and their children. There was a recognition of
sexuality and companionship as legitimate aspects of the
marriage relationship.
The emphasis at the formation of this new type of marriage
was on individual choice and individual happiness. But the
happiness and satisfaction of these individuals was to be
pursued within what Stone described as the companionate
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marriage. It was a relationship in which the individual
personalities were important but they were important
largely from the point of view of compatibility. Allowing
individual choice of partner was a way of ensuring
hopefully - that a strong personal bond would develop.
Stone said that,
"marriage ceased to be mainly an artificial but necessary
constraint placed upon man's otherwise unbridled lust, and
became instead a prime source of personal pleasure, both
emotional and sexual ... This new pragmatism planned to
make the individual's desire for happiness contribute to
the common good." '
In these words Stone demonstrates how the interests of
individualism and community were to be combined in the new
marriage form. The community of the companionate marriage
was not community enforced by legal rules of property or
imposed by the religious inspired doctrine of unity. It was
a community of life, emotion and companionship. The spouses
were no longer tied together by the legal rules governing
their property. They were encouraged to bind themselves
together in terms of emotion, intellect and personal
development.
This new community stemmed from the promotion of a form of
individualism. The companionate marriage was based on a new
type of philosophy; one that placed personal satisfaction
and the pursuit of happiness as its goal. While the
foundation of the companionate marriage was individual
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freedom, individual choice and individual personality, its
goal was the creation of a community.
MARRIAGE AS A CONTRACT
Legal writers have often spoken of marriage as a contract.
With the demise of the marriage form based on submergence
of the wife; with the emergence of the wife as a legal
person, and with the changing position of property in
marriage it became popular to speak of marriage as a
contract. It was regarded as an agreement entered into
freely by two individuals. This was an extension of a
general adoption of liberal philosophy and terminology. The
suggestion was that there was a shift from status
something which is imposed or attributed - towards
contract. This method of viewing marriage again emphasised
the importance and freedom of individuals. It highlighted
O O
individual autonomy and freedom of will.
As with the companionate marriage, I would suggest that the
contract model gives unmerited emphasis to the individual
within the relationship. The use of a contractual analogy
for the relationship of marriage falsely highlights the
individual. It does so first on the basis of purely legal
argument. Marriage is at best only partly contractual. The
second way in which the use of contract misleads is a
result of the particular type of contract to which marriage
has been compared.
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Many of the Scottish legal writers between the 17th and
19th centuries considered the idea of marriage as a
contract. Erskine approved the notion, writing that
"marriage is truly a contract.Others were more critical
in their consideration of marriage as a contract. Fraser
said that many juridical writers had defined marriage as a
contract but that this definition had been "the fruitful
source of grave error.
This application of the legal definition of contract to
marriage contributed to an increased emphasis on the
individual. Stone's emphasis on the individual - the
individual choice of spouse - was overshadowed by the
subsequent promotion of the companionate marriage. In a
similar way, in legal terms, the contractual analogy
highlighted the agreement of two individuals. It portrayed
marriage as a privately negotiated agreement, as an
exchange of obligations between individuals. The contract
analogy however ended at the point where consent was given.
It is suggested that the emphasis on marriage as a contract
may have been intended to convey the rule that marriage is
constituted by agreement alone and without the need for
O-l
consummation.J
What followed the giving of consent varied according to
different writers. Stair argued that entry to marriage was
based on consent but thereafter the individuals could not
"frame or compose" the form of the relationship "at their
own will." According to Stair, marriage was
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"not a human, but a divine contract ... Though marriage
seem to be a voluntary contract by engagement ... yet that
marriage itself, and the obligations thence arising, are
jure divino.
For Fraser, entry to marriage was governed by the law of
contract, based as it was on individual consent.
Immediately consent had been given, however, the
relationship became governed by the law of husband and wife
O O
which "tramples down all private stipulations." Contract
gave way to legally defined status. Fraser also had
sympathy with Hegel's concept of marriage. Marriage was a
contract in that it required the consent of two persons,
but it was very much more than that. Marriage was an
agreement to transcend the idea of contract.
For all of these writers marriage was only to a very
limited extent contractual. Marriage was based on consent
and in that sense could be defined as contractual but,
thereafter, the power was taken out of the hands of the
individuals. It was not for them to stipulate the form, the
duration and the obligations of their contract. These were
imposed upon them by municipal law, the law of husband and
wife or indeed by divine law. The relationship was at best
a combination of contract and status. It granted supremacy
to the individual at the point of entry, but having given
their consent the individuals were transformed. They gave
K
their consent as individuals to enter the institution of
marriage but thereafter their individual freedom was
subsumed to the community of marriage.
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From a purely legal approach the use of contract to define
the relationship of marriage was inaccurate and misleading.
Marriage was only in a very limited legal sense a contract.
Marriage was formed by means of a contract between two
individuals but thereafter they became subject to imposed
status.
The contract analogy also gave a misleading image of
individual freedom in terms of the particular type of
contract. Many of the legal writers saw marriage as a
specific type of contract. Marriage was not a contract of
sale. Nor from the point of view of the lawyers was it a
contract for mutual sexual use. It was a contract of
partnership. Erskine described marriage as a contract of
partnership. Stair considered marriage as a contract of
partnership, particularly in terms of the regulation of
property. According to Stair the rights which a husband had
over the combined property were not really for the purpose
of ownership. The husband had rights over the combined fund
because it was the partnership fund of husband and wife. It
was in the interests of better administration and
management of the fund to give sole powers of
O C
administration and control to one partner.
This particular legal model of marriage as a partnership is
significant to consideration of the tension between
individual and community. A contract of partnership, under
Scots law, involves the agreement of two to form a new
personality - the partnership, the marriage unit.
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This notion of marriage as a partnership was not something
which was imposed by legal rules. It developed as a result
of various diverse influences. The separation of home from
work; the introduction of a family wage; the rise in
importance of the matrimonial home; the cult of
domesticity; the centrality of children to the family, and
the increased medical and social opinion highlighting the
need for close bonding between mother and child all
contributed to the creation of promoted roles for both
husband and wife. Both were now seen as essential to a
successful marriage and family. It was not just their
simple coupling that was important but their continued
interaction. They were to form a partnership of the most
successful kind, with each partner bringing different but
equally important skills.
To some extent the promotion of new and separate roles for
husband and wife and, in particular, the creation of a
sphere of importance for the wife equalised their different
roles and made it possible to view marriage as a
partnership. It was an enterprise to which each could bring
different but complementary skills. The consequence of
entering into partnership, however, is to create a new
entity. In this way their individual freedom to choose to
enter into a contract and their individual importance as




"Individual liberty ... and the community of life of
spouses are ideals, but the law governing the economic
relations of spouses operates in the realm of economic ...
reality."-36
Stone's emphasis on individualism as a dominant factor in
the companionate marriage and the emphasis in legal
discussion on the contractual nature of marriage give
precedence to the importance of the individuals at the
point of entry to the marriage. They do not deal adequately
with the close bonding; the combined unit; the community
that are also present in each of these models of marriage.
They contribute to an image of marriage with which the
subsequent relationship may fail to fit.
Sirnone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex wrote that,
"the couple should not be regarded as a unit; rather each
individual should be integrated as such in society at large
... then attachments could be formed in pure generosity
with another individual equally adapted to the group.'
Modern concepts of marriage have hinted at this sort of
relationship. Stone has suggested that the modern marriage
is based on individualism. The use of contract, borrowed
from society at large, has suggested that marriage is a
freely made relationship between two individuals.
Individualism, however, is only present on entry to the
relationship and in defining the roles of the spouses.
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Modern concepts of marriage continue to encourage or to
expect the subsequent creation of a community.
Legal rules governing the property of husband and wife,
however, have completely espoused this ideal of
individualism. They assume a relationship between two
equally adapted individuals. They ignore the community of
life in which the individual spouses participate. Thus
there has been created a split: a tension between community
and individualism. There is a split between, on the one
hand, a marriage which inconsistently promotes
individualism and community and, on the other hand, laws of
property which consistently treat the spouses as
individuals. The split may have serious repercussions in
property terms because assets, while likely to have been
acquired by one or other spouse individually, are closely
linked to the existence of the community of marriage.
Lee Holcombe sums up this split.
"Husbands and wives have assets as members of a family
rather than as individuals ... although these assets are
financed by the earnings of individual members of the
family. But the law assigns ownership of property to the
individual whose assets purchased it, not to the husband
and wife jointly or to the whole family."^®
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LEGAL COMPROMISE
Law has at times recognised this tension in marriage
between individual and community in relation to property.
It has been prepared to diverge in some way from the basic
property system. Both under the community of the common law
system and under the individualism of the present system of
separate property the law has occasionally recognised that
marriage involves elements of both or that a particular
marriage relationship may fail to fulfil the ideal. These
measures have tended to take the form of compromise and ad
hoc modifications, designed to alleviate particularly harsh
aspects of the tension between community and individual in
terms of marriage and property. They have not involved any
widescale consideration of the fundamental tension which
continues to exist between a relationship which is based on
community and a system of property which finds it difficult
to envisage any kind of ownership other than one based on
individuals. They do not fully expose the inconsistencies
that persist in marriage and its relationship with
property.
I intend to consider three legal methods that have been
developed to reconcile conflicting interests of individuals
within marriage and conflicting interests of the individual
good and the common good. Marriage contracts were used in
the 19th century as a model for affording protection to
individuals within marriage and family groups. More
recently, occupancy rights under the Matrimonial Homes
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(Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981 have recognised the
potential danger of the pathological individual within the
family community and the financial and property provisions
of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 have signalled an
acceptance of the inadequacy of equal individual rights
within a practical economic community.
All of these measures have existed simultaneously with, but
to some extent in contradiction of, the basic system of
rules governing the property of husband and wife. Contracts
provided individual protection in contrast to the basic
community property system, whereas the Matrimonial Homes
(Family Protection)(Scotland) Act 1981 and the Family Law
(Scotland) Act 1985 introduce elements of community into a
system of separation of property. All three measures show
an attempt to cause minimal disturbance to the underlying
system. They aim to alleviate the hardships arising from
the community/individual tension without entering into
fundamental questioning of it. They use legal devices which
allow some co-existence of community and individual.
PROTECTIVE TRUSTS
Perhaps the most obvious instance of conflict between
individual and community within marriage was to be found
under the common law. In that marriage relationship the
wife merged into her husband with limited legal recognition
of her individual existence and no separate rights to
control her property. She was part of a community which was
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controlled by the husband. The promoted ideal was of a
husband who administered the common fund in the interests
of the partnership of husband and wife. Under the common
law rules, the wife had very limited individual legal
status and she was treated as incorporated into the unity
of marriage: a relationship which was represented by her
husband.
This was a legal system which did not allow for co¬
existence of two individuals within the relationship of
marriage. Husband and wife combined to form one and this
one was represented by the husband. The vulnerability of
the wife's position within this ideal and the possibility
of conflict between the husband's interest, the wife's
interest and the interest of the community that they formed
did not go unnoticed. Private variation of the common law
was permitted through the use of marriage contracts and in
these there could be detected signs of commercial concern
for the individual.
Propertied families had long made use of ante-nuptial
contracts to regulate the financial basis of marriage. In
their earlier form these contracts would be used to set out
the contributions to be made by both parties to the
marriage, to regulate the administration of this fund of
matrimonial property and to provide for its subsequent
distribution.
"The marriage contract simply regulated the sums - tocher
and donation propter nuptias - that were to be contributed
-280-
by the parties respectively, their interests in the amount
and the manner in which it was to be invested."
Marriage could be regarded as a joint venture, with husband
and wife usually contributing to its financial base. For
the property owning classes, assets donated by both sides
to the marriage would frequently be invested to provide an
income for the couple. The marriage contract could be used
to set out the contributions to be made, how they were to
be invested and what returns each individual should
receive.
In this early form, marriage contracts did not exclude the
husband's jus mariti or jus administrationis. They could
not be used to disturb the legally imposed combination of
property of husband and wife.
"This right of the husband in the goods of the wife is so
great, that hardly can it be avoided by the pactions of the
parties.
They adhered to the common law system which granted control
and lordship to the husband, while regulating the specific
assets of the couple and ensuring that there would be
adequate individual return for investment in the
matrimonial fund. Marriage contracts of this kind were
limited in their aim to the fixing of specific provisions
in relation to donation and distribution. They were unable
to alter the husband's power over the property of the
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marriage, but they did offer certainty as to the share of
each spouse in the property.
It was not until the decision in Walker v. Creditors of her
Husband^-*- that renunciation of the jus mariti was
permitted. Previously it had been argued that,
"such a renunciation or reservation, being a right
conceived in favour of the wife, fell under the jus mariti
and disappeared."^
By 1745 it was agreed that the right of administration
could also be renounced.^ Once it had been accepted that
the jus mariti and the right of administration could be
excluded, the scope for marriage contracts widened
considerably. Thus marriage contracts could be used to
avoid the automatic combination, on marriage, of the
property of husband and wife. By means of a marriage
contract, a separate estate could be maintained for the
wife.
The details of each contract varied widely, reflecting
their original purpose of allowing for specific variation
of the general law. There emerged, however, a common
pattern by which the husband would make financial provision
for his wife following his death usually by means of an
annuity or liferent and the wife might make similar
provision for her husband. It was likely that provision
would also be made for any children of the marriage. Clive
describes a common form which such a contract might take.
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It would often provide for a liferent or annuity for the
wife on her husband's death. He explained that the wife
would usually be given a fixed annuity and she might also
be given a
"liferent of conquest which would give her an equitable
share in any subsequent improvement in"
her husband's circumstances.^
An effective and increasingly popular method of securing
these obligations was by the setting up of a trust.
"With the growth of the trust concept ... it became more
common for the husband to convey property to trustees to be
held perhaps for himself in liferent, then for his widow in
liferent and for the children in fee."
In this way the husband was guaranteeing future provision
for the wife. Her financial security on her husband's death
was achieved by placing a portion of the husband's property
out of his reach and beyond the reach of his creditors.
Money given to the wife, perhaps by her father, might also
be placed in the hands of trustees. This, in conjunction
with an exclusion of the jus mariti, would provide for the
wife a separate income while preventing her from misusing
the capital. This device meant that,
"wealthy fathers who wanted to protect their daughters from
being financially dominated by their husbands after
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marriage could convey or bequeath property in trust t
the income to their daughters for their separate use."
Such a scheme would protect the individual needs of the
wife. The setting up of a trust to control the wife's
property was an important way of guarding her against the
business failures of her husband.^ Where the jus mariti
was excluded by private contract or later abolished by the
Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act 1881, the wife's
moveable property remained her separate estate.^ She might
nonetheless gift or loan some of this property to her
husband or it might in some way become mixed with his
estate. There was concern that such property could then be
attached by the husband's creditors. In particular, if the
husband became bankrupt, the trustee could claim the wife's
moveable property which had become inmixed with that of the
husband. Only if her property was kept separate from her
husband's would it escape from her husband's creditors and
one way of keeping her property quite separate was to place
it in trust.
A wife's property could be placed in trust not only to
protect her from her husband but also to protect her from
herself. Having encouraged a woman in the altruism
necessary for maintenance of the family community, there
was fear lest she might foolishly indulge her husband or
children at the expense of her capital. Murray said of the
modern marriage contract that its purpose was,
-284-
"by means of the machinery of a trust, to place a certain
amount of the property of the spouses beyond their own
control ... to protect the wife s property against her
husband and against herself."-5
The court in Menzies v. Murray-5-*- held that the provisions
of a marriage contract relating to the spouses and their
children could not be renounced, even where all parties
consented. Thus a wife, perhaps under pressure from her
husband, could not reject the protection that had been
negotiated for her. Further protection for the provisions
of the contract could be secured by constituting them as
alimentary in nature. Such alimentary provisions could not
s ?be alienated or attached by creditors. Under such
provisions, the capital would remain within control of the
trustees who would pay an annuity to the beneficiary solely
for the purpose of his or her maintenance.
The use of marriage contracts and later of trusts, if not
inspired by a desire for female equality, was at least a
recognition of the danger inherent in a regime which
assumed a common interest and which gave the husband full
responsibility for it. It recognised that there were
potentially conflicting interests within the supposed
community and that the supremacy of one spouse might
threaten and override the claims of the other family
members. Marriage contracts and trusts were signs that the
promoted image of community and common interest within
marriage might not be achieved. The common law which
combined property of husband and wife continued to mirror
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the doctrine of spousal unity. In private, however,
marriage settlements recognised the potential conflicts of
interest within this community. They were an admission of
the tension between the officially promoted unity of the
relationship and the interests of the individuals.
The marriage contract was largely a device of protection.
In its earlier form it was designed to protect both parties
by ensuring that individual contributions to the
matrimonial fund were clearly set out and that provision
was made for subsequent sharing of the fund. With the later
use of marriage contracts to exclude jus mariti and jus
administrationis, there was protection for the wife by
giving her a separate estate. By excluding the husband's
rights over his wife's property, recognition was given to
the wife's individual existence as a property owner. She
was protected from the potential dangers of her property
being placed in the hands of her husband. Protection of the
individual spouses could also be seen in the use of trusts
as a means of securing financial provision. By placing
property in the hands of trustees, provision could be
ensured for husband or wife. Property placed in trust was
set aside from the couple's existence. In particular the
wife's property could be set apart from her husband and
protected from his creditors. It was thus safe from
individual failings or misfortunes of the spouses.
The use of trusts was also an interesting recognition of
the tension between individual and community or between
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selfishness and altruism within marriage. The trust was
seen as a means of protection not only from others but from
oneself. Where a father set up a trust in favour of his
daughter, the aim was often to protect the wife not only
from her husband but also from herself. There was here an
attempt to balance the altruism which would be expected of
the wife within marriage with the selfishness necessary to
maintain her wealth. Property placed in trust would provide
an income for the wife, while maintaining the trust fund
outwith her hands and thus preventing the wife from
squandering it on her husband and children.
SECURE COMMUNITY
A more recent attempt to deal with the tension between
community and individual can be seen in the Matrimonial
Homes (Family Protection)(Scotland) Act 1981. This
legislation was introduced to deal with two separate but
often interlinking problems - the precarious position of a
spouse who does not have legal title to occupy the
matrimonial home and the problem of domestic violence. Both
of the problems can be considered in terms of conflict
between individuals within the relationship and in terms of
conflict between the interests of individual and community.
The matrimonial or family home has already been discussed
with regard to developments in the personal relationship of
marriage and in relation to property. Stone describes the
importance of the family home as offering private domestic
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space within which family relationships can develop. The
family home ideally would provide a purpose for the wife
and a haven for the husband. In terms of property the
family home also became increasingly important, with a rise
in house building and owner occupation.
There appears to be a similar pattern, with the family home
gaining in prominence both in terms of marriage and in
terms of ownership, but closer analysis suggests that there
is ground for conflict. The image of the companionate
marriage, developing within the matrimonial home, is an
image which is based on community. What is envisaged is the
close co-existence of husband and wife (and their children)
within the home. The growth in home ownership however is a
development which is primarily individualistic. While
occupation is envisaged on a communal basis, for many
families ownership is an individual right.
Where a house is owned or rented in the name of the
s ^
husband,
"the wife is in no better position than a mistress or a
trespasser or squatter whom the husband can turn out of the
home at will."-5^
Traditionally in Scots law the position of the wife in
relation to the family home has been precarious. In terms
of the marriage relationship it has been promoted as her
domain but in legal terms her right to occupation against
the wishes of her husband has been limited. It has been
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argued that, under the common law, a husband had power to
evict his wife by reason of his right of administration.55
This was later held to be the case even where the house was
owned by the woman. With the decline of the husband's power
over his wife and with the changing legal rules and the
move towards separation of property, the right to evict
came to be based simply on legal title to the house. In
MacLure v.MacLure,5^ it was confirmed that a husband's
right to evict his wife was a result of his rights as owner
or tenant. It was entirely separate from their conjugal
relationship. A wife could be evicted in the same way as a
stranger. This was in keeping with the move towards a
system of separate property which takes no account of the
relationship between husband and wife. The application of
the separate property principle to the matrimonial home
gave virtually unrestricted power to the legally entitled
spouse to evict his wife.
There was a stark contrast between, on one side, the
ideology of community which characterises marriage and the
modern nuclear family and, on the other, the strict
individuality of property rights. The family home was
regarded as vital to the proper existence of the domestic
family but, in terms of ownership, Scots law took no notice
of the relations between husband and wife. It was difficult
to sustain a property system which paid no heed to the
marriage relationship in particular when it allowed the
eviction of a wife from the setting in which the
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relationship encouraged her to exist. The existing law
denied to a wife who had no legal title to the home,
"the ability to regard the family home as a place in which
she will be able to live and bring up a family secure fPQm
the possibility of sudden dispossession by her husband."
The power of the husband to evict his wife at will pointed
out the impoverished nature of community within marriage
and within the home. The negative "conception of community
as an idyllic haven of harmony"-'®; "as the absence of
conflict"-'0 was exposed by the husband's power to control
occupancy of the family home. By giving occupancy rights
only to the legal owner, Scots law was supporting a
community which depended for its existence on the goodwill
of one individual. Co-residence in the family home was not
based on mutual rights but was based on dependency and
avoidance of conflict.
The Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act
1981, therefore, aimed to provide some security for
individual spouses to co-exist within the matrimonial home.
In the Act there was a move to satisy the view that,
"the spouses will regard the home as 'theirs'. The law
should treat it as 'theirs'.""0
Certainly the ideology of marriage and the image of the
modern companionate marriage raise the expectation that the
home is "theirs." Strict separation of property
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demonstrated that fulfillment of this expectation depended
not on any legally recognised relation between the family,
as a community, and the home but on the continuing
indulgence of the legally entitled spouse. It was,
therefore, recognised that there was a need to give legal
expression to the wife's expectation of security in the
family home.
The way in which the Matrimonial Homes Act chose to provide
this security left largely untouched the separate property
system. By section 1 of the Act a wife, by virtue of
marriage, is given an occupancy right in the matrimonial
home. Occupancy rights do not affect ownership of the home
but they provide means whereby its use can be controlled.
To give co-ownership of the matrimonial home, as an
incident of marriage, would have been an extreme departure
from the system of separate property. It would have
heightened the emphasis on individuality within marriage.
It would have introduced fixed shares and the notion of
division into the couple's relations to their home. By
using occupancy rights it might be argued that the law is
strengthening the community nature of marriage. Occupancy
rights arise automatically on marriage but in the absence
of conflict within marriage they are likely to remain
dormant. They provide legal recognition of the importance
of communal life to the ideal of the companionate marriage
and they give a secure legally enforceable basis to this
ideal. Although occupancy rights are an automatic incident
of marriage, the power to regulate them rests with the
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court. Thus in cases of conflict between spouses, as to the
home, the court is able to regulate occupancy of it.
A specific situation which requires regulation of occupancy
rights in the matrimonial home is that of domestic
violence. Alleviation of this problem was the second
purpose of the Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection)
(Scotland) Act. Giving the wife a legal right to occupy the
home was seen as a prerequisite for dealing with the
problem of domestic violence. Knowledge that her continued
co-existence in the home depended on the permission of her
husband might force a woman to endure domestic abuse. An
absence of conflict, meaning acceptance by the wife of her
husband's violence, was often perceived by the woman as the
only way of maintaining the community's residence.
The problem of domestic violence is a threat to the safety
of the matrimonial home and it threatens to disrupt the
harmony of the family's existence. The choice often
presented to a victim wife was to continue suffering in
order to preserve the community of her family or to expose
the individual pathology existing within it and as a result
risk the family's disintegration and the possible
homelessness of some of its members. Existing legal
remedies were largely ineffective and therefore the
Scottish Law Commission suggested a scheme of protection
against domestic violence which was based in the
matrimonial home and which would minimise damage to the
family community.
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The protection which the Act provides against domestic
violence is based on regulation of occupation of the
matrimonial home. While the legislation does not interfere
with ownership of the home, the provisions relating to
domestic violence represent a significant interference with
personal enjoyment of property. Section 4 gives the court
the power to exclude a spouse from the matrimonial home.
The expectation was that this would usually mean exclusion
of the spouse who has legal title to the house. The
availability of an exclusion order makes it possible to
divide the incidents that are normally part of ownership
between two individuals. Where a legally entitled husband
is excluded from the matrimonial home, he retains ownership
of the property but use and enjoyment of it is reserved for
his wife.
The court will only make an exclusion order where,
"it appears to the court that the making of the order is
necessary for the protection of the applicant or of any
child of the family from any conduct or any threatened or
reasonably apprehended conduct of the non-applicant spouse
which is or would be injurious to the physical or mental
health of the applicant or child."0
There is in this provision evidence of a move away from the
priority of individual property rights to the idea of an
imposed scheme of regulation which promotes personal
values. An individual claim over the house as a simple
asset is subsumed to the continued use of it as a family
home. Protection of the wife and children and their
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continued co-existence within a family unit is seen as more
important than fulfillment of legal expectations arising
from individual rights. The Scottish Law Commission in its
Memorandum said that,
"the sole situation in which exclusion is justified is
where it is necessary for the protection of the remaining
members of the family."0
The provisions of the legislation dealing with domestic
violence demonstrate a preference for the continued
existence of the family community within the matrimonial
home over the protection of an individual legal right. They
give legal recognition to the promoted community nature of
marriage by securing the rights of members of the community
to occupy the matrimonial home. At the same time, they
introduce a mechanism whereby there can be judicial control
of occupancy of the matrimonial home. Through this
regulation, the threat of individual deviance can be
lessened and a reduced family - usually the wife and
children - can continue to occupy the family home. The
Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981
is strong evidence of the tension between individual and
community within marriage. It tries to deal with the
individual who threatens the secure and loving family
community; a problem which, in legal terms, is exacerbated
by a tension between individual legal rights of ownership
and the community expectation of residence.
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CONTRACT/RECOMPENSE
In their Consultative Memorandum on Matrimonial Property,
which formed the background to the Family Law (Scotland)
Act 1985, the Scottish Law Commission note that,
"in the modern search for a matrimonial property law which
combines fair sharing with equal rights, and practicability
with ^protection, traditional divisions are breaking
down. ^
There are signs of a movement away from either community or
separate systems to systems that combine elements of both.
The compromise which the Scottish Law Commission finally
chose was one which left largely unchanged the principle of
separation of property during marriage but encouraged
sharing of a fund of matrimonial assets on divorce.^
In the provisions of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985
there is evidence of a movement away from an
individualistic approach to the property of husband and
wife. There are signs of a rejection of a strict liberalist
approach to property and recognition of a continuing need
for protection rather than individual autonomy. The values
of the individualist market require some modification in
the community of the family.
Liberalism championed the model of freedom of contract.
This was a model which infiltrated marriage, with the
contractual nature of the marriage relationship being
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emphasised. Legal discussion of the categorisation of
marriage as a contract pointed out the inadequacy of this
legal relationship as a description of marriage. Marriage
was contractual only to the extent that it required consent
for its formation. The legal relationship of marriage
depended on consent. Without consent there could be no
marriage. But marriage only possessed this one aspect of
contract. Having exchanged consent the parties were not
free to negotiate their own terms. The basic obligations
and incidents of marriage were not to be left to individual
negotiation but were imposed by the law of husband and
wife. Individuals chose to enter into the contract of
marriage but the terms of the contract were imposed on
them.^
Following the Married Women's Property reform legislation,
one aspect of marriage was, however, left entirely to the
individual negotiation of spouses. With the abolition of
the jus mariti and the husband's right of administration,
the law of husband and wife provided no terms of the
contract to deal with property. It was left to the parties
to regulate their own financial affairs. Perhaps because of
the ideological force of the split between property and
affect, between love and money; perhaps because of trust in
the obligations of the personal relationship, few couples
make their own contractual provision.
Under Scots law, husband and wife can make contracts with
each other. By section 3(1) of the Married Women's Property
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(Scotland) Act 1920 a married woman is "capable of entering
into contracts ... as if she were not married." There
continues, however, to be a difference in the legal
approach to such agreements. It is an essential of contract
that there is an intention to create legal relations. That
is what distinguishes a social arrangement from a legally
enforceable contract. The general rule is that there is no
need for express intention. The law will imply an intention
to create legal relations. In domestic contracts, however,
the opposite rule applies. The law assumes that agreements
made within a domestic context are not meant to be legally
enforceable. It is always possible for a husband and wife
to expressly state in their agreement that they intend it
to be a legally binding contract but in the absence of such
express statement the court will assume the opposite.
Spouses are free to enter into contracts with each other in
relation to rights in and ownership of property. They must
show, however, an extraordinarily strong expression of
intent. Otherwise the presumption will prevail that
domestic agreements are not intended to be contractual.
There is a more abstract barrier to the creation of
domestic contracts to be found in the presentation of a
split between community and contract. A contrast is present
between community, with the implication of altruism and
contract, as a legal method inspired by selfishness.^^
Marriage is presented as a relationship of community which
requires altruism. It provides the balance to a public
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world of commerce which is ordered by selfishly inspired
contracts.^ This is a split which emerged strongly from
Lawrence Stone's discussion of changes in marriage: his
description of a move from marriage based on the commercial
values of property to marriage based on affect.
The public/private distinction as employed by liberals also
contributes to the dominance of a contrast between the
public world of commercial contract and the natural private
world of altruism. It identifies contract with selfishness
and contrasts this with the altruism which is supposed to
flourish within marriage.
Perhaps as a result of these influences contract is little
used to regulate inter spousal relations, in particular, in
terms of their property entitlements. Frequently there is
no provision in relation to the property of the couple and
their legal rights are, therefore, calculated in accordance
with the individualistic principles of ordinary property
law. Rather than deal with these continuing images and
ideals of selfish market and altruistic family that direct
our thinking about relations between individuals, the law
is moving away from strict principles of separation and
strict application of contract. Increasingly,
"judges and lawyers ... faced with practical problems
arising from human relationships, have concluded that pure
autonomy, extreme liberal freedom of contract, is often
unjust and ought not to be pursued at the expense of all
other values."""
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In the principles of the Family Law (Scotland) Act for
awarding financial provision on divorce^ and in the
presumption in favour of equal ownership of household
assets,^® there are signs of recognition of the potential
unfairness of "pure autonomy" and "extreme liberal freedom
of contract." There is evidence in the legislation of a
move towards a recompense based model for dealing with the
financial and property relations of spouses. It seems that,
"it is departing from the individualistic, self-reliance
stance of traditional law."
In considering the property rights of spouses on divorce
and their rights during marriage to household assets, the
legislation demonstrates a break with the traditional
individualistic contractual approach. Under the separate
property system, the legal right to assets depends on who
has purchased or acquired the goods. In the absence of any
contractual agreement between spouses regulating ownership,
the law ascribes ownership to the purchaser or the spouse
who has otherwise acquired title to the goods. This system
concentrates on the individual's legal rights and takes no
notice of the relationship between the couple or of their
expectations about ownership which may have been influenced
by the nature of their relationship. On the strength of the
community of the marriage relationship, or the dependency
and support existing within it, the spouses may expect to
have some security in assets that have been acquired and
used in the course of the relationship. A system which
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awards rights only on the basis of legally binding
agreements will often fail to satisfy these expectations.
The principles for property sharing contained in the Family
Law (Scotland) Act demonstrate, however, a willingness to
look at the marriage relationship in order to satisfy
7 ?
reasonable expectations produced by it. Compensation can
be given for undue reliance within the relationship or for
benefits given. Thus there is increased security for those
who have acted altruistically within marriage and have done
so without a contractual base. The property owner may be
liable to compensate the other spouse, not on the basis of
a contractual agreement but on the strength of a benefit he
has received. There are signs of a
"willingness to reduce ... the property rights of an owner,
in order to give, effect to a moral ideal, that another
party who had benefited an owners ... be entitled to be paid
for the value of that benefit.
The Family Law (Scotland) Act, therefore, suggests some
legal recognition of the continuing tension between
community (altruism) and individualism (selfishness) within
the relationship of marriage. It avoids a questioning of
the fundamental distinctions that influence perceptions of
relations between individuals both in the commercial market
and the family. Instead it moves away from the traditional
approach of contract. It moves towards a more flexible,
recompense based model of dealing with property rights.
With the exception of the presumption in favour of equal
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sharing of household assets during marriage,^ it postpones
consideration of property rights until divorce. This is in
keeping with the move away from contract. Contractual
rights arise on the giving of a promise whereas rights
based on recompense arise only after the benefit-conferring
action has been completed. Thus altruism can continue to be
encouraged during the relationship with individual
compensation postponed until its breakdown.
CONTINUING TENSION
Histories of change^"* may point towards increased emphasis
on individualism and may indicate a clean break between
individual and community. Consideration of specific points
of intersection between marriage, law and property
demonstrate that instead of a break there is a continuing
tension. The common law system of community appeared to
preclude the possibility of tension by denying the legal
existence of one of the spouses. The system of separate
property that followed gave supremacy to individual legal
rights and took no account of this tension. Both systems
have proved to be inadequate and can be criticised for
their failure to recognise an inevitable tension. An
insistence on either community or individualism hides the
co-existence of elements of community and individualism
within marriage and in relations between marriage, property
and law.
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To confine marriage within one side of this perceived split
between community and individual gives rise to unfulfilled
expectations. By defining marriage as a relationship of
community, conflicting interests between individuals will
be obscured and classified as deviant. By characterising
marriage as individualistic, there will be no recognition
of real interdependent relations. What is needed is not
modification of either community or separate property
systems but a recognition of the specific relations between
marriage, property and law. Their interaction should be
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MARRIAGE, PROPERTY AND LAW; CONCLUSIONS
In the introduction to this thesis I set out my intentions
and the pattern of study that I would follow. It was not, I
said, a thesis "inspired by the desire to change or to
solve." Its purpose was to explore relations between
marriage, property and law. In my conclusion, therefore,
there will be no solutions, no proposals for reform.
My interest in marriage focused, to a large extent, on ways
of thinking about the relationship. I was interested in
considering perceptions of marriage and its relations with
property and law. These might be popular perceptions or
perceptions reflected in legal rules. It has been argued
that,
"ideas are a causal factor in the development of the
conjugal family.nl
I wanted to consider some of the ideas which seem to
inspire the marriage relationship and to analyse their
influence in legal rules. If I hoped to produce reform it
was in ways of thinking about marriage rather than
primarily in legal regulation.
CONFUSED RELATIONS
I began with the proposition that there was confusion.
There was confusion within marriage and its relations with
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property and law. The interrelation, if indeed there was
any, between these three elements had become obscured. My
intention was to demonstrate this confusion, to seek to
explain its development and in so doing to re-establish
links between marriage, property and law.
For families of the past, property seemed to be an
important factor in marriage. Economic considerations and
questions of ownership influenced marriage patterns and
legal regulation of property was an accepted element of
marriage. There was a clear link between marriage and
property in the feudal society where the,
"family was not. perceived to be separate from the rest of
economic life."^
Within this society, there seemed to be no split between
marriage and property. They were recognised as being
closely linked. Through later stages of society, property
continued to be relevant to spouse selection and the
formation of marriage, with its importance being reflected
in the common law and in the use of marriage contracts.
This acceptance of property as an integral part of marriage
contrasted with more modern perceptions of a split.
Romantic notions of marriage reject property concerns and
this split gives rise to a reluctance to consider the
economics of a marriage relationship.
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"Family ideology over the past 150 years has laid greater
emphasis on the romantic and companionate ideal of marriage
while disguising its fundamental economic ... aspects."
Regulation by husband and wife of their property can be
used to question the quality of their personal
relationship. Practical links between marriage and
property, however, are evident. There is, for example, an
obvious link between marriage and the matrimonial home. The
importance of property is often made clear in the bitter
disputes which can accompany divorce. In discouraging
husbands and wives to recognise the importance of their
rights to property, and to regulate them accordingly, there
seemed to be a false denial of links between marriage and
property. An image of the marriage relationship appeared to
mislead spouses into a misunderstanding of connections
between marriage and property.
HISTORICAL CHANGE
The foundation of this thesis lay in tracing developments
from a system which recognised a close link between
marriage and property to one which obscured or denied any
link. Beginning with these popular perceptions, it was my
intention to search through historical studies of legal
reform, of marriage and of property to discover what
evidence there was to support them. In isolated histories




The changes in the legal rules governing the property of
husband and wife could be stated briefly as being the
abolition of the jus mariti and the husband's right of
administration. These two rights which had previously
brought all of the wife's property within the control, and
to some extent ownership, of her husband were gradually
modified and finally removed. In the wake of reform,
Scotland was left with a system of separate property. It
was a system by which marriage had no effect on the rights
of ownership of husband and wife.^
These reforms, while specific in their nature, brought with
them implications of change. They signalled a break with a
system which had been characterised as one of community.
They signalled a break with legal regulation of marriage.
They also signalled a decrease in the importance of
property as an element of marriage. They suggested a break
between marriage and property.
Marriage0
Summarised conclusions, drawn from Lawrence Stone's
historical account of changes within marriage, pointed
towards a split between the personal relationship of
marriage and property. The property centred family was
replaced with the affective family. Increasing emphasis was
focused on the companionate marriage, a relationship of
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personal affective significance. This modern marriage was
characterised by privacy and an emphasis on its individual
members. The marriage unit, the nuclear family, was
distinct from the network of wider kin; it was closed off
in terms of physical space and it was inward looking and
self centred. The relationship was inspired by individual
J
desire and its success depended on individual affective
relations. In terms of the marriage relationship there
appeared to be three major trends: property to affect;
openness to privacy, and community to individual.
Property^
The third history was one of property. I considered changes
within property and, in particular, in terms of matrimonial
property. Here too there were signs of change. There was a
shifting balance between heritable and moveable property.
Land became of reduced significance to the majority of
families with an accompanying move from inheritance or
marriage to earned income as the primary source of property
acquisition. Changing rules of succession and of entail
suggested a loosening of links between a specific family
line and land. Growth in the importance of moveables and,
in particular, money encouraged a view of property as the
asset in itself rather than the earlier view of property as
a right in something: usually a right in land. This
changing vision of property, accompanied by the growing
importance of earned income, placed emphasis on the
individual nature of ownership. The individual's right to
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the enjoyment of his labour was a strong influence in
theories of property.
IMAGES OF CHANGE
In presenting these three histories there was a dual
purpose. First, I wanted to provide some knowledge of
concrete change in each of these three elements. Secondly,
I wanted to use these histories to investigate my
proposition that there was confusion with regard to
relations between marriage, property and law. It was my
suggestion that an image of marriage had developed which
was influential in perception and regulation of the
relationship.
From the histories of law and of marriage, there emerged a
similar vision of marriage and its relation with property.
There were several consistent characteristics. There was a
split between marriage and property; a move towards privacy
and an emphasis on the individual. It might be argued that
law was responding to an image or an ideal of marriage.
While the presence of these characteristics in legal terms
was real - there was a move towards individualism and non-
regulation - I was unconvinced about the emerging ideal of
marriage.
In Part II, I set out to question the image that had
emerged. I adopted two methods of questioning. The first
was to consider what had been left out of the historical
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accounts® and the second was to engage in criticism of
Q
their historical method .
"One strategy for attacking the illusion is to point to
1 n
'the facts' left out of the ideological representation. "J-
I suggested that what had been left out of the account of
the legal reforms and of Stone's account of marriage was an
historical consideration of property.
The legal reforms abolished the jus mariti and the right of
administration. These were elements of a legal system
devised in a society where land was the most important type
of property. Various arguments can be made as to why they
were finally removed but one obvious reason for their
ultimate disappearance was a change in property. A growth
in moveable property and the declining importance of land
to most families questioned the continued relevance of the
husband's rights. The old rules had become unsuitable
partly because of changes in property and changes in
relations between marriage and property. No positive
attempt was made, however, to consider what new types of
property there were, what new types of relations might
exist between marriage and property and how these could be
regulated. On the basis of the demise of one type of family
property, there was a withdrawal of specialised legal
regulation.
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Similar criticisms can be made of Stone's account of change
within marriage. He describes the demise of the property
centred family. This was a family form wherein choices were
governed by considerations of land and status. It was part
of a social structure which was dependent on land and in
which marriage was an important factor in land acquisition
or transfer. Within this system marriage could bring
benefits in property but it could also pose a threat and,
therefore, it was reasonable for property and economic
concerns to play an important role in the matchmaking
process. Stone describes the decline of this system in
terms of the lessening control of parents and kin over the
choice of spouse. It provides, for him, a break between
marriage and property. As property concerns exert less
influence over mate selection thus he concentrates on
personal choice and the growth of affect. He balances the
property centred family against the affective family. The
decreasing significance of land was the main factor in the
demise of the property centred family. Stone fails to
consider the emergence of new types of matrimonial property
and thus suggests a definite split between marriage and
property.
In both the legal reforms and Stone's account of marriage,
there was a failure to deal with the third history - the
history of property. The image of a split between marriage
and property can be questioned by pointing to the facts
that were left out. By reinserting aspects of change within
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property it becomes clear that there continue to be
1 1
relations between husband and wife and property.
Thus, by supplying the missing facts, one characteristic of
the modern image of marriage is questioned. A growing
emphasis on affect has not replaced property. Affective
relations may be closely interlinked with physical
property. While this characteristic may be questioned, it
remains fully enshrined in the legal rules, which following
abolition of the jus mariti and the husband's right of
administration, recognised no link between marriage and
property.
My second method of questioning the image of marriage was
to engage in criticism of traditional methods of presenting
family histories. There are frequent tendencies to conceive
of the family as a universal form; to view it from the
inside as a distinct unit and, in tracing its development,
to fit it within one side of established dichotomies.
In the legal reforms there was an apparent tendency to
prioritise the land owning family; to make the rules to
suit the family which owned significant property and which
made private arrangement for its regulation.^ similarly in
Stone's account there is a tendency to prioritise the
family of a particular social class: the property centred
family of the land owning class or the companionate
• • 1 ^
marriage of the middle class. The presentation of one
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family form as The Family may create a misleadingly clear
picture of change.
In historical accounts of the legal reforms, which took no
notice of changes in property, and in changes within the
marriage relationship there was a tendency to give rise to
unjustified expectations. The legal reforms signalled a
move towards non-regulation and towards individual
equality; both of which were presented as benefits. The
practical effects only become clear when these legal rules
are inserted within economic and personal relations. In
Stone's account, a family centred history presents a shift
from an open family towards a closed and private nuclear
unit and from a relationship influenced by the good of the
community to a relationship which emphasised the
individuals. They thus give undue emphasis to changes
within the distinct unit of marriage without taking notice
of its changing external relations.
The desire to discover deaths or splits within family
existence forces relations to be compartmentalised. In both
the legal reforms and Stone's historical account there is a
tendency to divide relations between public and private and
between community and individual. The retreat of legal
regulation signals an increasing privatisation of marriage;
an image which is amply supported in Stone's picture of the
closed off, isolated, private nuclear unit. The removal of
the jus mariti and right of administration are classified
in terms of a move from a community property system to a
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system of separate property which preserves individual
rights. This shift is also evident in Stone's history in
the declining control of community over marriage and the
rise of individualism. In both histories, there is a
tendency to portray marriage as fitting within one side of
an opposing pair and in so doing to strengthen the
existence of these splits.
By criticising these three aspects of traditional
historical presentation, I highlighted the dominant
characteristics that emerged from the histories of legal
reform and marriage and questioned their validity. Having
set up the argument that a move from property to affect;
from public to private, and from community to individual
were dominant characteristics of an image of marriage and
having suggested that they contributed to a false image, I
went on to consider these characteristics in terms of
specific points of interaction of marriage, property and
law.
REFLECTED IMAGES
What was the significance of the ideology of marriage? It
was my intention to suggest that a false image of marriage
and its relations with property might lead to unfulfilled
expectations and to inequitable legal results. It might
also restrict the vision of those within marriage and those
who sought to regulate it. The characteristics which had
emerged were reflected in the legal rules. They were also
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present in terms of property. Within the relationship of
marriage, however, their existence was to some extent an
illusion.
"...the occupancy of a status ... may ... justify special
expectations.
The occupation of a status within marriage may give rise to
expectations based on the ideology of marriage. An image of
marriage as affective and private may give rise to
expectations. The characteristics of this image may be
present in economic terms and may also influence the legal
rules.
In Part III, I considered aspects of relations between
marriage, property and law which reflected the image of
apparent splits between property and affect, public and
private, and community and individual. This was not
intended to be a comprehensive display of the effect of a
family image on legal regulation. It was intended to be a
collection of fragmented reflections. Thus, in concluding,
I do not want to universalise or simplify aspects of that
discussion. In considering the infiltration of an image of
the marriage relationship into relations between marriage,




Within the image of marriage there was an implication of
progress. Both the history of the legal reforms and the
changes within marriage were presented in terms of
straightforward improvement. The trends - property to
affect; open to private, and community to individual - were
presented in Stone's account as progress. In general legal
terms, they were also presented as progressive. When we
consider property changes and the interaction of all three
elements, their beneficial nature is questioned.
A shift from property to affect as the focus of marriage,
was presented by Stone as a benefit. The removal of the
husband's rights to his wife's property were also generally
welcomed. Thus, the indication of a legal split between
property and marriage was seen as a benefit. Neither
accounts, however, looked at changes in property. They
failed to consider new relations between marriage and
property. Giving greater freedom to individuals to choose
their own spouse and freeing wives from the inequalities of
the common law system, clearly appeared to be beneficial.
The progress lay, however, within the bounds of the
specific circumstances. It might be argued that there is
nothing inherently good in a split between property and
affect. What is required is recognition of the relations
that do exist. The presentation of a progressive split
between property and affect effectively denied the
continuing relations between property and marriage.
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The move from openness to privacy was similarly presented
by Stone as improvement. The autonomy granted to the
spouses and the physical privacy of the nuclear family's
domestic space may be welcomed as benefits for the family.
Increased space for personal development and improved
living conditions were welcomed. The move from enforced
regulation of marriage to a system which allowed for
private ordering may also be seen as progress. Allowing
individuals to regulate their own affairs was seen as
preferable to the enforced pattern of regulation which had
operated at common law. Privacy, however, should not be
hailed as inherently good. In both the legal reforms and
Stone's account, the benefits of privacy were emphasised by
comparison with the defects of the preceding system.
"Privacy itself is an empty concept, only when the private
area has been ... found to be desirable, does it make sense
to champion it."-'"-'
The questionable desirability of privacy, as it applies to
marriage and relations between spouses and property, has
been discussed in chapter 7. The potential threat of the
private home becomes obvious in relation to domestic abuse.
The benefits of privacy are doubted when it hides
dependency and hierarchy.
For Stone and for the legal reforms, a switch from
community to individualism was also presented as
improvement. Stone emphasises individualism as signalling
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progress from the previous enforcement of the common good.
In so doing he takes little account of the benefits of
community and obscures the community nature of the
companionate marriage. With the removal of the husband's
rights to his wife's property, the legal reforms reject a
system of community. This is generally presented by the
legal writers as a progressive reform. The defects of the
community system of the common law, however, had more to do
with inequality than with community. Individuality is
therefore credited with a beneficial nature which it does
not inherently possess.
INCONSISTENT TERMS
The characteristics which have been highlighted have
different implications within each of the three elements of
marriage, property and law. In the histories of legal
reform, marriage and property similar characteristics
emerge. Privacy and individualism figure in each of the
three accounts. While the elements of law, marriage and
property appear outwardly to have developed consistently
with each other, on closer analysis, a potential for
conflict can be shown.
For Stone, privacy means separation of the nuclear unit
from the concerns of their wider family and from the prying
eyes of the neighbourhood. Privacy means isolation within
the matrimonial home and an emphasis on personal relations.
In terms of property, privacy means an emphasis on the
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individual's right to property; the right to use and abuse
it free from public regulation. It can also mean the
physical privacy of property and its personal domestic
nature. In legal terms, privacy means non-intervention by
law. It denotes a sphere of private autonomy where
relations are ordered by private contract.
Individualism, similarly, may have different meanings in
each of the elements. For Stone, individualism means an
emphasis on individual choice, individual personality,
individual desire and individual affective relations. In
terms of property, individualism suggests a system which
emphasises the selfish rights of the individual owner; the
relationship between individual owner and asset.
Individualism, in law, emphasises the supremacy of
individual legal rights. It is characteristic of the
liberal notion of individual legal autonomy.
Although the same words have emerged from each of the
elements of law, marriage and property, it is misleading to
assume that they have the same meanings. The implications
of these terms can be different within each element. It is
deceptively simple to see a progressive fit between
marriage, property and law. Whereas there may be an outward
appearance of consistency, there may in fact be discord.
For Stone, for example, individualism within marriage
entailed a partnership of different individuals. Within the
companionate marriage, there was recognition of the
different roles of husband and wife. Legal individualism,
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however, takes no account of difference. This inconsistent
understanding of individualism may produce unfair results.
DICHOTOMIES
The development of these characteristics has been portrayed
in terms of dichotomies: property/affect; public/private,
and community/individual. This method contributes to the
vision of marriage as an isolated, closed compartment.
Relations within marriage are constrained by the limits of
these dichotomies. Thus the options of the spouses and the
potential for reform are restricted. Fran Olsen has argued,
in her discussion of the family and the market, that by
dividing aspects of life into one or other side of an
1 fi
opposing pair, the options for change are limited. All
that reform can do is to make either side more like itself
or more like the other.
As discussed above, the characteristics of modern marriage
were presented as benefits. Affect, privacy and
individualism were portrayed as the good side of the
dichotomies with property, public and community as the bad.
Specific developments were thus fitted into a predefined
system of divisions. This structure contributed to the
creation of an ideal of marriage, constrained by the limits
of these dichotomies. Discussion in chapters 7 and 8 has
shown that marriage and its relations with property and law
fit inconsistently within one or other side of the pair. A
study of specific relations, specific points of
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intersection, highlight the inadequacy of these
dichotomies. By placing the marriage ideal within one
compartment, a standard is set. Failure to remain within
that compartment constitutes deviance. Rather than
recognising the inadequacy of the structure, there is a
tendency to highlight the failure of the individual.
There has been legal recognition, both under the common law
system and under the modern system of separate property, of
the indequacy of a marriage ideal. Failure to conform with
the dominant image has at times been recognised by
1 7modification of the legal rules. ' Modifications have been
made, however, largely on the basis of the dysfunction of
the rules and with relatively little consideration of the
perceptions, the images, the ideology which surround
marriage. The image of the romantic, affective relationship
appears to be sustained by the denial of an underlying
involvement with property. The result may be the
perpetuation of a vulnerable relationship, open to the
threat of emerging property dispute. A realisation of the
image which surrounds marriage and its links with property
and law might permit the development of better informed,
realistic and more secure relations.
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